Problems for modal reductionism : concrete possible worlds as a test case by Nassim, Jonathan
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Problems for Modal Reductionism: 
Concrete Possible Worlds as a Test Case 
 
Jonathan Nassim 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Birkbeck, University of London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is entirely my own. 
  
Jonathan Nassim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3	  
Abstract  
 
This thesis is an argument for the view that there are problems for Modal 
Reductionism, the thesis that modality can satisfactorily be defined in non-modal 
terms. 
I proceed via a case study of David Lewis’s theory of concrete possible worlds. This 
theory is commonly regarded as the best and most influential candidate reductive 
theory of modality. Based on a detailed examination of its ontology, analysis and 
justification, I conclude that it does badly with respect to the following four minimal 
conditions on a satisfactory reductive theory of modality: that it be (a) genuinely 
reductive, (b) materially adequate, (c) conceptually adequate and (d) that its 
justification provides good reason to think it true. 
These problems for Lewis’s theory are not, I suggest, due to his idiosyncratic 
conception of possible worlds as concrete entities. Rather, because Lewis’s theory 
can be seen to represent an important class of structurally similar reductive theories 
of modality, the problems for Lewis’s theory generalise to problems for these other 
theories. This suggests that Modal Reductionism is unpromising. In the light of this, 
the alternative approach to understanding modality, Modal Primitivism, appears 
more attractive. 
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The music-master praised the bird tremendously, and insisted that it was much 
better than the real nightingale, not only as regarded the outside with all the 
diamonds, but the inside too. ‘Because you see, my ladies and gentlemen, and 
the emperor before all, in the real nightingale you never know what you will 
hear, but in the artificial one everything is decided beforehand! So it is, and so 
it must remain, it can’t be otherwise. You can account for things, you can open 
it and show the human ingenuity in arranging the waltzes, how they go, and 
how one note follows upon another!’ (Hans Christen Anderson, ‘The 
Nightingale’) 
 
 
 
 
 
And now the question remains whether we would give up our language-game 
which rests on ‘imponderable evidence’ and frequently leads to uncertainty, if 
it were possible to exchange it for a more exact one which by and large would 
have similar consequences. For instance, we could work with a mechanical ‘lie 
detector’ and redefine a lie as that which causes a deflection on the lie detector. 
So the question is: would we change our way of living, if this or that were 
provided for us? – And how could I answer that? (Ludwig Wittgenstein, in 
Kerr 2008, 91) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7	  
Contents  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.0 Modal Reductionism...………………………………………………….... 
1.1 Concrete possible worlds as a test case………………………...………… 
1.2 Testing reductive theories of modality…………………………………… 
1.3 Thesis outline…………………………………………………………….. 
 
Chapter 2: Lewis’s theory of modality 
2.0 Lewis’s theory of modality………………………………………………. 
2.1 Relating Lewis’s ontology of worlds and the analysis of modality……… 
2.2 Justification………………………………………………………………. 
 
Chapter 3: Ontology 
3.0 Introduction…………………………………………………………….… 
3.1 Why Lewis needs a principle of plenitude………………….……………. 
3.2 Ways…………………………………………………………….………... 
3.3 The objection to Ways………………………………………………......... 
3.4 The Principle of Recombination and its roles in Lewis’s theory………… 
3.5 Objections to The Principle of Recombination..….……………………… 
 3.51 Irreducible modality…………………………………………….… 
 3.52 Material inadequacy………………………………………….…… 
3.6 Assessment…………………………………………………….…………. 
 
Chapter 4: Analysis 
4.0 Introduction………………………………………………………………. 
4.1 Lewis’s analysis is a conceptual analysis..………………………..……… 
4.2 Lewis’s arguments for the conceptual connection……………………….. 
 4.21 Translation with explicit rules……………………………………. 
 4.22 Clarification and critique…………………………………………. 
 4.23 Translation without explicit rules………………………………… 
 4.24 Clarification and critique…………………………………………. 
 4.25 The Theoretical Identification Argument………………………… 
 
9 
19 
26 
33 
 
 
36 
39 
49 
 
 
56 
57 
60 
65 
68 
71 
72 
75 
85 
 
 
87 
93 
100 
101 
102 
109 
111 
120 
8	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.26 Clarification and critique…………………………………………. 
4.3 Arguments against the conceptual connection……………….…………... 
 4.31 Quantification and understanding………………….……………... 
 4.32 Ontological commitments and modal concepts…………………... 
4.4 Assessment…………………………………………….………………..... 
 
Chapter 5: Justification 
5.0 Introduction………………………………………………………………. 
5.1 Lewis’s conception of primitives………………………………………… 
5.2 The Modal Reduction Principle and The General Reduction Principle….. 
5.3 The Unification Principle and The Truth Principle……………………..... 
5.4 Objections to Lewis’s justification…………………………….…………. 
5.5 Assessment……………………………………………….………............. 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.0 Results of the case study………..………………………………………... 
6.1 Generalisations and their limitations…………………….………….......... 
6.2 Modal Primitivism………………………………….…………………….. 
 
Bibliography……………………………………………………...…………. 
121 
129 
130 
137 
145 
 
 
147 
153 
156 
162 
168 
183 
 
 
185 
187 
201 
 
207 
 
9	  
Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.0 Modal Reductionism  
 
I 
 
Modal notions play a fundamental role in our lives and thought. Without them there 
is much we could not think or do. The connections between modality and the 
standard accounts of decision-making, free will and moral responsibility, abundantly 
illustrate this. On such accounts, decision-making involves deliberation about which 
of a range of possible actions should be performed, and the selection of one to 
perform.1 Free will places a modal condition on decision-making: having a free will 
requires being free to choose to do a possible action, say F. We are free to choose to 
do F only if we could have chosen to do another possible action G. Finally, moral 
responsibility requires free will, for we are not morally responsible for actions with 
respect to which we couldn’t have chosen otherwise. So modality comes into 
standard accounts of: (a) what we reason about when we deliberate, (b) what we aim 
to bring about when we act, (c) free will, and so (d) moral responsibility. 
 
These connections suggest a rather platonic picture of humans: their rational minds 
can escape this earthly realm, and gain access to the paradise of possibility. In this 
realm an array of possible actions are contemplated and one selected to bring about 
by action. This platonic picture is supported by a long tradition which seeks to 
distinguish humans from other animals by virtue of our access to the realm of 
possibility, and the use we make of it in our lives. Often our access to it is tied to our 
linguistic capacities. For instance, Pettit holds that  
 
it is certainly unlikely that non-human animals live up to the picture [of 
decision-making as a matter of deliberation+decision]. According to this 
description, the options over which agents deliberate are abstracta, not 
concreta: they are ways things might be – ways the agent knows how to make 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The possibilities we deliberate about might be thought of as agential possibilities, courses of action the agent 
takes themselves to be able to perform. Thanks to Nathan Hauthaler for this point. See Hansson 2005, 23 and 
Pettit 2010, 256. 
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things be – not actual events. Human beings can identify such entities on the 
basis of how they answer to abstract linguistic specifications: my helping the 
beggar is that way things may be, under certain contextual constraints, which 
makes true the sentence ‘I help the beggar.’ But it is unclear how creatures 
without language could ever entertain options as objects of thought and ever 
deliberate about the features of such options.2 
 
On such a view, animals lacking language lack modal concepts; and lacking modal 
concepts, they cannot grasp thoughts about different possible courses of action, at 
least not as such; and so they cannot choose between possible courses of action; so 
they do not have free wills; so they cannot be morally responsible agents. They are 
imprisoned in actuality. Our capacity to partly shape the course of our lives by 
stepping back from the actual has been contrasted with non-human animals, the 
course of whose lives is taken to be wholly dictated instead by instinct or desire. Just 
as grasp of thoughts about what is possible has been taken to be a mark of our 
humanity, so too has the grasp of thoughts about what is necessary. The intellectual 
grasp of the necessary truths of mathematics, logic, metaphysics and ethics are 
plausibly distinctively human achievements.  
 
The connection of modality with both practical and theoretical concerns appears to 
mean that without grasp of modal notions, our ability to act and shape the world to 
fit our ends would be impoverished, for our understanding of the world would be 
impoverished. Bertrand Russell pictured the world as at bottom non-modal and so 
fully graspable without modal notions. This is a world in which  
 
propositions are simply true or false and there is no such comparative and 
superlative of truth as is implied by the notions of contingency and necessity.3 
 
If this were our picture of the world, then we would appear to be blind to the modal 
facts. We would be able to encompass modal facts in our thought, but not as such. 
We could, for instance, imagine different ways the world could be, but fail to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Pettit 2010, 256. See also Nicholas Rescher whose idealism leads him to the view that “the domain of 
possibility is the creation of intelligent organisms and is a realm accessible to them alone” (1979, 171). 
3 Russell 1994, 520. 
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understand the imagined scenarios as possible; or we may think that a necessarily 
true proposition which contains no overtly modal content – such as the proposition 
that 2+2=4 – is true, but fail to think of it as necessary. Or we could think that some 
event either happens or doesn’t, but not think that it happens contingently or 
necessarily. Or we could think that something has or fails to have some property, but 
not that it does so accidentally or essentially. The non-modal picture of the world – 
which Kit Fine characterised as an “on-or-off” affair4 – makes no room for modes of 
truth or existence, modes which appear fundamental to our ordinary characterisations 
of the world, and our understanding of ourselves as free, morally responsible agents 
in it. Such a picture, closed in upon the actual, threatens to deprive us not only of the 
resources to decide and act in the world, but also of access to distinctions that seem 
vital to characterise it as we find it. 
 
II 
 
Frank Ramsey said that 
 
Philosophy must be of some use and we must take it seriously; it must clear 
our thoughts and so our actions.5 
 
Given the importance of modality to our thoughts and actions, in heeding Ramsey’s 
advice we may start by clarifying our thoughts involving modality. How is that to be 
done? There are two very general philosophical approaches to clarifying concepts. A 
notion can either be reductively analysed or it can be taken as primitive. Both 
approaches connect the target concept with other concepts, but do so in very 
different ways. 
 
A reductive analysis of a concept k defines it without making use of k or concepts 
which themselves can be defined in terms of k. We might think of a reductive 
definition as ‘unpacking’ the complex contents of k, or as ‘separating’ k into its 
constituent notions. By seeing what these constituents are and how they are related, 
our understanding of k is thereby illuminated. By contrast, taking k as primitive is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Fine 2005, 1. 
5 Ramsey 1990, 1. 
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matter of treating it, in some theory T, as not being reductively definable in T.6 
Treating k as primitive doesn’t, unlike a reductive definition, immediately illuminate 
k. Illumination is to be found, on this view, not by ‘peering inside’ k, but rather by 
understanding k’s role in the theory in question; understanding, that is, how k 
connects to other notions by, for instance, partially defining them. It is in this sense 
in the consequences of treating some notion as primitive that our understanding of it 
is improved.  
 
To illustrate these different approaches, take the concept of knowledge, which has 
been treated in both ways. It used to be thought that it could be reductively analysed 
in terms of truth, belief and justification.7 It is now taken seriously that knowledge 
should be taken as primitive, and that our understanding of knowledge is improved 
by showing what we can do with it.8 For instance, Keith Hossack takes knowledge to 
come into the definition of various notions including: concept, content, reference, 
truth, necessity, consciousness, language, testimony and others.9 On this primitivist 
view of knowledge, theorising about knowledge becomes theorising in terms of it, 
rather than dissecting it. 
 
Disagreements about what the right theory in some area of philosophy is often come 
down to disagreement about which notions should be taken as primitive and which 
can be reductively defined. This point is particularly important in an intellectual 
climate in which a premium is placed on theoretical simplicity, which is partly 
measured by the number of types of primitive notions a theory employs (see Chapter 
5 for discussion). Take for instance, the disagreement between Bertrand Russell and 
Donald Davidson about the conceptual priority of the notions of mind and truth. 
Russell takes the concept of mind as primitive, and uses it to illuminate the concept 
of truth. Truth, according to his correspondence theory, is defined in terms of a 
relation between a mental representation and a fact.10 So the concept of mind figures 
in the definition of truth. Davidson, by contrast, takes the concept of truth as 
primitive, and uses it to illuminate the concept of mind. According to his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 I understand a concept to be primitive if it does not admit of a reductive definition. 
7 For suggestive remarks see Plato’s Theaetetus, 201d-210a and his Meno 98, in Plato 1997. 
8 This is partly due to the influence of Williamson 2000. 
9 Hossack 2007. 
10 See Russell 1951, 119-30. 
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interpretationism, to have a mind is to be able to speak a language, and to be able to 
speak a language is to be able to grasp content, and content is understood in terms of 
truth-conditions. So the concept of truth figures in the definition of mind.11 
 
Which notions a philosopher takes to be primitive, and which not, typically reflects 
their deepest philosophical convictions. Materialists, for instance, will want to 
exclude any mental primitives from their theory; nominalists will want to exclude 
any abstract primitives; extensionalists will want to ensure there are no modal or 
other intensional primitives in theirs. There is in general no way of deciding, before 
theorising, whether a notion can either be reductively defined or else should be taken 
as primitive.12 Whether, for instance, what is good is defined by God’s will, or 
whether He wills the good because it is good, is a matter which might be advanced 
by trying to reduce the good in terms of God’s will, and see where it gets you. 
Likewise with modality: the attempt to reduce it helps us come to a clearer view on 
whether it is primitive, and if so, why. 
 
III 
 
This thesis aims to explore the problems which arise when modal notions are treated 
as reducible to the non-modal. Modal Reductionism is the thesis that the concept of 
modality is ultimately definable non-modally. Modal Non-Reductionism is the 
denial of this thesis. Modal Non-Reductionism can be further divided into Modal 
Primitivism, the view that the concept of modality is coherent and primitive, and 
Modal Incoherentism, which is the view that the concept of modality is incoherent, 
and so neither primitive nor reducible.13 In this thesis I take for granted the 
coherence of modal notions, and so set aside Modal Incoherentism.  
 
Modal Reductionism is opposed to irreducible modality. It takes modal notions to be 
legitimate only in virtue of being defined by non-modal notions which are in good 
standing. Modal Reductionism is not to be confused with Modal Eliminativism, 
which is the thesis that modal notions should be excised from our theories 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Davidson 1984, 134-35. See also, Ellis forthcoming. 
12 Stalnaker makes this point in his 2012, 4. 
13 I sometimes, for ease of expression, write as if there is a single modal notion, and sometimes as if there are 
several. I don’t mean to imply by this a stance on the issue of the number of (basic) modal notions there are. 
14	  
altogether.14 One motivation for Modal Eliminativism is the Quinean view that 
because science doesn’t employ irreducible modality in its theories, we have no good 
reason to hold onto it in our philosophy. Modal Reductionism, on the contrary, is an 
attempt to preserve modal notions in a theoretical context in which they are not 
primitive. The reductionist and primitivist, unlike the eliminativist, agree on the 
theoretical value of modal notions, but see different ways of preserving them. The 
reductionist by fitting them into a non-modal theory, and the primitivist by fitting a 
modal theory around them.  
 
The value that modal concepts have in philosophy – arguably reflecting their 
importance outside of it – can be seen in the central roles they play in the 
philosophical disciplines of ethics, logic, semantics, metaphysics, philosophy of 
action, philosophy of science, and others.15 Modality is taken to come into the 
definitions of some of the core notions of these disciplines. For instance, in logic it is 
usually taken to be a necessary condition of a logically valid argument that its 
conclusion must be true if its premises are (equivalently: it is impossible for its 
premises to be true, and conclusion not true). The reductionist and primitivist both 
accept the centrality of modal notions to philosophy, their disagreement lies in 
whether, in the last analysis, it is correct to define them non-modally. Indeed, for 
both types of theorist, it is the prevalent use of modality throughout philosophy that 
provides the theoretical justification for reducing it or taking it as primitive. 
 
Fine has suggested that the value of modal notions has been exaggerated. He 
diagnoses a condition called “modal mania”, whose characteristic symptom is 
“seeing everything as modal”.16 We might distinguish two senses of ‘modal mania’: 
first, the view that modal notions – of some kind or other – come into the definition 
of many other philosophically significant notions; second, the view that necessity or 
possibility in particular (the notions formalised by the box and diamond) come into 
those definitions. But even if the value of modal notions has been exaggerated in one 
or other way, and modality comes into only some philosophically important notions, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 While both theories may endorse the view that ‘we can do without modal notions’, the modal reductionist 
means we can do without irreducible modal notions, while the modal eliminativist means we can do without 
modal notions altogether, reducible and irreducible notions alike. 
15 See e.g., Lewis 1986, 3. 
16 Fine 2005, 9. 
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then it is still the case that whether modality is reducible or primitive is a 
fundamental question with important consequences for our thought both about 
modality itself and about the notions it helps to define. 
 
IV 
 
Ironically, one of the reasons for defining various concepts in modal terms in the 
first place – and so perhaps, one explanation for modal mania – was the impression 
that modal concepts were not ontologically committing, that they didn’t function like 
quantifiers.17 Modality seemed to be a way, particularly in the philosophy of 
mathematics and metaphysics, of saying what we want to say about, say, numbers or 
properties, without incurring commitment to dubious entities. This modalising 
strategy proved attractive and low-cost from the perspective of anti-platonist 
epistemology or nominalist metaphysics. The irony is that the now dominant view of 
modality is that it should be analysed in terms of quantification over possible worlds. 
The problematic status of these entities raises questions about the true cost of the 
modalising strategy. For while a modal analysis of, say, properties as sets of 
possibilia might avoid commitment to some troublesome objects – the properties – it 
brings with it commitment to others – the possibilia. Many of the same epistemic 
and metaphysical concerns about numbers and properties that motivated the 
modalising strategy in the first place, now infect the objects in terms of which 
numbers and properties were defined. 
 
Quantificationism is the thesis that modal notions are ultimately to be analysed in 
terms of quantification, specifically, first-order quantification.18 Quantificationism 
says nothing particular about the kind or kinds of objects modal claims quantify 
over; it is a thesis about the structure of modal claims, not about which objects fill 
the structure. Quantificationist theories typically take the following ‘Leibnizian’ bi-
conditionals to capture de dicto modality:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See e.g., Putnam 1967, and Field 1989. 
18 By ‘ultimately’ I mean, in the last analysis. So Quantificationism is incompatible with the view that modal 
claims can first be analysed in quantificational terms, which are then further analysed in non-quantificational 
terms. Non-quantificationist theories may treat modal claims quantificationally, but treat them as a manner of 
speaking, to be ultimately understood in non-quantificational terms. 
16	  
 Possibly p iff p is true at some possible world w 
 Necessarily p iff p is true at every possible world w 
 
where the interpretations of ‘true at’ and ‘possible world’ are left open for each 
variant of the view to specify.19 The basic thought behind this approach to modality 
is that possibility claims are existential quantifications, necessity claims are universal 
quantifications – the rest is detail.20 It is an ontological conception of modality: 
modal discourse is discourse about objects. Quantificationism is an instance of a 
general approach to a variety of concepts, which involves treating them as first-order 
quantifiers over a domain of objects. For instance, Temporal Quantificationism is the 
thesis that temporal discourse is really quantification over instants of time. The 
logical relations between temporal notions are explained in terms of the existence of 
instants of time and certain relations which hold between them. 
 
A large class of reductive and non-reductive theories of modality agree with the view 
that modal notions are guided by the logic of the quantifier. Quantificationism, 
which cuts across the reductive/non-reductive distinction, comes in two versions: 
Reductive Quantificationism and Non-Reductive Quantificationism. Reductive 
Quantificationism is the thesis that modal notions are ultimately to be analysed in 
terms of quantification over possible worlds which are themselves definable without 
recourse to modal notions (see §6.1 for more discussion of this thesis). Non-
Reductive Quantificationism treats possible worlds either as indefinable entities 
classified as irreducibly modal, or else as entities definable in irreducibly modal 
terms. The various different versions of Reductive and Non-Reductive 
Quantificationism are typically formulated by keeping the Leibnizian structure of the 
analysis more or less fixed, and varying the entities which are taken to play the role 
of possible worlds.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 I leave aside de re modality to simplify my exposition. I also simplify by treating Quantificationism as the 
thesis that modal claims quantify over possible worlds. This is the dominant view, but there are other views we 
should rightly class as quantificationist, according to which modality is to be understood primarily in terms of 
quantification over possibilities which are incomplete or not fully determinate, meaning that the possibility 
doesn’t determine for any proposition p, whether p or ¬p. Rumfitt, for instance, holds that possibilities are best 
thought of as ways things might be, not fully determinate ways things might be. He explains why he thinks this as 
follows: “since I am unsure whether there is even a fully determinate way things actually are, I prefer to avoid 
commitment to possible worlds” (Rumfitt 2010, 55). See Hale 2013, 230-31, and Humberstone 1981. 
20 For a similar point see Dunaway 2013, 152-53. 
17	  
Before Saul Kripke’s seminal work in providing a semantics for modal logic, 21 there 
were two dominant competing approaches to reducing modality. The first was the 
traditional rationalist view that modality is apriority; on this view, modality is not a 
notion drawn from ontology, but from epistemology.22 The second was the view that 
modality is analyticity; on this view, modality is a notion drawn from semantics.23 
Since Kripke, however, Quantificationism has dominated the field; rather than ask 
which kind of analysis of modality is correct, philosophers began asking which 
version of Quantificationism is correct. And since Kripke, Reductive 
Quantificationism has become the standard way to implement Modal Reductionism. 
 
The original motivation for treating modal notions as quantifiers likely came from 
noticing analogies between our modal, temporal and quantificational discourse.24 
Specifically, between the notions of all, always and necessarily and likewise some, 
sometimes and possibly. These analogies led philosophers to take seriously the 
thought, as Arthur Prior put it (without endorsing the view), that  
 
the modal expressions ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’ are disguised 
quantifications of some sort.25 
 
The analogies indicate that modal and temporal discourse disguise a hidden 
parameter: a possible world, or instant of time variable over which modal and 
temporal notions quantify. I won’t go through all the analogies here, but I mention 
two by way of illustration.  
 
First, modal, temporal and quantificational notions have ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ forms. 
The strong form: ‘Necessarily p’ implies, but is not implied by ‘p’. ‘Always p’ 
implies, but is not implied by ‘p’. ‘For all x, fx’ implies but is not implied by ‘fa’. 
The weak form: ‘Possibly p’ does not imply, but is implied by ‘p’. ‘Sometimes p’ 
does not imply, but is implied by ‘p’. ‘For some x, fx’ does not imply, but is implied 
by ‘fa’. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See Kripke 1963. 
22 For a contemporary defence of this position see Hossack 2007 and forthcoming. Elements of the ‘modality is 
apriority’ view also exist in Edgington’s 2004. 
23 For a contemporary defence of this view see Sidelle, 1989. 
24 See Cresswell 2014 for a historical overview. 
25 Prior and Fine 1977, 10. 
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Second, the way modal, temporal and quantificational concepts interact with truth-
functional connectives also run in parallel. For instance, ‘necessarily’, ‘always’ and 
‘all’ distribute over implication. From ‘Necessarily (if p then q)’ we can infer ‘If 
necessarily p then necessarily q’. From ‘Always (if p then q)’ we can infer ‘If always 
p then always q’. From ‘Anything, if it is f, is g’ we can infer ‘If everything is f, then 
everything is g.’26 
 
The widespread acceptance of Temporal Quantificationism, and its ontological 
commitment to instants of time gave succour to quantificationist treatments of 
modality. Modal and temporal claims came to be understood ultimately in terms of 
non-modal or non-temporal claims being true of possible worlds or instants of 
time.27 If analyses of modal and temporal claims are cut from the same pattern, and 
if temporal claims are understood in terms of quantification over instants of time, 
and so incur commitment to these instants, it seems hard to resist both the view that 
modal claims quantify over possible worlds, and so are committed to their existence. 
If we are not instrumentalists about instants of times, what would warrant going 
instrumentalist about possible worlds?  
 
Despite the powerful analogies, and despite the theoretical power of possible world 
semantics, it is still possible to resist their pull. Prior, for instance, accepts the 
analogies, but takes them to teach the opposite lesson from the one that is standardly 
taken. On his view, rather than think of modal logic as quantificational logic in 
disguise, the reality is quite the opposite: quantificational claims are really modal 
claims in disguise.28 I won’t develop this intriguing view, but that it exists is worth 
bearing in mind. For it raises the prospect that the very idea of an object is modal; if 
so, then the quantificationist strategy for reducing modal discourse to discourse 
about non-modal objects is self-defeating, even if it can be carried through.29 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This closely follows ibid., 15. 
27 Ibid., 103. 
28 Ibid., 10-11 
29 For a connected view see Hale 2013, 32. 
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1.1 Concrete possible worlds as a test case 
 
I 
 
In this thesis, I look at the prospects for Modal Reductionism by examining David 
Lewis’s theory of modality as a test case. We might think of Lewis’s theory as a 
materialistic reduction of modality.30 Just as he attempts to fit the mind into a theory 
in which there are no irreducibly mental entities,31 so he attempts to fit modality into 
a theory in which there are no irreducibly modal entities. According to his theory of 
modality, there exist an infinite number of concrete possible worlds and our modal 
notions are quantifiers over them.32 So he is a reductive quantificationist. It is the 
concreteness of Lewis’s worlds which primarily distinguishes his position from the 
more common quantificationist view that possible worlds are abstract entities of 
some kind.33  
 
We can think of Lewis’s perceived need for worlds as arising from two sources: 
Quinean, and anti-Quinean. The first is his commitment to the Quinean project of 
analysing any notion worth its salt in first-order terms, according to which if a non-
logical notion is to be analysed, it must be a matter of quantification over entities for 
which a criterion of identity can be given. Worlds, understood as concrete objects, 
appear to fit the bill. The second source is Lewis’s anti-Quinean enlargement of the 
range of beliefs which philosophy ought to take seriously. For Quine, our non-
scientific beliefs need not be incorporated into the systematic theory of the world 
which it is, he thinks, philosophy’s job to build. For Lewis, on the other hand, 
theorising must respect as many of our beliefs as possible, scientific and non-
scientific alike, and that includes our modal beliefs. This leads to Lewis expanding 
the range of notions which, prima facie, are worth their salt to include modal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Throughout the thesis I distinguish between the ontology of Lewis’s theory of modality, that is, the objects it 
postulates, from its analysis, that is, its reduction of modal notions. Lewis’s theory as a whole comprises the 
ontology and analysis. 
31 See Lewis 1983, 99-107. 
32 I will refer to Lewis’s concrete possible worlds as simply ‘worlds’ and reserve ‘possible world’ as a 
placeholder which various theories of modality fill in with different entities. For Lewis’s definition of worlds see 
§§2.0-2.1. 
33 For a qualification of this view of concrete worlds, see Lewis 1986, 75-76. Their concreteness amounts to their 
being composed of objects standing in spatio-temporal relations, and so appear to allow for a reduction of 
modality. 
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notions.34 The problem then arises that the physical world doesn’t appear to have 
enough in it to sustain the truth of our modal discourse.35 So given Lewis’s reductive 
quantificationist analysis, he seems compelled either to admit non-modal non-
concrete entities for modal discourse to be about, or else say that our world is but a 
small part of concrete reality – and of course he chooses the latter. 
 
We can divide Lewis’s theory into an ontology of worlds, and an analysis of modal 
notions in terms of these worlds. The ontology – which Lewis calls ‘Modal Realism’ 
and I sometimes call ‘Lewis’s ontology’ – postulates a plurality of worlds, entities of 
the same kind as our universe.36 Modal Realism shouldn’t be confused with the 
whole of Lewis’s theory of modality. It is, he writes, simply “an existential claim”.37 
The analysis – which I sometimes call ‘Lewis’s analysis’ – interprets modal claims 
as quantifying over these worlds. The theory is that logical space is constituted by 
the totality of concrete worlds – ‘the pluriverse’ – and modal claims represent states 
of that space. 
 
This framework provides what Lewis needs to attempt a rehabilitation of modal 
notions in a first-order extensional language which lacks primitive modal 
vocabulary. But there is a suspicion that, as Fine put it, “au fond, Lewis is as 
sceptical of modal notions as Quine.”38 I will find, in this thesis, that there is much to 
recommend Fine’s thought, though I complicate it by arguing, in Chapter 3, that 
Lewis’s theory in fact requires the very modal notions it appears sceptical of (see 
§3.3 and §3.51). 
 
II 
 
Why use a test case? I initially wanted to approach the question of whether Modal 
Reductionism is a plausible thesis as an argument from elimination: taking the full 
range of plausible candidate reductive theories, I aimed to examine each of them, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See Loux and Zimmerman (2003, 1-7) for discussion of this point and relevant references. 
35 See Fine (2005, 1-2) for this point.  
36 Lewis 1986, 2. There is, in Lewis’s theory, no categorical distinction between the actual world and other 
worlds. In whatever sense our world exists and is real, so too are the others. His ontology is, in this sense, flat or 
egalitarian. A possible world is just a world; a possible individual is just an individual which is part of a world. 
37 Lewis 1986, viii. 
38 Fine 2005, 2. 
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and determine whether they satisfactorily reduce modality. I soon discovered this 
project was too large, but also that a detailed study of Lewis’s theory could throw 
considerable light on a number of structurally similar theories.39 
 
But why train a test case on Lewis’s theory in particular? The idea that doing so 
could provide some general illumination would appear to be shot down by Lewis’s 
own admission that 
 
if the common suspicion of possible worlds…were justified, then my analysis 
could have little interest...40 
 
By ‘possible worlds’ Lewis here refers to the worlds of his theory, that is, universes 
such as the one we inhabit. Given that people still are sceptical of such worlds other 
than our own, isn’t he right to think that this scepticism would drain his analysis of 
modality of interest?41 The answer to this and the reasons his theory is worthy of 
serious study are as follows. Despite the widespread scepticism directed at Lewis’s 
ontology, (1) his theory and the methodology that animates it and comes into its 
justification are hugely influential, (2) his theory is the best regarded candidate 
reductive theory, and (3) it is representative of reductive quantificationist theories of 
modality. These points – which I elaborate below – mean that Lewis’s theory is well 
suited to be a test case for Modal Reductionism.42  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 There appears to be a pattern amongst post-Kripke theories of modality: they treat modal notions in 
quantificational terms, only really disagreeing about what they quantify over, and what the precise form the 
analysis should take. Lewis’s theory is a reductive implementation of this quantificationist pattern. 
40 Lewis 1973, 84. 
41 See e.g., Sider 2003, 187 and Williamson 2013, 18. 
42 A personal reason why Lewis takes centre stage is that I find his theory the simplest and clearest of any theory 
of modality. I take the following points Moore gives as reasons to study Utilitarianism, as similar to the reasons I 
believe it worth studying Lewis’s theory of modality. He writes: “One great difficulty which arises in ethical 
discussions is the difficulty of getting quite clear as to exactly what question it is that we want to answer. And in 
order to minimise this difficulty, I propose to begin…by stating one particular theory, which seems to me to be 
peculiarly simple and easy to understand. It is a theory which, so far as I can see, comes very near to the truth in 
some respects, but is quite false in others. And why I propose to begin with it is merely because I think it brings 
out particularly clearly the difference between several quite distinct questions, which are liable to be confused 
with one another. If, after stating this theory, we then go on to consider the most important objections which 
might be urged against it, for various reasons, we shall, I think, pretty well cover the main topics of ethical 
discussion, so far as fundamental principles are concerned” (1975, 5). 
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III 
 
(1) Influence. Fine writes that “our current thinking about modality…has been 
heavily influenced, one might even say dominated” by the views of W.V. Quine and 
Lewis.43 I believe the influence Lewis has had on current thinking about modality is 
not so much from what his theory says – in particular, that there exist a plurality of 
worlds – but rather from how he theorises about modality and how he justifies his 
theory. Robert Stalnaker puts this point as follows: 
 
while most philosophers reject David Lewis’s modal realism, most have 
accepted his way of framing the debate about possible worlds.44 
 
This ‘framing’ involves three guiding assumptions. First, theorising about modality 
should take the form of a reductive conceptual analysis, because a central aim of 
theorising is to decrease the number of primitive notions a theory employs, and 
thereby unify it. Second, it should aim at giving the truth-conditions of modal 
discourse in a first-order language. Or, as Timothy Williamson more colourfully has 
it,  
 
The effect of Lewis’s influential and ingenious system-building was to keep 
centre stage a view that imposed Quine’s puritan standards on modality long 
after Quine’s own eliminativist application of those standards had been 
marginalised.45  
 
Third, the theory should be justified and judged in terms of a trade-off between its 
simplicity and fit with current beliefs. Here is Stalnaker again, noting his concerns 
about Lewis’s methodology, but confirming its influence: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Fine 2005, 1. 
44 Stalnaker 2012, 10. Similarly, in a discussion of philosophical methodology, Oliver writes that “Lewis’s work 
on metaphysics has had an overwhelming influence on subsequent investigations” (1996, 2). 
45 Williamson 2013, xiii. 
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I have alluded to the cost-benefit, reflective equilibrium methodology that 
Lewis articulated and made fashionable, but I have my reservations about this 
way of thinking about the way philosophical alternatives are evaluated.46 
 
Not only is Lewis’s theory of modality influential in the above respects, but so too 
are his other works – many of which are applications of his Modal Realism. This is a 
view supported by Peter Unger, who holds that Lewis is  
 
by far the most influential philosopher over the last fifty years. No one else 
comes close…47 
 
Unger’s view is supported by a study of citations in top philosophy journals from 
1993-2013 by the sociologist Kieran Healy. She concludes part of her study – which 
places Lewis’s On The Plurality of Worlds (henceforth ‘OPW’) as the second most 
influential book, after Kripke’s Naming and Necessity – with the following: 
 
No one else comes anywhere near…[Lewis’s] level of influence….For 
someone who didn’t intend to be a systematic philosopher, Lewis certainly 
ended up having a systematic effect.48 
 
(2) Best regarded. Whether Lewis’s theory is the best candidate reductive theory is 
not clear without examining his theory and comparing it to rival theories. What is 
clear is that his is widely recognised as being the best available candidate reductive 
theory. Though few can bring themselves to believe Lewis’s theory, the high regard 
in which it is held by philosophers who are themselves held in high regard, is at least 
a reason to take it very seriously. Below are a few examples. Ted Sider, for instance, 
writes: 
 
Lewis’s analysis of modality is compelling and comprehensive…Hard as they 
are to accept, only Lewisian possible worlds allow a non-circular analysis of 
possibility and necessity; that is their great advantage…49 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Stalnaker 2012, 5. 
47 Unger in Boey 2014. 
48 Healy 2013. 
49 Sider 2003, 193, my italics. 
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Joseph Melia is likewise impressed by Lewis’s analysis: 
  
the theoretical benefits of…[Lewis’s]… theory of modality are enormous. All 
the benefits of possible worlds semantics, the analyses of our modal thought 
and talk, the analyses of counterfactuals and the like are all available to the 
extreme modal realist.50 
 
He goes on to give 
 
thanks to David Lewis, who has forged [Modal Realism]…into the most 
comprehensive, comprehensible and detailed theory of possible worlds, one 
can now see that extreme realism [that is, Modal Realism] offers the greatest 
benefits of all possible worlds theories currently on offer. Indeed, arguably, it 
is the one theory that truly delivers on all counts.51 
  
Ross Cameron concurs: 
 
The most well worked out attempt at a reduction of the modal to the non-
modal remains David Lewis’s Modal Realism.52 
 
Jessica Wilson offers a more qualified endorsement: 
 
Not everyone has reductive ambitions, but supposing one does, 
Lewis’s…appears to be the best game in town; and even those not inclined 
towards modal reductionism can acknowledge that if one can generate the 
space of metaphysical modality in non-modal terms, that would be a win from 
the perspective of ontological and/or ideological parsimony.53 
 
Finally, on Bob Hale’s measured view, Lewis’s analysis is the “most promising – 
and indeed the most prominent – approach to modal reduction…”54 Further evidence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Melia 2003, 121. See also ibid., 110. 
51 Ibid., 102. 
52 Cameron 2012, 1. 
53 Wilson forthcoming. 
54 Hale 2013, 70. 
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of the good repute of Lewis’s theory is that his analysis is often used as a benchmark 
for testing the quality of other analyses. Showing that some analysis is equivalent to 
his, is widely accepted as showing that it is a satisfactory analysis.55 
 
(3) Representative. A final reason to use Lewis’s theory as a test case for Modal 
Reductionism is that it can represent, in a range of respects, a number of similar 
theories to it. Lewis’s theory shares a common structure with reductive 
quantificationist theories: (a) a range of entities are postulated, and (b) modality is 
reductively defined in terms of quantification over these entities. We may expect that 
if, as I take to be the case, the central problems for Lewis’s theory are not primarily 
due to what is peculiar to it – for instance, the concrete nature of his possible 
worlds56 – but are rather due to its structure, then we may expect that these problems 
will most likely also exist for theories with the same structure. 
 
IV  
 
This thesis locates several problems for Lewis’s theory by asking how it does with 
respect to the minimal conditions I outline in §1.2. I will argue that his theory 
appears to do badly with respect to these conditions, and assuming that the 
conditions are reliable, they indicate problems for this theory. In brief, these 
problems are that his theory appears (a) not to fit with our view of the truth of certain 
modal claims, (b) not to fit with our view of the content of certain modal claims, (c) 
not to be genuinely reductive of modal notions. Finally (d) the justification Lewis 
advances for his theory is unsatisfying. I argue, in Chapter 6, that these conclusions 
can be generalised to other theories, which supports the view that there are problems 
for Modal Reductionism. I will suggest at the end of this thesis that Modal 
Primitivism doesn’t appear vulnerable to the problems of Modal Reductionism, and 
seems to be a more promising alternative to it. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See e.g., Rosen 1990 and Hossack, forthcoming, who both use Lewis’s theory as a benchmark. 
56 Other accusations against Lewis’s theory that I set aside, which are also about its ontology, include: that it is 
profligate, that it is inconsistent with the results of physics and that we cannot know about the existence or nature 
of worlds. For these points see Sider (2003, 187), Williamson (2013, 18) and Rosen (1990, 339-40), in that order. 
In this thesis I focus less on problems with Lewis’s worlds than problems with what he does with them. 
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1.2 Testing reductive theories of modality 
 
I 
  
This thesis uses Lewis’s theory of concrete possible worlds as a test case for Modal 
Reductionism. I understand modal reductionist theories as attempts to give 
conceptual analyses of modality. What is wanted, generally speaking, from such 
reductive theories of modality? Such theories should illuminate our modal notions by 
means of a reductive analysis. Theories which meet the following four minimal 
requirements are good candidates for doing so. 
 
(A) A conceptual analysis of modality must be part of a theory that at least preserves 
what we take the truth-value of modal claims to be – it must not fly in the face of our 
modal intuitions about the modal claims we would be inclined to say are true, under 
suitably reflective conditions. While this requires that the theory validate our pre-
theoretical view of the truth of these claims, it doesn’t require that their meaning or 
truth-conditions are validated by the theory 
 
(B) A further demand on conceptual analyses of modality is that they must be 
faithful to our modal concepts – they must not fly in the face of our intuitions about 
what the meaning or truth-conditions of our modal claims are, under suitably 
reflective conditions. A theory may accurately model patterns of belief – understood, 
for instance, as patterns of assent or dissent – while being unfaithful to the content of 
belief.  Consider, for instance, discourse about rabbits. A theory of our rabbit-talk 
may preserve the pre-theoretic view of the truth-value of rabbit-talk, by identifying 
rabbits with numbers. Such a theory would be unfaithful to our concept of rabbit, 
which is the concept of an animal, not a number.57 There are very many theories 
which can correctly reproduce our patterns of belief, but which fail to capture what 
we mean by those claims. 
 
(C) There are two parts of a theory, and if a theory is to be reductive, no part of it 
may employ irreducibly modal notions. This means neither the analysans of an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 For more on rabbits, see Quine 1960, 29. 
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analysis of modality nor its ontology may employ modal notions which are 
irreducible by the analysis. 
 
(D) Finally, it is a plausible scenario that a range of candidate reductive theories of 
modality which purport to meet the requirements (A)-(C) are available. If only one 
of them can be true, we need a distinctive reason to think some particular one is. We 
require, in short, a justification. In such competitive theoretical contexts, such 
reasons typically invoke theoretical or methodological considerations, having the 
form: the best theories are f (where f may be a property of, for instance, simplicity, 
coherence or explanatoriness etc., or some weighted combination of them) and that 
this theory is the f-est.  
 
II 
 
I will now say a little more about each of these requirements. The first requirement a 
modal reductionist theory must meet is that it on the whole preserves our modal 
beliefs. This is the material adequacy condition. Though we cannot directly test for 
the truth of a theory of modality, we can test, at least for a range of important cases, 
whether it preserves our assignments of truth or falsity to modal claims. By analogy: 
if we want to assess whether superluminal flight breaks physical laws, we don’t go to 
the laws themselves, and ask if superluminal flight breaks them, we go to what we 
take to be the laws. Material adequacy is a condition which is defined relative to a 
body of belief; it requires that the theory’s verdicts roughly conform to that body of 
belief.58 That is, for any modal belief we have, the theory should not say it is wrong; 
and for modal claims about which we are undecided, it is best that the theory does 
not issue a clear verdict one way or the other, and so reflects our own neutrality with 
respect to the claim in question. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 We evaluate the material adequacy of a theory by reference to our beliefs. And while we have a potential 
infinity of modal beliefs, we can test only for a small finite number of them, typically paradigm cases. So we 
check to see if the modal facts according to us, match the modal facts according to the theory. This requirement 
is inherently conservative, favouring theories which agree with our picture of modal reality – to the extent this is 
represented by the way we distribute truth-values over modal claims – as against those which revise it. This 
conservatism might perhaps be explained by a (metaphysical) background assumption that our beliefs are, by and 
large, correct, or by the (epistemological) view that we have no better way of testing a theory than against our 
beliefs. 
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Material adequacy is not hard to achieve if we place no constraints on the theory’s 
ontology in terms of which it analyses modality. All that is required is that this 
ontology co-varies in the right way with our patterns of modal belief. The theory’s 
model need not be the intended one to do this job; indeed many models may do the 
job equally well.59 This indicates what a thin notion material adequacy is. A theory is 
materially adequate just in case for any given modal proposition p which we believe, 
the theory entails the truth of an analysis of it, q.60 But there need exist no other 
connection – for instance, conceptual, metaphysical, epistemic – between p and q. 
All that is required is that the truth-value of p and q match. 
 
III 
 
Further constraints on a theory of modality are required for it to give a correct 
conceptual analysis. It might be thought that widening the scope of material 
adequacy will do the trick. Material adequacy requires that the theory of modality 
conserve our modal beliefs; we might now add that it should not violate too many of 
our other beliefs either.61 Widening the scope of material adequacy doesn’t provide 
any assurance that the resulting analysis will be faithful to our concepts, for the aim 
is overall theoretical benefits which might be served best by mutilating our original 
concepts. 
 
The conceptual adequacy condition is designed to narrow down the class of 
materially adequate theories to those which are faithful to our modal concepts. For 
instance, it rules out an analysis of our concept of rabbit in terms of number, because 
our concept of rabbit is not a numerical concept. Our understanding of the concept to 
be analysed can be exploited to rule out theories which are unfaithful to it.62 The 
conceptual adequacy condition is used to preserve our beliefs in the following rich 
sense that Oliver notes:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See Menzel 1990, 372. 
60 There are two general ways a theory of modality can fail to be materially adequate: First, if we have modal 
beliefs it fails to analyse at all, and second, if it fails to assign a modal belief the expected truth-value. 
61 Lewis subscribes to this conservative view, adding that the more important beliefs count for more and incur a 
higher cost of violation (1986, 133). The famous ‘incredulous stare’ objection to Lewis’s theory he took to 
express the view that his theory disagrees with ordinary views about what there is (ibid., 133), not disagreement 
over the modal facts. 
62 Lewis employs just this technique in his 1973, 86, 90 and in his 1986, 184. 
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The preservation of common-sense beliefs is the preservation of two things at 
once: the truth and the content of those beliefs.63 
 
As the rabbit example indicates, if we take theories that aim at the preservation of 
the truth of belief to also be aiming at the preservation of content, then we will be 
taken far astray. Adding the conceptual adequacy condition to our minimal 
conditions expresses the fact that it is not enough for a theory of modality to merely 
validate the truth of our modal claims, but it must do so in the right way, preserving 
their meaning. The condition aims to ensure that our original modal notions are not 
unrecognisably distorted in the pursuit of a good theory. 
 
It might be useful to think of the difference between conceptual and material 
adequacy as the difference between sense and reference. As John Searle writes 
 
You can get a mapping of one sentence onto other sentences where each side 
has the same truth conditions. But that is not, in general, the right way to 
understand the sense of the original sentence.64 
 
The mapping preserves truth, but not sense.65 Whereas in a conceptual analysis the 
aim is to preserve the sense of a sentence, not merely its reference where this is 
thought of as truth-value. For instance, while ‘x is trilateral’ may be a materially 
adequate analysis of ‘x is triangular’, for it preserves reference, it is not a 
conceptually adequate analysis, because it fails to preserve sense. 
 
The conceptual condition for modal theories can be stated roughly as follows: a 
theory of modality is conceptually adequate iff for any modal proposition p which 
we believe, the proposition q which analyses it is faithful to p. The trouble is how to 
be more precise about when a theory is faithful to the content of our beliefs, and 
providing criteria for recognising it to be. It is sometimes, as in the rabbit example, 
easy to see when an analysis isn’t faithful – it seems obvious that this analysis gets 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Oliver 1996, 4-5. He continues: “So rejection may take two forms: preserve the truth but change the content, or 
keep the original content and declare it false” (1996, 4-5). 
64 Searle quoted in Crane 2014, my italics. 
65 Though this somewhat depends on what precisely you take a truth-condition to be. For a useful discussion see 
Hale 2013, 66-69. 
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the content of rabbit claims wrong – but this gives us no handle on when it is, or a 
reflective understanding of why it either is or isn’t. 
 
The notion of a theory being faithful to the content of our beliefs can be cashed out 
in various ways. One dominant one is that for a theory to be faithful to our beliefs it 
must provide the intended interpretation of those beliefs. Quine’s problem with 
possible worlds was that it was unclear how they could provide this interpretation. 
He wrote that 
 
Possible worlds did indeed contribute to the semantics of modal logic, and it 
behoves us to recognize the nature of its contribution: it led to Kripke’s 
precocious and significant theory of models of modal logic. Models afford 
consistency proofs; also they have heuristic value; but they do not constitute 
explication. Models, however clear in themselves, may leave us still at a loss 
for the primary, intended interpretation.66 
 
Quine, it appears, is sceptical of possible worlds or any other models as providing 
the intended interpretation of modal discourse because he is sceptical of the 
coherence of the modal notions they purport to interpret. If we want to know what 
modal discourse is about, a mathematical model which can be used to preserve what 
we take to be the truth-values of its sentences is certainly not enough.67 The trouble 
is that there is no agreed procedure for determining when an interpretation is the 
intended one. Putting the question of when an analysis is faithful to the target 
concept in terms of when an interpretation is the intended one doesn’t seem to 
advance the issue. We need criteria to determine when a theory is faithful to the 
content of our beliefs. Suggestions include, that the theory yields an analysans which 
(a) says the same thing as the original proposition, or (b) figures in our inferences in 
the same way as it, or (c) embeds in propositional attitude contexts in the same way 
as it, or (d) is known in the same way as it or (e) conforms to some specified set of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Quine 1972, 492. 
67 The following point of Rosen’s about his fictionalism is relevant here: “I have supposed that fictionalism, like 
modal realism, aims to be a theory of possibility...But note that this assumption is not strictly necessary given the 
modest problem we began with…[which was to obtain]… license to move back and forth between modal claims 
and claims about worlds…[I]t is one thing to embrace these biconditionals – even to embrace them as a body of 
necessary truths – and another to regard them as providing analyses…” (1990, 353-54). 
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intuitions about the topic in question. I suggest the least controversial of these 
suggestions is (a). Vague as it is, it is a plausible constraint on descriptive conceptual 
analyses. (For instance, Searle’s point above seems to presuppose it.) In Chapter 4, 
§4.0, I provide three further plausible criteria we may expect an analysis of type (a) 
to meet. 
 
IV 
 
The reduction condition is the requirement that a theory of modality be reductive. 
This means the theory cannot contain modal resources which it cannot itself reduce. 
So no irreducible modal notions – irreducible, that is, relative to the theory in 
question – can be employed by the theory. There are four points to note about this 
condition.  
 
First, the classificatory question of which notions are modal is contested. Some 
notions – such as alethic necessity and possibility – everyone accepts as modal. As 
we move further away from these paradigms, to for instance, essence, disposition, 
the counterfactual and non-alethic modals, things become less clear. It is common to, 
at least initially, treat all these notions as modal. Theorists may, if they have them, 
use their favourite definitions of modality to refine the classification. I will stick to 
the liberal classification which treats of all these notions, and related ones, as 
modal.68  
  
Second, a theory fails to be reductive when it contains irreducible modal notions. For 
a theory to contain such notions is a matter of it either containing a circle of inter-
defined modal notions, none of which admit of a reduction, and so no way of 
breaking into the circle exists, or else containing primitive notions which are 
classified as modal. 
 
Third, modality can be concealed in a theory in various places. It is normal to focus 
attention on the concepts in the analysans, and hunt there for covert circularity. But it 
is no less important to look at a theory’s ontology to see if it contains irreducible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Here I follow Hale 2013, 63 fn.1. 
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modal notions. What matters for the reduction condition is that the theory as a whole 
– its analysis and ontology inclusive – does not employ irreducible modal notions. 
 
Fourth, a theory of modality may itself make use of modal notions, so long as it 
exhaustively reduces them. If a theory makes use of modal notions but only 
reductively defines some of them, this is not enough, for then there will be remainder 
modal notions lacking reductive definitions. A connected point is that reductive 
theories of modality are under no obligation to reduce every modal notion there is – 
they are only under obligation to reduce any notion in their machinery, together with 
any modal notion they recognise. So it is no criticism of a candidate reductive 
theory, from the point of view of the reduction condition, that it can reduce the 
notion of necessity, but not, say, the notion of essence. Of course such a theory may 
fail from another standpoint, but not from the point of view of the reduction. It is 
worth emphasising here that ‘Theory T reduces concept k’ does not mean that T 
successfully reduces k. The reduction condition doesn’t care about whether a theory 
is successful in other terms – for instance, true or perhaps, materially or conceptually 
adequate – it cares only whether it is reductive. 
 
V 
 
Facts about a theory, for instance that it satisfies the above minimal conditions, is not 
yet a reason to believe it, until satisfaction of the conditions are understood to be 
indications of truth. Theories of modality exist in a highly competitive theoretical 
space, where rivals purport to have met conditions similar to the material, conceptual 
and reduction conditions – and these are just the actual rivals, there are many more 
possible rivals! Faced with an array of theories to choose between, we need a reason 
to prefer one theory rather than the others. The justification condition places a very 
minimal requirement on a putative reason: it should raise the probability of the truth 
of the theory it justifies. For instance, if it is accepted that simpler theories are more 
likely true, then to show that T is simple raises the probability of T’s truth. A good 
reason provides us with a reason to believe that the theory is true; it is a reason, not 
necessarily a decisive one, for other reasons may outweigh it. Such reasons are 
typically theoretical or methodological in nature – and so call for some theoretical or 
methodological explicitness about what is wanted from a theory and why. 
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Theories are often justified by aesthetic or pragmatic reasons.69 But these are only 
reasons to believe a theory if they are epistemically relevant.70 For some desirable 
aesthetic or pragmatic property of a theory F, possessing F only provides a reason to 
believe a theory if F raises the probability of its truth. This needs to be shown – 
though invariability isn’t – before aesthetic properties such as simplicity can 
legitimately be used as reasons to believe. 
 
1.3 Thesis outline 
 
This thesis is divided in two: the frame (Chapters 1, 6) and the test case (Chapters 2-
5). The frame provides the context of the test case, and suggests conclusions we can 
draw from it. The test case itself is divided into three main parts71 each focusing on 
one aspect of Lewis’s theory: its ontology (Chapter 3), its analysis (Chapter 4) and 
its justification (Chapter 5). These strands are tangled together in a tight knot in 
Lewis’s work. I aim, perhaps artificially, to disentangle them and critically explain 
the contribution of each to his theory. Each of the test case chapters consist of two 
parts: an expository first part, and a critical second part. In each of these chapters I 
ask to what extent Lewis’s theory meets the minimal conditions for a reductive 
theory of modality as laid out in the previous section. The plan of the thesis is as 
follows.  
 
In Chapter Two ‘Lewis’s theory of modality’, I provide a simple exposition of three 
aspects of Lewis’s theory: its ontology, its analysis and its justification. I aim to 
clarify some of the interactions between its ontology of worlds and its analysis of 
modality. The chapter provides a skeletal understanding of Lewis’s theory, on which 
later chapters build with further exposition and critique. 
 
In Chapter Three ‘Ontology’, I suggest that Lewis’s theory can neither satisfy the 
reduction condition nor the material adequacy condition. The argument focuses on 
Lewis’s ontological postulate that there exists an abundance of worlds. There 
appears no way to specify this claim such that it sustains the material adequacy of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 See Kriegel 2013 and Oliver 1996. 
70 On epistemic justification see Bonjour 1978, 5. 
71 I set aside Chapter 2, which is a simple exposition and discussion of Lewis’s theory. 
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the analysis, without recourse to irreducible modal notions. The best way Lewis 
comes up with, his ‘Principle of Recombination’, is implausible, for (a) to generate 
enough worlds it requires irreducible modal notions, and (b) it is committed to the 
Humean denial of necessary connections, so distorts the facts of modality. The 
former problem suggests the theory is not reductive, the latter problem suggests the 
theory is not materially adequate.  
 
In Chapter Four ‘Analysis’, I argue that Lewis’s theory appears not to satisfy the 
conceptual adequacy condition. The argument here focuses on Lewis’s analysis as a 
conceptual analysis. If our modal concepts are quantifiers over worlds, as Lewis 
suggests, then (i) there should be an a priori conceptual connection between modal 
and worldly claims, (ii) our understanding of the worldly claims should be sufficient 
for our understanding of modal claims, and (iii) the ontological commitments of 
modal and worldly claims should be identical. I first find that Lewis’s arguments for 
the a priori conceptual connection leave much to be desired, and then argue, that 
Lewis’s analysis appears neither to deliver on (ii) nor (iii). This suggests that 
modality is not to be understood in terms of quantification over worlds. 
 
In Chapter Five ‘Justification’, I argue that Lewis’s main justification for his theory 
is unsatisfactory as it appears not to provide a good reason to believe and so it 
appears not to satisfy the justification condition. Lewis holds that because his theory 
requires fewer primitive concepts than his rivals, we have a reason to think it true. 
He thinks that a theory is better, all else being equal, if it contains fewer primitives. 
The justification for this principle is that a theory containing fewer primitives 
provides a better – more unified and economical – systematisation of our beliefs. I 
argue that this justification doesn’t provide a reason to think Lewis’s theory is true, 
for it relies on three problematic assumptions: (1) that our beliefs form a unity, (2) 
that our beliefs and systematisations of them can be compared to determine the 
number of primitive notions they contain, and (3) that Lewis’s view of what the costs 
and benefits of theories are, and what grounds them, is correct. 
 
Finally, in Chapter Six ‘Conclusion’, I summarise the results of the test case. I then 
argue that the results may be carefully generalised to apply beyond Lewis’s theory, 
to theories which are of a similar structure or which employ a similar justification. 
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This builds the case for the view that not only are there problems for Modal 
Reductionism in virtue of its most influential and best regarded candidate having 
problems, but there are also problems because other similar theories appear to have 
similar problems to Lewis’s. I conclude by suggesting that Modal Primitivism offers 
an approach to modality which seems not to be vulnerable to these same problems, 
and is worthy of serious consideration. 
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Chapter 2: Lewis’s theory of modality 
 
In this chapter I lay out the ontological, analytical and justificatory foundations for 
the case study of Lewis’s reductive theory of modality. I first outline the skeleton of 
Lewis’s theory, clearly distinguishing its two main parts: its ontology of worlds and 
analysis of modality (§2.0). Later chapters will add flesh to its bones, as I discuss 
and critique it. I then clarify what the theory says, and explore the relationship 
between its two parts (§2.1). Finally, I outline Lewis’s justification of his theory by 
situating it in its theoretical setting (§2.2).  
 
2.0 Lewis’s theory of modality 
 
I 
 
Lewis’s theory is best approached by dividing it into two parts: an ontology of 
worlds and a conceptual analysis of modality in terms of them.72 Doing so allows us 
to later distinguish ontological from analytical criticism of the theory. Lewis himself 
usually formulates his theory by dividing it into these two parts, and I stick fairly 
closely to his own formulation of it.73 I start with the ontology, for it is in terms of 
this ontology that the conceptual analysis of modality is given. Several of the 
technical terms used below will be clarified in the following sections.  
 
II 
 
Ontology. Modal Realism can be roughly stated by the following claims:  
 
(i) There exists a plurality of worlds, where ‘world’ is defined as follows: x is a 
world iff x is a maximal spatio-temporally interrelated fusion.74 
 
To analyse modality, the plurality of worlds must be abundant. To state this 
abundance, Lewis appeals to a principle of plenitude for worlds (see §3.1 for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 This bipartite division of Lewis’s theory is particularly clear in Divers and Melia’s regimentation of it in their 
2002. 
73 Lewis 1986, vii, 3-5. 
74 See ibid., 73. 
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discussion of this principle). Lewis changed his mind about what the correct 
formulation of this principle is.75 He first used the principle I call ‘Ways’ and then 
replaced it with ‘The Principle of Recombination’: 
 
(ii) Ways: Every way that a world could be is a way that some world is; and 
every way that a part of a world could be is a way that some part of some 
world is.76 
 
(iii) The Principle of Recombination: Anything can coexist or fail to coexist 
with anything else, provided they occupy distinct spatiotemporal positions.77 
 
III 
 
Analysis. Having postulated an abundance of worlds which are all the ways a world 
could be, a materialist reduction of modality becomes possible: modal discourse can 
now be reduced to talk about these worlds and their parts. Lewis’s analysis states an 
equivalence, which is ordinarily read as laying down a truth-condition for modal 
claims. It doesn’t say how we are to determine for any given modal claim, what its 
truth-condition is. It just says that modal claims of certain forms have corresponding 
truth-conditions of a certain form. Though the analysis below is divided into the 
analysis of the de dicto and the de re, it treats both kinds of modal claim as 
fundamentally the same, in that they quantify over the same subject-matter: worlds 
and their parts. 
 
When we assert that it is necessary or possible that a general proposition p is true, we 
make a de dicto modal claim. Lewis analyses the de dicto as follows: 
 
 (a) Possibly p iff there is a world w, such that at w, p. 
 (b) Necessarily p iff every world w is such that at w, p.78 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Ibid., 86-87. 
76 Ibid., 2, 86. 
77 Ibid., 88. 
78 See ibid., 5-7. 
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An example: suppose we assert that there could be a blue moon. According to the 
analysis, we thereby assert that there is a world where there is a blue moon. One way 
to express this is as follows:  
 
  
 
which says that there is an x and y such that x is a world which y is part of, y is a 
moon and y is blue. 
 
When we say of a particular thing that it possibly or necessarily has a certain 
property, we make a de re modal claim. The analysis of the de re runs as follows:  
 
 (c) x is possibly G iff there is a counterpart of x which is G. 
 (d) x is necessarily G iff every counterpart of x is G.79 
 
Another example: suppose we assert that Moses could have played football. 
According to the analysis, what we assert is that there is a counterpart of Moses who 
plays football. One way to express this is as follows: 
 
  
 
which says that there is an x and y such that x is a world which y is part of, y is a 
counterpart of Moses, and y plays football. 
 
Note that both the de dicto and de re analyses are meant to analyse a single basic 
concept of modality, which is understood in terms of quantification over worlds and 
their parts. As such, the basic concept of modality in terms of which all others can be 
defined is, for Lewis, non-epistemic; it belongs to ontology, not epistemology. Other 
modal notions can be understood by restricting the domain of quantification.80 So, 
for instance, p is physically necessary just if for every world w which has the same 
physical laws as the actual world w*, at w, p.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Ibid., 8.  
80 Ibid., 7. 
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2.1 Relating Lewis’s ontology of worlds and the analysis of modality 
 
I 
 
Clarification of what worlds are. Worlds, for Lewis, are universes like the one we 
live in. (“The other worlds are of a kind with this world of ours.”81) But it is not 
exactly right to say that whatever our universe is, Lewis thinks of worlds as more 
things of the same kind. Lewis takes our universe to be a physical entity and other 
worlds are other such entities.82 Officially, Lewis takes words to be maximal spatio-
temporally interrelated fusions. How are such fusions to be understood? A 
mereological fusion of several things is that thing y such that for any x, x overlaps y 
iff x overlaps one of those things.83 What distinguishes the fusions which are worlds 
from those that are not? Fusions f which are worlds must meet the following 
conditions: 
 
 Totality: every part of f is spatio-temporally related to every other part of f 
 Maximality: anything spatio-temporally related to any part of f is a part of f.84 
 
Assume that my – Jonathan Nassim’s – body can be defined as a fusion of spatio-
temporal parts. Is my body a world? Totality doesn’t rule it out from being a world. 
Totality ensures that for any part of a world, there is a spatio-temporal path 
connecting it with any other part. My body clearly satisfies this condition: my thigh 
bone is (spatio-temporally) connected to my hip bone etc. My body fails however to 
satisfy Maximality. For your body is spatio-temporally related to my body, but it is 
not a part of mine. My body is a spatio-temporally interrelated fusion, but it is not 
maximal. Maximality is thought to pick out the subclass of fusions satisfying 
Totality which are worlds. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Lewis 1986, 2, my italics. Also see Lewis 1973, 85. 
82 Lewis 1986, 2, 69, 73. Lewis takes his two notions of world – the former indexical, the later physical – to 
coincide. It is the later notion which officially occurs in his theory. In practice, Lewis weakens the physical 
definition of ‘world’. Maximal fusions whose parts are related by external relations which are spatio-temporal or 
analogous to spatio-temporal relations, are both counted as worlds (ibid., 75, 76 esp. fn. 55, 230). This generates 
a tension with the indexical notion of world. For if we understand the notion of a world via the kind of thing 
which surrounds us, then it is questionable whether non-physical worlds really are worlds if they are very 
dissimilar that the thing which surrounds us. 
83 Lewis 1986, 69 fn.51, 70. 
84 For this formulation see Sider 2003, 192-93. 
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II 
 
This conception of the nature of worlds interacts in various ways with Lewis’s 
analysis of modality. I note two of them. First, it follows from Lewis’s definition of 
worlds, that they are spatio-temporally isolated. For if one world stood in spatio-
temporal relations with another, the two worlds would, by Maximality, be parts of 
the same world, and so not distinct.85 Isolation motivates the development of 
counterpart theory, and its use in giving an analysis of de re modality.86 The reason 
for this is that if worlds are isolated, then they have no parts in common. This means 
that possibilities for an individual i in some world w cannot be understood in terms 
of how things go for i itself in other worlds – for i doesn’t exist in worlds other than 
w. I elaborate on this aspect of the relationship between the ontology of worlds and 
the analysis of de re modality in the discussion of counterparts below. 
 
Second, though no object can be wholly in two worlds, Lewis takes there to be 
objects composed of parts of different worlds, called ‘trans-world individuals’. The 
existence of trans-world individuals follows from three of Lewis’s views: (a) that 
there exist a plurality of worlds, (b) the definition of worlds as fusions of individuals, 
and (c) the principle of unrestricted mereological composition, which says that for 
any things whatsoever, there is some thing which is composed of them.87 Together, a 
consequence rather awkward for Lewis’s analysis of modality appears to follow. 
According to Lewis’s analysis it appears that it is possible for x to exist iff there is a 
world where x exists iff there is a world which x is part of.88 Given that in general, if 
x is part of y, then the whole of x is part of y, it follows that if it is possible for x to 
exist, then the whole of x must be part of a world.89 Trans-world individuals however 
only partly exist in any world, that is, only some proper parts of them exist in any 
world. If the whole of a trans-world individual exists at no world, such entities are, 
according to the analysis, impossible beings. Indeed Lewis acknowledges this: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 A world a can contain a duplicate of another world b as a part, but this doesn’t violate the isolation of worlds, 
for a duplicate of b is not itself b. For ‘duplicate’ see Lewis 1986, 89. 
86 By ‘counterpart theory’ I mean Lewis’s counterpart theory, unless I state otherwise. 
87 Ibid., 211. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Lewis writes: “There are no free-floating possibilia. Every possibility is part of a world – exactly one world…” 
(Ibid., 23). 
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Parts of worlds are possible individuals; trans-world individuals 
are…impossible individuals.90  
 
A serious problem for this view is that it doesn’t conform to some important modal 
intuitions. First, it is correct to infer from the impossibility of x to the non-existence 
of x91, and second it is correct to infer from the existence of x to the possibility of x. 
Yet the view proposed allows that some x exists and is impossible, thereby violating 
both inference rules.92 
 
III 
  
Clarification of what counterparts are and their use in the analysis of de re modality. 
Take an individual i which exists at a world w. Its counterpart, in a world w’, is the 
most similar object to i in w’. In w, i itself is its own counterpart. The totality of 
counterparts of i is the set of objects, drawn one from each world, which are the most 
similar objects to i, in their respective worlds. The similarity relation that figures in 
the definition of counterpart is called ‘the counterpart relation’. The counterpart 
relation pairs up i and its counterparts in other worlds, by examination of their 
intrinsic and extrinsic qualitative properties. Lewis writes: 
 
Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important 
respects. They resemble you more closely than do the other things in their 
worlds.93 
 
Answers to questions about similarity are sensitive to which respects of similarity 
are in question and how those respects are weighted. Is this blue ball more similar to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Ibid., 211. Lewis, in an earlier work, admitted that “the possible individuals are not all the individuals”, and 
that “a cross-world sum is not a possible individual. There is no way for the whole of it to be actual. No matter 
which world is actual, at most a proper part of it actually exists. It is not in any world...for it is not part of any 
world. But it is partly in each of many worlds, overlapping different worlds in virtue of different ones of its 
parts” (1983, 39-40). So on this view there are objects not in logical space –it, as it were, has an outside. 
91 Lewis makes this inference, at least when source of the impossibility of x is that the given description of it is 
contradictory. See Lewis 1986, 7 fn.3 and 1983, 21. 
92 Lewis has a response to this charge. He writes: “to call the trans-world individuals ‘impossible’…is only a 
terminological stipulation” (Lewis 1986, 211, my italics). And he offers another terminological stipulation on 
which trans-world individuals turn out not to be impossible. It seems that given the importance of this issue to the 
coherence of Lewis’s analysis, these ‘merely’ terminological issues must be ironed out in a way that trans-world 
individuals, the analysis of modality and our modal inferences can live together. 
93 Lewis 1983, 28. See also his 1986, 88. 
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that green ball or to the blue sky above them both? This depends on which respects 
of similarity we focus on: if it is simply type of colour, then the ball and the sky are 
more similar, if it is simply type of shape then the two balls are more similar. If we 
focus on several respects of similarity – colour and shape, say – then the answer will 
depend in part on how these respects of similarity are weighted. Lewis thinks this is 
as it should be, because the counterpart relation is 
  
problematic in the way all relations of similarity are: it is the resultant of 
similarities and dissimilarities in a multitude of respects, weighted by the 
importances of the various respects and by the degrees of the similarities.94 
 
Counterpart theory and the semantics that flows from it require that worlds and 
things in them stand in determinate similarity relations. When we utter a de re modal 
sentence – say, ‘x could have F-ed’95 – we implicitly select a counterpart relation 
which determines the relevant class of counterparts, and so provides our sentence 
with a truth-condition: x could have F-ed so long as one of its counterparts Fs.  
 
Why use counterpart theory to analyse de re modality? Possibilities are, on Lewis’s 
view, worlds.96 He thinks that when we ask whether ‘Possibly p’ is true, we wonder 
whether there is a possibility, that is, a world, where p.97 When we ask whether ‘x is 
possibly F’ is true, the natural way of extending the analysis is that we are asking of 
x whether it is, in some world, F. The effect of ‘possibly’ in either case would appear 
to get us to a world. 
 
However, on Lewis’s mereological conception of worlds, this analysis would destroy 
contingency. For any object which is wholly part of a world, is wholly part of just 
one world. Suppose an object a exists in the actual world. Further suppose that ‘a is 
F’ is always false at the actual world. It follows, according to the natural extension 
of the analysis above, that ‘a is possibly F’ is necessarily false. For the only way for 
a to be possibly F is for a to be F at some world and for a to be F at some world a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Lewis 1983., 28. 
95 Where appropriate, quotation should be understood as quasi-quotation. 
96 Lewis writes: “It is usual to think that the unit of possibility is the possible world...It is true, and important, that 
possibilities are invariably provided by whole possible worlds” (Lewis 1986, 230). 
97 Where appropriate, single quotes are to be read as corner quotes. 
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must be in some world in which it is F. But in the actual world, the only world in 
which a exists, a is not F. So there are no worlds in which a is F. So ‘a is possibly F’ 
is necessarily false. Were Lewis’s analysis of modality to be extended in this way, 
no individual would have any property contingently. 
 
Counterpart theory is designed to analyse de re modality without giving up on 
contingency. Rather than treat ‘x is possibly F’ as stating that x itself is F at a world, 
counterpart-theoretic semantics takes its truth-conditions to be that a counterpart of x 
is F at a world. So while x itself remains (by definition) moored to the world of 
which it is a part, its modal properties are analysed in terms of the non-modal 
properties which the objects most like it possess at other worlds. By altering the 
analysis of modality de re, Lewis attempts to construct a semantics which 
accommodates contingency – or at least, simulates it – in a context in which the 
natural extension of his analysis would destroy it. Thus, though Lewis analyses the 
de dicto and de re in terms of the same subject-matter – worlds and their parts – they 
are distinct analyses, with distinct motivations. 
 
IV 
 
The relation between Lewis’s ontology and the language in which the analysis of 
modality is couched. We may ask which comes (conceptually) first: Lewis’s use of a 
first-order language to analyse modality or his ontology of worlds whose natural 
description is in a first-order language. Williamson seems to take the first view: 
 
Although Lewis’s attitude to modality is sometimes viewed as the opposite of 
Quine’s, he is more accurately understood as reducing modal language to 
Quineanly acceptable language…98 
 
Lewis’s project, as Williamson sees it, is primarily one about language and the 
ontology of worlds provides the means to carry out this project. Agustín Rayo, 
contrasting Lewis’s project with his own “linguistic project of assigning truth-
conditions to modal sentences”, sees Lewis as   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Williamson 2013, xii. For a similar point see also Williamson quoted in Antonsen 2010, 25. 
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primarily engaged in the metaphysical project of characterizing a space of 
Lewisian worlds…99  
 
Whichever way is correct, it is clear that if an ontology of worlds is to be described 
by a first-order language, the two must fit each other. If the objects which constitute 
the ontology are to be reached by names or variables of the language, they must meet 
certain conditions. What those conditions are is a matter of some debate, but it seems 
fairly clear that we must possess a criterion of identity for these objects – and this 
means the objects must be a certain way, for instance, they must be such that there is 
a determinate answer as to when any two of them are identical or not.100 The 
language in which a theory of possibility is couched imposes important constraints 
on the kinds of entities it can take possibilities to be. Lewis demands that 
possibilities are entities which we can quantify over, and this has important 
ramifications for his theory (see §§4.23-4.26). 
 
V 
 
Does the analysis follow from the ontology? I just noted two possible starting points 
for Lewis’s theory – language or ontology. I now ask whether there is evidence for 
thinking Lewis puts his ontology first, and whether his analysis is, in a sense, 
‘contained’ in it. I have assumed in the way I separated out the two parts of Lewis’s 
theory, and discussed their relation, that the ontology and analysis are logically 
independent aspects of it. However there are reasons to challenge this widely held 
assumption. Despite dividing his own theory into an ontological part and an 
analytical part, there is some textual evidence that Lewis thinks that the analysis 
follows from the ontology; and some of his commentators appear to support this.101 I 
now defend the view that though there are ways in which they are related, they are 
nonetheless logically independent. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Rayo 2013, 156, my italics. He goes on, on the same page, to recognise that “the two projects [metaphysical 
and linguistic] are interrelated, of course, since a space of Lewisian worlds can be used, in the presence of a 
suitable counterpart relation, to assign truth-conditions to modal sentences, and an assignment of truth-conditions 
to modal sentences imposes significant constraints on the space of Lewisian worlds.” 
100 Other than possessing a criterion of identity it might be thought that objects that can be named or quantified 
over must possess determinate identity conditions, or must fall under a sortal concept, or be possible members of 
sets. For some discussion of some of these requirements see Lowe 1995. 
101 One reason it is important for me to clarify which the correct interpretation is, is because I assume in the 
content and structure of this thesis that the two parts of Lewis’s theory are independent and can be treated 
separately. 
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We can distinguish two views about the relation of Lewis’s ontology and his 
analysis: 
 
Dependence: Lewis’s ontology and analysis are logically dependent. There are 
two ways they can be dependent: the analysis depends on the ontology or vice 
versa.  
 
Independence: it is not the case that Lewis’s ontology and the analysis are 
logically dependent.  
 
One apparent endorsement of Independence as the correct interpretation of Lewis 
comes from Stalnaker: 
 
The thesis of modal realism has two parts. First, the ontological claim that 
there are other worlds spatially and temporally disconnected from ours; 
second, the semantic claim that statements about what might or must be true 
are to be analysed as quantifications over these worlds.102 
 
By saying that Lewis’s ontology and analysis are distinct parts of his theory, 
Stalnaker may be understood as saying that they are logically distinct parts. The 
point is made more explicitly by Charles Chihara: 
 
….there is no logical connection between Lewis’s ontology of worlds and his 
analysis of modal operators, in virtue of which belief in the former commits 
one to acceptance of the latter.103 
 
Despite being the standard view, there are two curious facts about Independence. 
First, Lewis never explicitly endorses it. Second, there is some textual evidence that 
he rejects it, and takes the analysis to be ‘contained’ in his ontology. What is the 
evidence that Lewis supports Dependence?  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Stalnaker 1988, 118. Note that Stalnaker means by ‘modal realism’ here what I mean by ‘Lewis’s theory of 
modality’, comprising his ontology of worlds, and his analysis of modality. 
103 Chihara 1998, 83. 
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First, he stresses the entanglement of his analysis with the ontology of worlds. In 
advocating Modal Realism Lewis suggests that systematic philosophy goes more 
easily when we “presuppose modal realism in our analyses”.104 If presupposition of 
an ontological thesis by a conceptual thesis means that the latter entails the former, 
then presupposition may be thought to bring logical dependence. 
 
Second, and more importantly, Lewis seems to think that if there are all the worlds 
he holds there to be, it follows that the correct analysis of modal concepts is in terms 
of quantification over worlds. Introducing his analysis for the first time in OPW, he 
writes: 
 
What actually is the case, as we say, is what goes on here. That is one possible 
way for a world to be. Other worlds are other, that is unactualised, possibilities. 
If there are many worlds, and every way that a world could possibly be is a 
way that some world is, then whenever such-and-such might be the case, there 
is some world where such-and-such is the case. Conversely, since it is safe to 
say that no world is any way that a world could not possibly be, whenever 
there is some world at which such-and-such is the case, then it might be that 
such-and-such is the case. So modality turns into quantification: possibly there 
are blue swans iff, for some world W, at W there are blue swans.105  
 
Call this passage ‘Lewis’s Argument’. According to it, if Modal Realism is true, then 
possibly p iff there is a world at which p, where the bi-conditional is to be 
understood as expressing a conceptual analysis of modality. If the analysis were a 
purely conceptual thesis, then it would be hard to understand how it could follow 
from what appears to be a purely ontological thesis. For an ontological thesis asserts 
that so-and-so exists, from which nothing about the correct analysis of concepts 
appears to follow. One way of explaining how the conclusion of Lewis’s Argument 
is reached is by denying that the ontological thesis is purely ontological, and so to 
treat the ontological thesis as being a partly conceptual thesis. Another explanation is 
to deny that the conceptual thesis is purely conceptual, and so to treat the conceptual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Lewis 1986, vii, my italics. Also he counts his analysis of modality as an instance of Modal Realism “at 
work” (ibid., 5). 
105 Ibid. 
47	  
thesis as being a partly ontological thesis. A different approach altogether is to deny 
that the conclusion of Lewis’s Argument follows at all, and explain this fact by 
denying the existence of a logical connection between the ontological and conceptual 
theses.106 
 
Jessica Wilson appears to hold the second view: that Modal Realism is not a purely 
ontological thesis. She writes that Modal Realism, specifically, the principle of 
plenitude, does  
 
little more than encode, for worlds or parts of worlds, the operative assumption 
that modal claims involve quantification over possible worlds (such that, e.g., 
p’s being possible is understood in terms of p’s being true in some possible 
world)….[and that it]…provides a translation strategy for modal claims…107 
 
On Wilson’s Dependence view, Lewis’s ontology “encodes” his analysis. This 
seems to be consistent with the interpretation of Lewis’s Argument above, according 
to which his analysis follows from his ontology. Wilson focuses on Lewis’s 
principle of plenitude, and seems to think this part of his ontology “provides a 
translation strategy for modal claims”. However, it doesn’t appear at face value that 
any part of Lewis’s ontology could do such a thing. It is true that Lewis’s ontology 
postulates objects which can be utilised by an analysis, but this doesn’t put the 
ontology itself in logical relations with the analysis. 
 
On my view, Lewis embraces Independence, despite some appearances to the 
contrary. To support this, compare Lewis’s Argument with the following point he 
makes when discussing supervenience:  
 
A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation. Given an ontology 
of possibilia, we can formulate such theses in terms of differences between 
possible individuals or worlds. To say that so-and-so supervenes on such-and-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 I set aside a further possibility which is denying that Lewis’s analysis is a conceptual analysis. See §4.1 for 
evidence to support the view that it is. 
107 Wilson, forthcoming. 
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such is to say that there can be no difference in respect of so-and-so without 
difference in respect of such-and-such.108 
 
The point here is that the ontology of possibilia makes possible – not logically 
obligatory – an analysis of supervenience in terms of it. This is the same strategy 
Lewis applies again and again in his career: find a problematic concept in 
philosophy, and put possibilia to work in defining it. But that doesn’t mean the 
ontology forces any analysis upon us. Defining a concept in terms of worlds is a 
decision we may choose to make. Belief in the “vast realm of possibilia” gives you 
an ontology which those choices can exploit, and we are free in our theories to do 
so.109 Whether we should make such decisions is, for Lewis, a matter of balancing 
the costs and benefits to our theory of doing so (see §2.2 and Chapter 5). This helps 
us see that in Lewis’s Argument, he is using rhetorical flourish when he says “so 
modality turns into quantification”. This is not a conclusion of an argument. He 
should be read as saying that, given an ontology of worlds, we can – not must – 
analyse modality in terms of them. 
 
Having given a reason to think that Lewis isn’t committed to Dependence, I now 
give an intuitive reason to think that Independence is correct. Consider the following 
two hypothetical scenarios, neither of which appear to lead to contradiction: 
 
(i) Suppose our modal concepts are analysed in terms of quantification over 
worlds, but there are no worlds other than our own. 
 
(ii) Suppose a plenitude of worlds exist in all their glory, but our modal 
concepts cannot be analysed in terms of them. Perhaps our modal concepts turn 
out to quantify over another kind of thing, or perhaps they are not concepts 
drawn from ontology at all. 
 
Logic doesn’t seem to preclude either view. In the first case our modal concepts 
speak of other worlds other than our own but there are none, and so our modal 
beliefs are in error; in the second case worlds other than our own exist, but our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Lewis 1986, 29, my italics. 
109 Ibid., 4. 
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modal concepts do not speak of them. Neither situation appears contradictory so both 
situations appear logically possible, so Dependence appears false.110 
 
2.2 Justification 
 
I 
 
Plato had his Forms and Lewis his worlds; worlds are, for Lewis, the key to 
philosophical insight. He believed that philosophically problematic notions – such as 
content, proposition, property etc. – had been fruitfully defined in modal terms, in 
particular, in terms of possible worlds.111 But for a reduction of this circle of 
intensional concepts to be carried through, modality must itself be reduced, in 
particular the notion of possible world. Otherwise, modality will have been 
implicated in the definition of central philosophical concepts, but without a reductive 
definition of it being available; one intensional notion will have been used to define 
the others. 
 
For Lewis, the fact that his theory of modality is reductive provide a justification for 
it.112 In order to understand why he takes this view a little must be said about the 
theoretical setting of his theory. 
 
II 
 
First, Lewis’s philosophical starting point is a Neurathian conception of the given. 
This is the epistemological view according to which (a) we find ourselves with a 
range of beliefs about the world, and (b) there is no way to distinguish a special class 
of them (e.g., by intuition or experience) which are guaranteed to be epistemically 
secure. All of our beliefs are – in the sense of failing to have foundations – on an 
epistemic par.113 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 For a further reason for Independence being a requirement of Lewis’s theory, see §3.2. 
111 Lewis 1986, 3. 
112 Ibid., 4. 
113 This is of course not to say that there are no reasons for thinking some of our beliefs are on a more or less 
sound epistemic footing than others. It’s just that there is no way to establish that any are on an absolutely sound 
footing. 
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III 
 
Second, given a Neurathian starting point, philosophy cannot be the search for 
foundations. Instead, Lewis suggests, philosophy should aim at harmonising belief. 
Or as Quine had it, philosophy is concerned with “rounding out our system of the 
world” in pursuit of truth.114 The idea is to start with the beliefs we have – for on this 
view, we have nowhere else to start – and to bring as many beliefs as possible into 
‘reflective equilibrium’, in a unified theory of reality. As Lewis put it, 
 
[o]ne comes to philosophy already endowed with a stock of opinions. It is not 
the business of philosophy either to undermine or to justify these preexisting 
opinions, to any great extent, but only to try to discover ways of expanding 
them into an orderly system.115 
 
Unlike Quine, who wanted to bring clarity and order to our scientifically respectable 
beliefs, Lewis aims at a theory which brings all our beliefs into reflective 
equilibrium, scientific and unscientific alike.116 This is why modal beliefs get a 
hearing in Lewis; it is not due to his view that they are central to science, it is enough 
that we simply have them. 
 
IV 
 
Third, how does philosophy contribute towards bringing our beliefs into reflective 
equilibrium? A central way it can do so, for Lewis, is to make our theory of the 
world increasingly unified. Lewis writes:  
 
improv[ing] the unity and economy of the theory…is our professional concern 
– total theory, the whole of what we take to be true.117 
 
Lewis aims to implement the project of unifying our theory by reducing the number 
of concepts we have to accept as primitive.118 This essentially involves the use of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Quine in Magee 1978. See also Lewis 1986, 4. 
115 Lewis 1973, 88, my italics. 
116 Loux and Zimmerman 2003, 1-7. 
117 Lewis 1986, 4. 
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conceptual analysis. In the case of modality, Lewis takes this to involve postulating a 
range of worlds and reductively analysing modal notions as quantification over 
them. Lewis takes this approach to be “the only successful attempt I know of, to 
systematize…preexisting modal opinion”.119 He appears to fuse a traditional view of 
philosophy as the a priori search for conceptual analyses, with the view that these 
analyses should further the pursuit of bringing our beliefs together in the most 
unified theory available. The analyses aid the theory by showing how notions once 
accepted as primitive, can in fact be defined in more basic terms. 
 
V 
 
Fourth, conservatism. The change, in the form of unification, that Lewis wants 
philosophy to bring to our theory of the world must, he thinks, be balanced against 
preserving as much of our body of belief as possible. But conservatism isn’t merely a 
voluntary brake on unification, it a requirement on recognising this theory as true.  
 
Lewis’s takes a principle of charity to apply to the beliefs given in the original 
Neurathian position: they are by and large true.120 For Lewis, making our beliefs 
more unified is only epistemically worthwhile if they are already taken to be true; 
only then does the simplicity that unity brings to theory make it more likely true.121 
If truth comes from below (our initial beliefs) and above (our unification of them), 
then the philosophical balancing act is to unify, while not undermining, these initial 
beliefs. This explains why Lewis treats lack of fit of prior beliefs as a cost; for the 
truth of a theory is largely inherited from the initial beliefs it systematises. Lewis 
writes about this in the following passage:  
 
it is pointless to build a theory, however nicely systematised it might be, that it 
would be unreasonable to believe. And a theory cannot earn credence just by 
its unity and economy. What credence it cannot earn, it must inherit. It is far 
beyond our power to weave a brand new fabric of adequate theory ex nihilo, so 
we must perforce conserve the one we’ve got. A worthwhile theory must be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Ibid. 
119 Lewis 1973, 88. 
120 Ibid., 134. 
121 Ibid., 4. 
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credible, and a credible theory must be conservative. It cannot gain, and it 
cannot deserve, credence if it disagrees with too much of what we thought 
before. And much of what we thought before was just common sense. 
Common sense is a settled body of theory – unsystematic folk theory – which 
at any rate we do believe; and I presume that we are reasonable to believe it. 
(Most of it.)122 
 
It is natural, on this view, to want the systematisations of our beliefs that philosophy 
proposes to preserve the content and truth of our beliefs. Lewis holds that because 
revision of belief is a cost to a theory, they must be revised as little as possible.123 
This conservatism is captured by Quine and Joseph Ullian: 
 
the less rejection of prior beliefs required, the more plausible the hypothesis – 
other things being equal.124 
 
It is in unifying our beliefs which are taken by default to be by and large true that an 
improvement to those beliefs is thought to emerge. On this view, a unified theory 
however beautiful it may be has no claim to truth without incorporating beliefs we 
already take to be true. A central assumption guiding the view that systematisations 
of belief should be unifying but conservative is that the costs and benefits to a theory 
of conservation of prior beliefs and of unification are comparable and can be 
determined (they can be ‘traded-off’ against one another to find an acceptable 
equilibrium). I question this assumption in §5.4. 
 
VI 
 
Fifth, tension. The twin demands of unifying and conserving belief are in tension. 
Lewis takes the task of philosophy to be finding a theory in an acceptable state of 
tension.125 He self-consciously describes this productive tension as follows:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Ibid., 134. 
123 Where revision may amount to treating a proposition we believe to be true, as false or undecided, or treating a 
proposition we believe false as true or undecided, or treating an undecided proposition as true or false. 
124 Quine and Ullian 1970, 67. 
125 See Lewis 1986, 134 and his 1983, x. 
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In trying to improve the unity and economy of our total theory by providing 
resources that will afford analyses, for instance of modality as quantification 
over worlds, I am trying to accomplish two things that somewhat conflict. I am 
trying to improve that theory, that is to change it. But I am trying to improve 
that theory, that is to leave it recognisably the same theory we had before.126 
 
The tension starkly emerges in Lewis’s understanding of the role of conceptual 
analysis: 
 
The object of analysis is to reduce our burden of primitive notions, and to 
make tacit understanding explicit – not to bootstrap ourselves into 
understanding what we didn’t understand at all beforehand.127 
 
How can conceptual analysis serve the goal of improving our beliefs – by reducing 
“the burden of primitive notions” – and at the same time, capture their content? An 
analysis which revises belief, surely cannot at the same time record it. I think 
Lewis’s response would be to say that we have a folk-theory of, say, modality – but 
we are unaware of what it is. His aim is to make that folk-theory explicit, and so to 
show the content of modal belief as supplied by that theory. It turns out, on this 
response, that the contents of our modal beliefs are different from what we thought 
they were. According to this response, this isn’t a revision of modal beliefs; it is a 
discovery of what they’re really about; what is revised is our understanding of their 
content. Our theory of the world can be said to be improved because modal beliefs 
are shown not to require modal primitives, and so a simplification of our 
understanding of modality is achieved. The following passage is a good example of 
this strategy: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Lewis 1986, 134. 
127 Ibid.,154, see also 20 and 189. Compare with two of Lewis’s points about the role of analysis in the 
philosophy of mind, which are applications of “making tacit understanding explicit”. First, “[m]ental features of 
the world…are not at all beyond our ken. Finite assemblies of particles – us – can track them. Therefore there 
must some sort of simplicity to them. Maybe it will be a subtle sort of simplicity, visible only if you look in just 
the right way. (Think of the Mandelbrot set: its overwhelming complexity, its short and simple recipe.) But 
somehow it must be there. Revealing this simplicity is a job for conceptual analysis.” (1999, 297-98). Second, 
“conceptual analysis can reveal the simple formula — or anyway, the much less than infinitely complicated 
formula — whereby, when we know enough, we can pick out a mental feature of the world from all the countless 
other features of the world that likewise supervene on fundamental physics (ibid., 303). 
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The standards of validity for modal reasoning have long been unclear; they 
become clear only when we provide a semantic analysis of modal logic by 
reference to possible worlds and to possible things therein. Thus insofar as we 
understand modal reasoning at all, we understand it as disguised reasoning 
about possible beings. But if these are intelligible enough to provide modal 
logic with foundations, they are intelligible enough to be talked about 
explicitly. Modal reasoning can be replaced by nonmodal, ordinary reasoning 
about possible things.128 
 
The call for ‘replacement’ here is only the call for the replacement of the implicit 
with the explicit; not the elimination of one discourse, and its replacement by 
another. Of course it might be held that Lewis’s response is unsatisfactory. That in 
fact he is replacing one discourse by another. Sure, it might be thought, he respects 
the preservation of the truth-value of modal sentences, but he doesn’t preserve their 
content. On this view, Lewis’s is a weak or pretend form of conservatism. A strong 
or genuine kind preserves the truth and the content of belief. According to this line 
of thought, we are aware of what the content of modal claims are, and the surprise 
we all have on hearing Lewis’s analysis for the first time, shows that if we have a 
‘Folk Theory’ which gives our modal claims their meaning, we are not entirely 
unaware of it. We might put the point by saying that in the Neurathian situation, we 
are aware of what it is we believe. The ignorance about content Lewis requires for 
his re-interpretation of modal belief to work is implausible. 
 
VII  
 
Sixth, this finally brings us to the justification of Lewis’s theory. For a theory to be 
credible it must, for Lewis, be (a) conservative and (b) unified. Lewis takes his 
theory of modality to both be conservative with respect to our modal beliefs and 
more unified than any other theory of modality. This is primarily because he takes it 
to reduce modal notions. It is this feature of his theory that he takes to distinguish it 
from all others, and provide a central reason to belief it to be true. In Chapter 5 I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Lewis 1983, 10. 
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develop this line of thinking, and argue that Lewis’s justification for his theory is 
unsatisfactory. 
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Chapter 3: Ontology   
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
Lewis’s theory is standardly rejected due to concerns about his ontology of worlds. 
Sider, for instance, is typical in thinking that “it is very difficult to believe that they 
exist”, and that they are just “too much to take”.129 Reasons for this rejection, when 
they are rarely given, range from concerns of ontological profligacy, to the 
inconsistency of the pluriverse with the verdicts of physics.130 I don’t believe that the 
central problems with Lewis’s theory are purely ontological, but rather lie in the 
interaction between his ontology and his analysis of modality. In this chapter I focus 
on this interaction by asking what Lewis must say about his worlds for them to fit 
with our modal beliefs (and so meet the material adequacy condition) and reduce 
modality (and so meet the reduction condition, see §1.2 for the conditions). 
 
I will argue for two main points. First, the two conditions seem unable to be jointly 
satisfied in Lewis’s theory. This is because without irreducible modal notions in 
Lewis’s ontology, there appears no way for it to postulate an abundance of worlds. 
Given that Lewis understands our modal beliefs in terms of quantification over 
worlds, there don’t seem to be enough worlds to account for the truth of those 
beliefs. For Modal Realism to work, Lewis must embrace irreducible modality. 
 
Second, Lewis’s theory decides on a number of modal claims which we are pre-
theoretically undecided about or else outright opposed to – it would be better if his 
theory correctly captured our attitude towards such claims or else were neutral with 
respect to them. I provide several examples of such claims, and argue that Lewis’s 
revisionary stance with respect to them makes it questionable that his theory is 
materially adequate. I suggest that one reason for this revisionary stance is that 
Lewis builds into his ontology a combinatorial conception of possibility from which 
a substantive Humean view about what is or is not possible flows. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Sider 2008, 1. For a similar point, see Hughes 2004, 137. 
130 Williamson 2013, xii. 
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These conclusions mean that a common interpretation of Lewis’s theory of modality 
as reductive, materially adequate but unbelievable due to its ontological 
extravagance appears incorrect. Furthermore, it appears to mislocate what the 
fundamental problem with the ontology of worlds is as a problem of ontology, rather 
than as a problem of using this ontology to reductively analyse modality. I proceed 
in this chapter by asking if Lewis’s ontology can play the roles it is designed for, 
specifically, whether his principles of plenitude – the principles used to postulate an 
abundance of worlds – are fit for purpose. I begin by asking what such a principle is 
and why Lewis needs one (§3.1). In the rest of the chapter (§§3.2-3.5) I outline his 
two candidate principles of plenitude, and argue the neither are fit for purpose.131 
 
Before beginning, I want to note an objection to this approach to reduction. It might 
be thought that while it is not obvious whether Lewis’s theory postulates enough 
worlds, it is nonetheless easy to determine whether it is reductive: simply look at his 
analysis of modality and ask if it contains any irreducibly modal terms; given that it 
doesn’t, it is reductive. The trouble with this approach is twofold. First, as with any 
other analysis, the target concept might occur covertly and unobviously in its 
analysans. Determining whether it occurs covertly takes work – and cannot be done 
simply by examining the words used in the statement of the analysis. But second, 
and more importantly for our purposes, the problem with the approach is that it fails 
to respect the fact that Lewis’s theory of modality divides into two, and that both its 
ontology and its analysis must conform to the reduction condition. Any modal 
notions occurring in the ontology must be reducible in the analysis, and the analysis 
itself may not contain any irreducible modal notion. Exclusive focus on Lewis’s 
analysis will not bring out his use of irreducible modal notions in his ontology. 
 
3.1 Why Lewis needs a principle of plenitude 
 
I 
 
For it to be plausible that Lewis’s theory is materially adequate, it is not enough that 
there merely is an abundance of worlds – as there may well be – the theory must say 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 I agree with Lewis who himself accepts his first principle isn’t fit for purpose, I disagree with his verdict that 
his second attempt is. 
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that there is, and I will argue that it appears unable to do so without resort to 
irreducible modality. It is worth nothing the obvious: that while the postulation of an 
abundance of worlds may help make Lewis’s theory materially adequate, it is merely 
a postulation. It doesn’t, of course, answer the questions of whether we should 
believe (a) that there are all these worlds and (b) that they can be used to correctly 
(and/or reductively) analyse our concept of modality.  
 
A principle of plenitude is an ontological principle which expresses the thought that 
there exists a plenitude or abundance of objects of some kind or kinds. Any analysis 
of a notion in quantificational terms presupposes the existence of the range of objects 
quantified over.132 When the analysis quantifies over a very large number of things, 
we can say, vaguely, that the analysis presupposes an abundance of objects. Take, 
for instance, the reduction of the mental to the neurophysiological. It presupposes 
both that quite a lot of brain matter exists, and that an abundance of neurological 
connections exist therein. When it comes to modality, because we take there to be an 
infinite number of distinct possibilities, if modality is to be analysed as 
quantification over worlds, then the analysis presupposes the existence of an infinite 
number of worlds.133 
 
But while the motivation for a principle of plenitude often lies in an analytic or 
theoretical demand, it ought not to be defined in terms of that demand; a principle of 
plenitude should be specifiable independently of these analytic demands. Were 
principles of plenitude for objects of kind F of the form ‘There are Fs enough to 
provide a quantificational analysis of so-and-so claims’, its truth would fail to be part 
of an explanation of why those so-and-so claims are true.134  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Strictly speaking, the presupposition is not made by the analysis – which can be thought of as expressed by a 
bi-conditional of some sort – but by the analysis together with the truth of a proposition which it analyses.   
133 I take an abundance of worlds not merely to require a large number of worlds. For consider a world with one 
grain of sand in it, and nothing else. There is a numerical abundance of worlds if for each additional grain of 
sand, there is a world in which there is just that number of grains of sand and nothing else (at least presuming an 
infinite number of worlds is a numerical abundance of worlds). This is however not the right kind of abundance 
for Lewis’s purposes, for he ties the possibility of F to a world in which F exists. And worlds with grains of sand 
and nothing else don’t even cover all the possibilities involving sand – for instance, the possibility of a shore, 
which requires sand and sea. What Lewis needs is a qualitative abundance of worlds.  
134 Lewis doesn’t always make clear the distinction between the semantic and explanatory purposes he has for 
worlds. Stalnaker does: “Modal realism is really two theses, one semantic and one metaphysical. The semantic 
thesis is that claims about what is possible or necessary should be analysed as claims about what is true in some 
or all of the appropriately individuated parts of reality. The metaphysical thesis is that there exists a plurality of 
parts of reality individuated in this way—a plurality that is full enough to make true many of our ordinary beliefs 
about what is possible and necessary when those beliefs are interpreted in accordance with the semantic thesis” 
(2003, 40). 
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II 
 
Lewis’s quantificational analysis of modality treats modal claims as quantifications 
over worlds. For such an analysis to be materially adequate, it must be shown that 
the truth of our modal beliefs is sustained by worlds. So in order for there to be 
enough worlds to sustain our beliefs, an abundance of worlds needs to be postulated 
(noting what I said above: that ‘an abundance of’ does not simply mean ‘enough for 
some purpose’). Lewis indicates what is required: 
 
We have only to believe in the vast realm of possibilia, and there we find what 
we need to advance our endeavours. We find the wherewithal to reduce the 
diversity of notions we must accept as primitive…135 
 
The principle of plenitude Lewis needs is one which roughly specifies the class of 
possibilia, and so makes explicit what ontological commitments his theory of 
modality incurs. His hope is that the worlds it postulates make possible a reductive 
analysis of our modal notions, and an explanation of the truth of our modal beliefs.  
 
Lewis wants – and it is required for the material adequacy of his theory – a principle 
of plenitude to postulate a space of worlds which matches up with our intuitive 
conception of logical space. Given his view that, upon analysis, we see that modal 
beliefs are really beliefs about worlds, there are two ways a principle of plenitude 
can fail to match up with our beliefs. First by postulating worlds which are 
impossible by our lights, second, by not postulating worlds required for the truth of 
our modal beliefs.  
 
To address the first point, Lewis is not concerned that his principle of plenitude will 
generate impossible worlds. This is because he thinks the notion of an impossible 
world is contradictory and so describes nothing. Lewis’s reasoning is as follows: an 
impossible world is a world at which a contradiction holds; to describe such a world 
is equivalent to asserting a contradiction; and contradictions are necessarily false, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Lewis 1986, 4, my italics. We can think of this as Lewis’s general answer to a question posed by Stalnaker: 
“what kind of metaphysical commitments do we need to make in order to have access to the philosophical 
clarifications provided by analyses of various modal and intentional concepts in terms of possible worlds?” 
(1988, 122). 
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and so describe nothing.136 So long as his theory is free of contradiction – a general 
requirement on any theory – it won’t postulate contradictory worlds, and so won’t 
postulate impossible worlds.137 
 
Lewis’s main concern is the second point above: ensuring that every possibility we 
take there to be is modelled by his ontology. Were his ontology to fail to posit an 
abundance of worlds it would not provide enough worlds to ensure our modal beliefs 
are correct, and so his theory would be materially inadequate. Suppose, for example, 
only two worlds are postulated, our own and another in which there exists only a 
single rose. Putting Lewis’s analysis and this ontology together would yield an error 
theory of our modal beliefs: they are about a plurality of worlds, but there are not 
enough worlds to make them true. A principle of plenitude is, for Lewis, supposed to 
ensure that this kind of deficit of worlds does not arise. 
 
3.2 Ways 
 
I 
 
Lewis generously offered two principles of plenitude which aim to delineate the 
“vast realm of possibilia”. The first, which I call ‘Ways’, identifies worlds with ways 
worlds might be. The second principle, ‘The Principle of Recombination’, states 
roughly that there is a world for every combination of things (see §3.4). Lewis’s 
ontology first included Ways, which was then retracted and replaced by The 
Principle of Recombination.138 I begin by discussing Ways and its problems, before 
turning to The Principle of Recombination and its problems. Despite Lewis 
eventually abandoning Ways, I will argue in §3.51 that its problems also haunt its 
replacement principle. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Lewis 1986, 7 fn.3, 165 and 1983, 21. On contradictions being a priori false see Lewis 1998, 101. 
137 I won’t dwell on this reasoning, but I want to note two points about it. (a) It appears to reveal that Lewis’s 
notion of impossibility is at bottom a narrowly logical notion. This is odd, given that there appear to be 
impossibilities which are not resolvable into contradictions. For instance, that this table is now red all over and 
yellow all over, or that currently, James is taller than Helen, and Helen is taller than James, or that I could be 
born to parents other than my actual parents. (b) The given basis for rejecting impossible objects appears to be in 
tension with Lewis’s acceptance of trans-world individuals which are impossible, despite existing and having 
non-contradictory properties (see §2.1). This last point indicates that Lewis doesn’t simply equate the impossible 
with the contradictory, and so the necessarily false. This seems to indicate that Lewis’s own theory allows for a 
more refined notion of impossibility than both he and some of his commentators recognise.  
138 Lewis 1986, 86. 
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II 
 
Ways appears to be an integral part of Modal Realism. From the very beginning of 
OPW, Ways plays a fundamental role in the formulation of Lewis’s ontology. It is 
the means by which he teaches the doctrine of Modal Realism and so provides the 
basis of our understanding of his ontology. He informally introduces Ways on the 
second page of OPW: 
 
There are so many other worlds, in fact, that absolutely every way that a world 
could be is a way that some world is. And as with worlds, so it is with parts of 
worlds. There are ever so many ways that a part of a world could be; and so 
many and so varied are the other worlds that absolutely every way that a part 
of a world could possibly be is a way that some part of some world is.139 
 
Ways is also used in what, in §2.1, I called ‘Lewis’s Argument’ for his analysis of 
modality:  
 
What actually is the case, as we say, is what goes on here. That is one possible 
way for a world to be. Other worlds are other, that is unactualised, 
possibilities. If there are many worlds, and every way that a world could 
possibly be is a way that some world is, then whenever such-and-such might be 
the case, there is some world where such-and-such is the case. Conversely, 
since it is safe to say that no world is any way that a world could not possibly 
be, whenever there is some world at which such-and-such is the case, then it 
might be that such-and-such is the case. So modality turns into quantification: 
possibly there are blue swans iff, for some world W, at W there are blue 
swans.140 
 
Its official statement comes later in OPW, and is given by the following two theses, 
which aim to postulate an abundance of worlds and their parts: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Ibid., 2. 
140 Ibid., 5, my italics. 
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I made it part of my modal realism that (1) absolutely every way that a world 
could possibly be is a way that some world is, and (2) absolutely every way 
that a part of a world could possibly be is a way that some part of some world 
is.141 
 
III 
 
What does Lewis mean by Ways? There are two readings of this principle which ties 
worlds and possibilities together. It can be read as a correspondence thesis or a 
stronger identity thesis.142 The correspondence thesis states that for each possibility, 
there is a world it corresponds to. The identity thesis states that for each possibility, 
there is a world it is; each possibility just is a world.143 Either way, there will be no 
lonely possibilities unmarried to worlds. There are however two noteworthy 
differences between these readings of Ways: 
 
First, the identity thesis is a view about the nature of possibility or ways a world 
could be, while the correspondence thesis is a view about the relationship between 
ways, whatever they are, and worlds. The identity thesis tells us what kind of entities 
ways world could be are, viz., spatio-temporally interrelated fusions. By identifying 
possibilities with worlds, the identity thesis expresses an account of the nature of 
possibility.144 By contrast, the correspondence thesis provides a model of possibility, 
but leaves the nature of possibility an open question. 
 
Second there is a Rylean intuition which runs counter the identity thesis, but not the 
correspondence thesis. The intuition is that possibilities cannot be identical to worlds 
because worlds are a piece of real estate, and whereas coffee can be spilt on a piece 
of real estate, coffee cannot be spilt on a possibility.145 This intuition is problematic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Ibid., 86. In the following discussion of Ways I will for simplicity concentrate on thesis (1), and will treat 
Ways as restricted to (1). 
142 For the identity reading see Lewis (1973, 85) and for the correspondence reading see his ibid., 89-90 and 
1986, 90-91. 
143 The readings are stated in terms of complete or fully determinate possibilities. Adjustments must be made for 
incomplete possibilities. On this see Lewis 1986, 8, 230. 
144 Though I call this an ‘identity’ thesis, Lewis appears to take worlds to have priority in the following sense: 
possibilities are understood in terms of worlds, while worlds are not understood in terms of possibilities. There is 
a corresponding sense at the ontological level that Lewis takes possibilities really to be worlds, but not vice 
versa. The demands of reduction and identity seem to be in conflict here. 
145 This point was suggested to me by Ian Rumfitt. It should be said that coffee can be split on something which 
is possible because actual, such as this table I write on. The intuition is that coffee cannot be spilt on merely 
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for the identity thesis, for if worlds and ways worlds could be have different modal 
properties, they cannot be identical. By contrast, the intuition has no bearing on the 
correspondence thesis, because the correspondence thesis is uncommitted as to the 
nature of possibility. In particular, it is not committed to possibilities being concrete 
objects which is the source of this problem for the identity reading (see §§4.23-4.24 
for further discussion of ways the world could be).146 
 
IV 
 
I believe the identity thesis expresses Lewis’s reading of Ways.147 He provides four 
reasons to support it. First, ontological economy. He writes: 
 
Why distinguish two closely corresponding entities: a world, and also the 
maximally specific way that world is? Economy dictates identifying the ‘ways’ 
with the worlds.148 
 
The thought appears to be that ways worlds could be and worlds are so similar – 
both in their explanatory role and in what goes on ‘in’ them – that the ways can be 
identified with the worlds. This is thought to result in a more ontologically economic 
theory if (a) we assume that ways worlds can be would otherwise be treated as a sui 
generis entity, and (b) if we measure ontological economy in terms of the number of 
types of entity postulated.149 Given these assumptions, if ways worlds could be are 
identified with worlds – a type we already accept in our theory – we will have one 
less type of thing in our theory, and so we will have a more ontologically 
parsimonious theory. 
 
Second, conceptual reduction. Lewis aims to reductively analyse modality in terms 
of quantification over worlds. If ways worlds could be merely corresponded to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
possible objects or parts of merely possible worlds. The intuition illustrates that we ordinarily treat possibilities 
and concrete entities to have different modal properties, which suggests that possibilities are not identical to any 
concrete objects. 
146 If Lewis does accept the identity thesis, then it would appear he must just bite the Rylean bullet, that is, accept 
that coffee can indeed be spilt on a possibility, and accept that though this is counter-intuitive, it is worth the cost 
to obtain the reduction his theory promises. 
147 That Lewis endorses this reading is clear from his 1986, 5, 13, 86, 185 and his 1973, 85. 
148 Lewis 1986, 86. 
149 See Lewis 1973, 87. 
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worlds, then however successful the analysis of modality may be, there would be the 
further question as to whether ways themselves could be reductively defined. 
Identifying the ways with the worlds removes this additional question, and may be 
thought to establish the reductive credentials of Lewis’s theory. 
 
Third, explanation. Lewis wants to use worlds both to provide a semantic analysis of 
modal discourse and also to explain the truth of modal claims. The identity thesis 
seems better suited than the correspondence thesis to explain the source of modal 
truth. For while a world may correspond with a possibility, and so its existence may 
be used to correctly ‘predict’ the truth of a modal claim describing the possibility, 
the identity thesis takes a given possibility to be identical with a world, and so the 
world can explain the source of the truth of the claim describing the possibility. 
 
Fourth, meaning. The identity reading is also independently supported by Lewis’s 
account of the meaning of modal expressions, which is an application of his general 
account of the meaning of theoretical terms. In brief, Lewis takes the meaning of 
‘possibility’ (and other modal notions) to be given by a definite description which 
denotes an object which plays a certain role in our thought; and he further believes 
worlds to be the very objects which play this role, so he takes possibilities to be 
worlds, just as the identity reading has it (for the above argument and its problems, 
see §§4.25-4.26). 
 
V 
 
Lewis appears to want a principle of plenitude to be a non-trivial general principle 
about the range of worlds which exist, which is independent of his analysis of 
modality. Ways appears to meet these requirements. It lays down a condition which 
not every collection of worlds can satisfy, and so it is non-trivial. It thereby says 
something about worlds, but about no specific world, and so is general.  
 
While its generality means we cannot use it to determine whether some particular 
proposition describes a possibility, we can use it together with facts about what is 
possible which we are already confident of, to infer facts about which worlds exist. 
For instance, it appears possible that there be a blue moon, so we can use Ways to 
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infer that there is at least one world in which there is a blue moon.150 And of course, 
we can in principle use it to go the other way too: from the existence of a world we 
can infer, using Ways, the existence of a possibility. The identification of 
possibilities with worlds is the crucial principle underlying transit across the bi-
conditionals of Lewis’s analysis.151 
 
3.3 The objection to Ways 
 
I 
 
Lewis ends up rejecting Ways as his principle of plenitude, and tries instead to 
secure the abundance of worlds via The Principle of Recombination. I now elaborate 
the reasoning underlying his rejection of Ways, and argue that his rejection of it 
incurs greater costs than he imagines. 
 
Ways is a modal thesis (it identifies ways worlds could be with worlds). So it must 
be analysed by Lewis’s analysis. If Ways is so analysed it turns out to mean ‘Every 
world is identical to some world.’152 Because this is trivial, it cannot serve as a 
principle of plenitude; any collection of worlds satisfies it – it is true even if there are 
no worlds.153 Yet this is a puzzling result: for Ways is the backbone of Modal 
Realism, and we seem to perfectly well understand the apparently non-trivial claim 
that every way that a world could be is a way that some world is. 
 
There appear two ways to resolve this puzzle. The first is to assume we do indeed 
correctly understand Ways and it is indeed a non-trivial condition on worlds. If this 
is so – and this of course was our starting point – then we can only conclude that 
because Lewis’s analysis trivialises it, his analysis gets it wrong. If Ways is an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 A trivial non-knowledge extending case: from actual fact that p, there is a way the world could be such that p, 
and so by Ways, there is a world at which p., viz. the actual world. As Lewis says, “What actually is the case, as 
we say, is what goes on here. That is one possible way for a world to be. Other worlds are other, that is 
unactualised, possibilities” (1986, 5). 
151 Note that Ways provides for transit across Lewis’s bi-conditionals only when modal claims have already been 
analysed as quantification over ways (as in Lewis 1973, 84). For Ways – an ontological principle – connects 
ways worlds could be to worlds, it doesn’t connect statements (such as ‘Possibly p’) to worlds, because it doesn’t 
connect modal statements of any form to worlds. 
152 Lewis acknowledges as much in his 1986, 87. He also considers analysing Ways in terms of other objects in 
his ontology, none of which he takes to fair any better than worlds. 
153 Compare to Rayo 2008, 1. 
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irreducibly modal principle which is part of Lewis’s theory, then the theory appears 
not to be reductive.154 The second way to resolve the puzzle is to assume that rather 
than our understanding of Ways being correct, it is Lewis’s analysis of modality 
which is correct. This of course is a position which Lewis is entitled to. Given that 
the analysis tells us that Ways is a trivially true principle, then because on our initial 
unreflective understanding of it is non-trivial, it follows that our initial understanding 
of it is mistaken.  
 
II 
 
Lewis takes the second view, which leads him to reject Ways as the principle of 
plenitude for Modal Realism. This is, I believe, more costly than he imagines. It is 
costly in part because it is hard to resist the thought that his analysis of modality fails 
to get the right result, given that the analysans is trivially true, but the analysandum 
appears not to be. But a more important reason it is costly concerns what Lewis must 
say about our understanding of Ways. 
 
In OPW Lewis takes us to have understood Ways as a substantial constraint on 
worlds; this is why he uses it in his exposition of Modal Realism (see §3.2). Lewis 
wonders what Ways really means: 
 
It seems to mean that the worlds are abundant, and logical space is somehow 
complete. There are no gaps in logical space; no vacancies where a world 
might have been, but isn’t. It seems to be a principle of plenitude. But is it 
really?155 
 
His answer is ‘no’; the principle apparently means that the worlds are abundant, but 
is in fact trivial. If this is so, then one wonders how we correctly understood Modal 
Realism, based on a principle which is in fact trivial. If it was trivial how did it 
appear to work so well? Was this just a matter of luck? Lewis appears committed to 
the view that our grasp of his Modal Realism was, all along, in fact illusory. Here, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Note that ‘irreducible’ here is relativised to Lewis’s theory. We cannot conclude from the fact that Lewis’s 
theory cannot analyse a concept that it cannot be analysed in some other theory. 
155 Lewis 1986, 86. 
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Lewis must think of Ways as a didactic ladder we climb in order to see Modal 
Realism aright. But then isn’t an explanation of our illusion of understanding owed? 
If Ways only seemed to mean what we thought it meant, how were we deluded, and 
how could an illusion have done so much work in Lewis’s theory? Did it only seem 
to do that work, did we only seem to understand Modal Realism? Lewis provides no 
account either of how Ways could have played a significant role in his theory if in 
fact it was trivial, or of the semantic illusion he seems forced to think we are under 
with respect to Ways. And in the light of the work the principle does in his theory 
(see §3.2) this is surprising. It seems to me that Lewis gets things the wrong way 
round. Ways does mean what we, and Lewis, originally understood it to mean – “that 
the worlds are abundant, and logical space is somehow complete”.156 We know this 
better than we know any analysis of what we say. So because Ways is part of 
Lewis’s theory and because he cannot analyse it correctly, his theory appears not to 
be reductive. 
 
This leads to a connected cost for Lewis. His analysis of modality is not intended to 
be revisionary; rather it is to be a descriptive conceptual analysis (see §4.1). But his 
analysis of Ways is revisionary. For by saying that our ordinary understanding of it 
rests on a mistake, the analysis requires us to revise our beliefs about the meaning of 
this modal claim. In §4.31 I will argue that this scepticism Lewis’s theory induces 
about our ordinary verdicts on the meaning of our modal claims means is not just 
confined to Ways, and that his theory is much more revisionary than it is often 
realised as being. 
 
Lewis denies that Ways plays a foundational role his theory. Were Ways the only 
principle of plenitude on the table, then Lewis’s theory of modality would face 
severe difficulties. For Ways appears either to be trivial and so fails to postulate an 
abundance of worlds, or it cannot be analysed and so fails to be reductive, thereby 
undermining the analysis’ raison d’être.157 Fortunately, Lewis has a reply which he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Ibid. 
157 One option I don’t discuss is that Lewis could fall back on the correspondence interpretation of Ways. It is 
only when ways and worlds are identified that the problems described in §3.3 arise. However, as I said earlier (a) 
the correspondence interpretation of Ways leaves as an open question whether ways worlds could be are 
reducible, and (b) the correspondence interpretation doesn’t provide an explanation of the source of modal truth. 
As both reducing modality and explaining the source of modal truth are the main goals of Lewis’s theory, this 
option is not attractive for him. 
68	  
believes allows him to maintain his reductive analysis and postulate the abundance 
of worlds. The replacement for Ways he supplies is The Principle of Recombination. 
This is, he says, a “new way to say…that there are possibilities enough, and no gaps 
in logical space.”158 He takes it to be a principle of plenitude which can be 
reductively analysed and remain a substantive constraint on the space of worlds. I 
am sceptical about this, and will argue that (a) it presupposes an irreducibly modal 
existence claim about possibilia (see §3.51), and (b) it doesn’t seem to yield the right 
model of worlds to secure the material adequacy of the analysis (§3.52). 
 
3.4 The Principle of Recombination and its roles in Lewis’s theory 
 
I 
 
Lewis’s core statement of The Principle of Recombination is that 
 
anything can coexist with anything else, at least provided they occupy distinct 
spatiotemporal positions. Likewise, anything can fail to coexist with anything 
else.159 
 
This principle, unlike Ways, certainly doesn’t state anything about the abundance of 
worlds – it doesn’t even explicitly mention worlds. It is a claim about the co-
existence of spatio-temporal entities, and the claim is roughly that any such entity 
can coexist (or fail to) with any other. It effectively states that there are no modal 
forces of repulsion or attraction, forcing such objects apart or binding them together. 
 
Note that like Ways, The Principle of Recombination is a modal principle. A modal 
principle in the ontology is compatible with a reductive analysis of modality only if 
the analysis can reduce the principle. Unlike Ways, there are various ways to do so. 
For instance, the principle may be reformulated as follows: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Lewis 1986, 87, my italics. 
159 Ibid., 88. Lewis immediately qualifies the principle, but its unqualified core statement suffices for my 
purposes. 
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For each plurality of distinct things, and for each spatio-temporal arrangement 
of them, there is a world in which only those things in that arrangement 
exist.160 
 
No modal concept appears to be expressed in this principle, so perhaps after all, 
Lewis isn’t forced into making a choice between retaining his reductive analysis and 
obtaining an abundant ontology of worlds. By treating worlds as fusions of spatio-
temporal individuals, Lewis has a way of understanding the variety of worlds in 
terms of the totality of combinations of the individuals that constitute them. 
Combinatorial – that is, mathematical – notions go in place of modal notions. 
 
II 
 
I now want to distinguish two readings of The Principle of Recombination. The first 
reading takes the quantification in it to be actualist, the second possibilist. The 
distinction needs to be made explicit because of how Lewis understands existential 
quantification. For Lewis, existential quantification is to be treated as first-order 
quantification, understood as absolutely general unless restricted. ‘Everything’ 
without restriction, ranges over every object whatsoever, be they concrete or 
abstract, actual or merely possible. For Lewis of course, the domain of ‘everything’ 
includes the plurality of worlds and the things within them. To quantify over 
everything actual is a matter of restricting our quantifiers to include just the world 
we are part of, and the things within it. Because existential quantification may be 
intended as restricted in various ways or as unrestricted, some care must be taken in 
interpreting the quantification in The Principle of Recombination.161 
 
On the first reading, the objects to be re-combined are drawn from the actual world. 
On this reading, The Principle of Recombination says that any combination of actual 
objects is possible; it is a claim about actual objects and their possible combinations. 
For instance, suppose, as I hope is the case, that you and I exist. From The Principle 
of Recombination we can infer four modal facts about re-combinations of these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 For discussion about the precise non-modal formulation of The Principle of Recombination see Nolan 1996, 
Efird and Stoneham 2008, and Derby and Watson 2010. 
161 See Lewis 1986, 2-3, 92-3. 
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actual objects, viz., that we can exist together, that I can exist without you, that you 
can exist without me, and that we can fail to exist together.162 Lewis suggests this 
actualist reading of The Principle of Recombination doesn’t go far enough: 
 
it won’t do to say that all worlds are generated by recombination from parts of 
this world, individuals which are possible because they are actual. We can’t get 
the alien possibilities just by rearranging non-alien ones. Thus our principle of 
recombination falls short of capturing all the plenitude of possibilities.163 
 
Alien individuals are defined as individuals which either instantiate properties which 
are not instantiated in the actual world, or instantiate combinations of actual 
properties in a way not instantiated in the actual world.164 If we take there to be 
(alien) possibilities involving such individuals, then on its actualist reading The 
Principle of Recombination will be materially inadequate, for no re-combination of 
actual individuals will generate the alien individuals that figure in alien possibilities. 
To solve this problem, Lewis should take The Principle of Recombination to 
quantify unrestrictedly over any object whatsoever, actual or possible. And indeed 
this possibilist reading of The Principle of Recombination is suggested in two 
passages. First, Lewis writes that we should understand The Principle of 
Recombination to quite generally “patch together parts of different possible worlds 
[to] yield another possible world” where just those parts exist together.165 In this 
passage, Lewis takes The Principle of Recombination to say that any number of parts 
of any different world – not limited to parts of the actual world, or worlds generated 
from its parts – can be ‘patched together’ to form another world.166 Second, Lewis 
says that although recombination  
 
will not generate alien worlds out of the parts of this world, it nevertheless 
applies to alien worlds.167 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Thanks to Keith Hossack for this example. 
163 Lewis 1986, 92. 
164 Ibid., 91-92. 
165 Ibid., 87-88, slightly amended. 
166 Or more precisely, their duplicates can be. 
167 Ibid., 92, my italics. 
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In this passage, Lewis admits that we cannot use The Principle of Recombination 
together with actual objects to postulate the full range of worlds. The distinction 
between ‘generate’ and ‘apply’ allows Lewis to hold a compromise position: that 
while our theory cannot generate alien worlds – because we cannot give the 
specifications of alien individuals to the theory – if there are some alien individuals, 
The Principle of Recombination will apply to them. We might put it like this: were 
we able to specify alien individuals, the theory would generate every alien world in 
which they are recombined. 
 
III 
 
Lewis believes The Principle of Recombination can take over the role Ways played 
in Modal Realism.168 Ways was introduced primarily as an ontological principle, 
used to state the abundance of worlds. By contrast, The Principle of Recombination 
plays several other roles in Lewis’s theory. It is important to distinguish these roles, 
as it is easy to confuse them: 
 
 (a) ontological, the principle of plenitude for worlds and their parts. 
 
(b) psychological, the method by which we form our modal beliefs, by 
inference from our non-modal beliefs about worlds and their parts.169 
 
(c) epistemological, a method by means of which modal beliefs can be reliably 
or knowledgeably inferred from non-modal beliefs about worlds and their 
parts.170 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 For the opposed view that The Principle of Recombination is not part of Lewis’s Modal Realism, see Efird 
and Stoneham 2005, 21 fn.1. 
169 Lewis writes: “I think our everyday modal opinions are, in large measure, consequences of a principle of 
recombination” (1986, 113). And: “We get enough of a link between imagination and possibility, but not too 
much, if we regard imaginative experiments as a way of reasoning informally from the principle of 
recombination. To imagine a unicorn and infer its possibility is to reason that a unicorn is possible because a 
horse and a horn, which are possible because actual, might be juxtaposed in the imagined way” (1986, 90). 
170 Lewis writes that The Principle of Recombination “gives us our best handle on the question what possibilities 
there are” (2001, 611). It is interesting to compare this with Lewis 1973, where he says that Quinean ersatz 
worlds “give us an excellent grip on the real possible worlds by their ersatz handles” (90). Quinean ersatz worlds 
are understood in terms of quadruples of real numbers whose recombinations represent the occupation of space-
time by matter. See also Lewis (1986, 114) where he notes some psychological and epistemic limits to The 
Principle of Recombination. For a good criticism of Lewis’s epistemic use of The Principle of Recombination 
see Rosen 1990, 339-40. It was Shalkowski (1994, 697 fn.11) who made me aware of the different roles of The 
Principle of Recombination. 
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For each of these principles, insofar as we can use them in our theorising, we are 
limited to postulating, imagining or knowing only those worlds we can think of, and 
so only worlds built out of combinations of actual individuals or properties. The 
principles may apply to worlds radically different from our own, but if we cannot 
think of them, we cannot use these principles in our theorising to postulate, imagine 
or know about them.  
 
3.5 Objections to The Principle of Recombination 
 
I now provide two objections to The Principle of Recombination as a principle of 
plenitude for worlds. First, I argue that for The Principle of Recombination to be a 
plausible principle of plenitude, it must be assumed that every object that could exist 
does exist, and that the principle quantifies over all of them (§3.51). This assumption 
appears to bring in irreducible modality into Lewis’s ontology. 
 
Second, I argue that The Principle of Recombination appears to yield a materially 
inadequate model of logical space (§3.52). I provide illustrative counterexamples 
which suggest that we hold a range of modal beliefs which The Principle of 
Recombination cannot provide for. This is, I take it, largely a consequence of the fact 
that reductive, combinatorialist theories of modality are committed to a Humean 
conception of what is possible.171 And it is this Humean conception which forces 
serious revision and mutilation of our ordinary modal beliefs. 
 
3.51 Irreducible modality 
 
I 
 
I understand that The Principle of Recombination (a) quantifies over any concrete 
object whatsoever, actual or possible, but (b) doesn’t postulate (or ‘generate’) every 
world, because we cannot specify alien individuals in the theory. (a) provides the 
reason that The Principle of Recombination appears to be a powerful principle of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 By ‘combinatorial theory of modality’ I mean any theory that defines possibilities in terms of combinations of 
simple objects. I don’t take this doctrine, as it is sometimes understood, to be essentially limited to re-combining 
actual objects. 
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plenitude; (b) provides the reason it is limited in the context of an ontology which 
aims to postulate, in general terms, every world that exists. In the light of (b) the 
comforting thought was supposed to be: though The Principle of Recombination 
doesn’t postulate every world, it applies to every world (§3.4). We can, it is hoped, 
feel confident that because the principle seems to work well when applied to a small 
sample of actual objects172, there is nothing to prevent it from applying to alien 
objects in alien worlds too. Yet underling this confidence in The Principle of 
Recombination lies the following assumption: that all the objects which exist – and 
which the principle quantifies over – are all the objects which could be. This 
assumption transforms The Principle of Recombination into a plausible principle of 
plenitude. If this isn’t assumed, what reason is there to think that every combination 
of every object according to The Principle of Recombination constitutes an 
abundance of worlds which suffices to analyse modality? I now develop this point. 
 
II  
 
The Principle of Recombination – as an expression of a combinatorialist theory of 
possibility – treats possibilities as the products of applying a combinatorial principle 
to a range of input objects. Combinatorial theories postulate combinations of objects, 
the range of which is determined by (a) which ‘input’ objects the theory takes to 
exist and (b) what particular combinatorial principle/s it employs. The following 
analogy from John Bigelow is helpful: 
 
Combinatorialism may be conceived as a kind of Restaurant Theory of the 
Modal Universe. Something is possible when the ingredients all exist, which 
constitute its recipe. Logical space is the menu, the list of all the dishes for 
which the ingredients exist; the actual world is the series of dishes which arrive 
at our table.173 
 
This is useful because it emphasises the dependence, in a combinatorialist 
framework, of possibilities on the existence of their ‘ingredient’ objects together, of 
course, with how they are combined. If such a theory is used as a principle of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 For some examples of Lewis’s, see 1986, 88. 
173 Bigelow 1988, 41. 
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plenitude, it must assume (a) that sufficient ingredients exist to be combined to form 
every possibility, and (b) that the principle combining these ingredients quantifies 
over all of them. A similar point about the dependence of possibilities on their 
constituent objects in a combinatorialist theory was made by Wittgenstein. He wrote:  
 
If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are 
also given.174  
 
But why would we think that there is a mapping from objects to possibilities such 
that the range of possibilities can be inferred from the totality of objects, given the 
right combinatorial principle? The only answer I can think of – besides stipulating 
that what counts as possible are those combinations – is by assuming that the domain 
of objects include every object there could be.175  
 
To see why Lewis needs to make this assumption, suppose that he doesn’t. That is, 
suppose that there is an object o which could exist but does not. Given it doesn’t 
exist, it is not quantified over by The Principle of Recombination, which quantifies 
over only existing spatio-temporal objects. Thus no worlds which include o as a part 
would, given the assumption, be postulated by Lewis’s ontology. Yet it seems that 
given o could exist, there are a range of genuine possibilities excluded by this 
ontology, viz., all the possibilities in which o figures. No ontology which excludes 
these possibilities, yields the full abundance of worlds. The only way I can see for 
Lewis to go is to equate the totality of objects his theory postulates with the totality 
of objects there could be, and thereby include objects such as o in its domain. In 
effect, Lewis must assume an abundance of possibilia to fund an abundance of 
worlds.176  
 
If this line of reasoning is correct, then Lewis must be able to state this assumption 
explicitly in his theory. The problem is: how can it be stated, whilst avoiding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Wittgenstein 1961, §2.0124. See also §2.014. 
175 Stalnaker (2012, 1-2) sees Wittgenstein and Lewis as necessitists. See also Williamson 2013, 1-2. 
176 The trouble, as Lewis puts it, lies in providing “a domain of quantification suited to the topic of modality” 
(Lewis 1983, 26-27). In this early work Lewis is quite explicit about what is required: “[t]he domain of 
quantification is to contain every possible world and everything in every world” (ibid., my italics). Note that this 
statement is ambiguous between a modal reading of ‘possible world’ as ways a world could be and a reductive 
reading as world. See §4.24 for discussion of this ambiguity in Lewis’s Paraphrastic Argument. 
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irreducible modality? It seems to me that the only way of specifying the class of 
possibilia is in irreducibly modal terms, using locutions such as ‘every possible 
object’ or ‘every object that could possibly exist’ or ‘every way a part of a world 
could be’.177 The Principle of Recombination, as a principle which takes objects to 
worlds, is inevitably silent on how to state the abundance of its input objects; it 
cannot be reapplied to the input objects indefinitely. But the only other principle of 
plenitude that appears on offer is Ways, and we already saw that this was irreducibly 
modal. So The Principle of Recombination, though it appears to be a suitable 
principle of plenitude for Modal Realism, ultimately seems to require an irreducibly 
modal assumption.178 
 
It is worth noting that whether The Principle of Recombination requires an 
irreducibly modal existence assumption is independent of the question of whether it 
applies to or postulates (or fails to apply to or postulate) alien worlds. For supposing, 
in the best case, that The Principle of Recombination could generate alien worlds, we 
still need a reason for thinking that once we have all the worlds which are all the 
recombinations of all the objects there are, including the alien ones, we thereby have 
all the possibilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 We might resist the view that the modal notion involved in stating the assumption requires irreducible 
modality. For instance, we might try to understand possibilia in terms of worlds: as all the parts of all the worlds 
which exist. However, this is clearly unhelpful in the context of combinatorialism. For it is the worlds that we are 
trying to postulate by means of a grasp of their combinatorial constituents. If we already had a grasp of the range 
of worlds, we wouldn’t need to appeal to a principle of plenitude at all (or at least, only to understand the 
engineering of worlds). 
178 Discussing combinatorial theories of possibility, Bigelow wrote that “The risk with all such theories is that the 
constraints imposed on combinations will presuppose modality” (1988, 44). The equal and opposite risk is that 
when there are almost no constraints imposed on the combinations – as in Lewis’s “anything can coexist with 
anything else” (Lewis 1986, 88) it is the hidden constrains imposed on the initial elements themselves which 
presuppose modality. It is to be expected that a combinatorial principle of plenitude requires an additional 
existence claim. For such a principle takes ‘inputs’ to worlds, and to do so it must recognise a range of objects as 
inputs. Lewis was aware of this. Writing about David Armstrong’s actualist combinatorialism, he says that 
“[w]hat possibilities we get by recombining the elements of the world depends on what those elements are” 
(1999, 199) ‘What those elements are’ can be understood both as about the kinds, but also about the range of 
elements which exist. Making this existence claim about inputs explicit in Lewis’s theory seems to require a 
Ways-like principle which says that every way a part of a world could be is a way that some part of some world 
is. 
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3.52 Material inadequacy 
 
I  
 
In the last section I suggested that The Principle of Recombination is incompatible 
with Lewis’s reductive ambitions. In this section I argue that even if The Principle of 
Recombination were to reductively generate an abundance of worlds, the resulting 
theory wouldn’t be materially adequate. A materially adequate theory of modality 
should treat our modal beliefs, as interpreted by the theory, as true according to it. I 
will argue that in the following revealing instances our modal beliefs are revised by 
Lewis’s theory, which means either propositions we take to be true are determined 
by it to be false (or vice versa), or propositions which are pre-theoretically 
undecided, are decided by it one way or the other: 
 
 (1) Beliefs about necessary connections. 
 (2) Beliefs about necessary existence. 
 (3) The belief that possibly nothing exists.  
 
Lewis’s failure to capture our beliefs about necessary connections or necessary 
existence appears to be due to The Principle of Recombination being an expression 
of the Humean denial of necessary connections. While the failure to capture our 
beliefs about (3) seems to result from the combinatorial nature of The Principle of 
Recombination – that possibilities are constituted by existing objects. 
 
II 
 
Lewis makes it clear that The Principle of Recombination builds in David Hume’s 
denial of necessary connections: 
 
It is no surprise that my principle prohibits strictly necessary connections 
between distinct existences. What I have done is to take a Humean view about 
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laws and causation, and use it instead as a thesis about possibility. Same thesis, 
different emphasis.179 
 
The first two examples below aim to show some consequences of accepting a 
Humean conception of what is possible. According to this conception, no distinct 
objects are necessarily connected. The way this manifests itself in Lewis’s theory 
can be seen by the following example which limits itself to the connection between 
two objects: for any objects x and y in any worlds, there is a world w’ in which (a 
duplicate of) x exists but (a duplicate of) y does not.180 Because there are worlds in 
which one exists without the other, it seems to follow that x and y are not necessarily 
connected. So lack of necessary connection comes about because of the great 
diversity of worlds which Lewis takes to exist; there are too many possibilities to 
sustain necessary connections. Lewis introduced a principle of plenitude to ensure 
there is an abundance of worlds – but, as I take the following examples to indicate, 
The Principle of Recombination seems to postulate too many to sustain ordinary 
modal belief. 
 
III 
 
(1) Necessary connections. We appear to believe – or at least, take seriously the idea, 
even if we are undecided – that there is a range of necessary connections between 
distinct things. Two things x and y are necessarily connected just in case either x 
cannot exist without y, or y cannot exist without x.181 We may distinguish two 
classes of statements of necessary connection: those about (a) concrete objects, and 
those about (b) abstract objects.182 An example from the first class: it is not 
uncommon, at least in philosophy, to find those who believe that given they exist, 
their parents must also have existed.183 In the idiom of possible worlds, there is no 
possible world in which they do exist, but their parents don’t. An example from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Lewis 1986, 91. 
180 I generally drop ‘duplicate’ for ease of expression. 
181 Note (a) that any number of objects may be necessarily connected, (b) that x’s existence may require y’s 
existence, though y’s existence not require x’s. To say x and y are necessarily connected doesn’t say in which 
object the requirement lies, and (c) a simple analysis of necessary connection in terms of possible worlds doesn’t 
provide the resources to distinguish between necessary existents that require one another, and those that don’t, 
for because there is no world in which necessary existent x exists and necessary existent y doesn’t, then they are 
necessarily connected, even if neither requires the other. 
182 For a similar distinction see Hale 2013, Chapter 3. 
183 E.g. Kripke 1980, 112-13. 
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second class: it is commonly accepted that a set and its members are distinct, but 
necessarily connected, for if a set exists, so too must its members.184  
 
Lewis’s theory denies both kinds of necessary connection for different reasons. With 
respect to the first class of claims, Lewis’s view is as follows. If for there to be 
necessary connections between distinct concrete objects it is required that a concrete 
object exists in more than one possible world, his theory rules out the existence of 
any necessary connections. For each concrete object is wholly part of just one world 
(see §2.1). If it is the case that for two objects to be necessarily connected it is not 
required that they exist in more than one world, what then is required? There seem to 
be two options in Lewis’s thought. First, for x to be necessarily connected to y is for 
there to be no world in which a duplicate of one exists without a duplicate of the 
other. But The Principle of Recombination clearly rules that there is always such a 
world. For consider a world w in which both x and y exist. By The Principle of 
Recombination there exists a world for each rearrangement of entities in w. And one 
such re-arrangement is a world w’ in which a duplicate of x exists but a duplicate of 
y does not. The second way of understanding necessary connection is in terms of 
counterparts: for x to be necessarily connected to y is for there to be no world in 
which a relevant counterpart of x exists but no relevant counterpart of y. The 
Principle of Recombination doesn’t directly say anything about this, as it re-
combines duplicates, not counterparts.185 But presumably, so long as x and y are 
distinct, and the specification of the relevant counterpart relation for each does not 
include reference to the other, then there will be worlds where x’s counterpart exists 
and y’s does not. 
 
With respect to the second class of claims, which concern abstract objects – for 
Lewis, sets – the first thing to note is that The Principle of Recombination says 
nothing about them. For it applies solely to spatio-temporal or concrete objects. If it 
turns out that some of the entities we count as abstract are in fact reducible to 
concrete entities, then Lewis can treat them as above. For the rest, Lewis’s view 
might be put as follows. Literally speaking, there are no necessary connections 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 There are also hybrid cases, part concrete part abstract that I do not consider, such as fusions and their parts 
and instantiated universals and what instantiates them (perhaps also, sets of worlds are a hybrid case). See 
MacBride 2005, 124-27 for discussion. 
185 Lewis 1986, 88-89. 
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between abstract objects, because for something to be necessary it must be part of a 
world, and abstract objects are part of no worlds (on Lewis’s definition of a world, 
see §§2.0-2.1). So there are no necessary connections between abstract objects. In 
this way, reality is bifurcated: the concrete realm in which necessary connections 
make sense, but there are none, and the abstract realm, in which necessary 
connections don’t even make sense (which is a strange view, given that necessary 
connections between abstract objects such as numbers or propositions is the 
paradigm of necessary connection). Lewis writes:  
 
Numbers, properties, propositions, events—all these are sets, and not in any 
world. Numbers et al. are no more located in logical space than they are in 
ordinary time and space.186 
 
For Lewis, sets are not located in logical space because they are not located in 
ordinary time and space – for according to his theory, logical space is constituted by 
concrete worlds and entities therein.187 However, Lewis proposes a compromise 
view, according to which we can quantify over abstract entities as if they were parts 
of worlds. We think of them as falling in the  
  
least restricted domain that is normally…appropriate in evaluating the truth at 
that world of quantifications.188  
 
In this way, we can understand the possibility and necessity of claims involving 
abstract objects. Call the ‘least restricted domain’ of a world its ‘outer domain’. Then 
the question of whether an abstract object x is necessarily connected to an abstract 
object y, becomes the question of whether every world whose outer domain includes 
x, also includes y. Assuming that numbers are included in this ‘least restricted’ 
domain of every world, it will now be correct to say that there are necessary 
connections between there abstract existences. For instance, the number 2 exists in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Lewis 1983, 40. 
187 So like trans-world individuals, these non-concrete entities exist but are strictly impossible, because they are 
not wholly part of any world (see §2.1). Or, it is perhaps better to say that abstract objects exist but are ineligible 
for having modal properties. 
188 Lewis 1983, 40. 
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every world in which the number 1 exists, and so the two numbers are necessarily 
connected.189 
 
The problem with this view is that just as Lewis sees reality as bifurcated, so his 
notion of necessity has become bifurcated. For necessity with respect to abstracta 
means truth at the outer domain of a world, not truth in a world. It seems that for 
Lewis there are two notions of necessity, and so two notions of necessary 
connection. According to the first, abstracta do not stand in necessary connections. 
This is the sense in which Lewis says “Numbers et al. are no more located in logical 
space than they are in ordinary time and space.” But in a second sense – which 
Lewis calls a “terminological stipulation”190 – we may say that they do stand in 
necessary connections, at least assuming that if abstracta such as numbers exist and 
if they are in the outer domain of each world, they exist necessarily. I take the first 
sense to be the more important one, expressing as it does Lewis’s fundamental 
metaphysical idea: that logical space just is the pluriverse, which is constituted by 
concrete entities, and in terms of which modality is defined. 
 
IV  
 
(2) Necessary existence. It is worth first distinguishing between necessary 
connection and necessary existence. Two objects can be necessarily connected 
without either necessarily existing. For instance, while neither I nor my parents 
necessarily exist, it is plausible to suppose that I am necessarily connected to my 
parents. Put in terms of possible worlds: the necessary existence of x is a matter of x 
existing in every possible world; the necessary connection of x and y is a matter of 
either there being no possible world in which x exists but y does not, or vice versa.  
 
Consider the possibility of concrete necessary beings. As I have noted, Lewis’s 
definition of ‘world’ already rules out the existence of an individual which exists in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Though because numbers exist necessarily, on a modal account their necessary connection is a trivial matter 
(see fn. 180 above). It seems an important difference between necessary connections between contingent beings 
and between necessary beings that necessary connections between contingent beings (such as me and my 
parents) are (a) sensitive to the identity of those beings, and (b) not necessarily symmetric, whereas necessary 
connections between necessary beings (such as the number 1 and 7) are (a) indifferent as to the identity of those 
beings, and (b) are necessarily symmetric. 
190 Ibid., 211. 
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more than one world. Were necessary beings such individuals, then Lewis would 
have to deny their existence. In Lewis’s framework a necessary being is an 
individual which is not itself in every world but has a duplicate or counterpart in 
every world.191 I believe Lewis must deny the existence of a necessary being. 
Suppose a necessary being is a being which has a duplicate in every world. Is there 
such a being? For there to be such a being there must be something in each world 
with the same intrinsic properties. Take for instance one candidate which is a single 
occupied space-time point. Could this be a necessary being? No, because Lewis 
allows that there are non-material words, in which objects are not united by spatio-
temporal relations.192 For any candidate object, there seems to exist a world which 
Lewis countenances which lacks that object; and so it appears that according to 
Lewis there are no necessary beings.193 But this response reveals a tension in 
Lewis’s thought: if The Principle of Recombination is the principle of plenitude it 
must postulate all the worlds, understood in terms of recombinations of spatio-
temporal individuals. Yet by allowing that there are worlds in which there are no 
spatio-temporal objects, Lewis undermines The Principle of Recombination as the 
principle of plenitude. 
  
  
Suppose now that instead of being understood in terms of duplicates, a necessary 
being is understood as a being which has a counterpart in every world. Is there such 
a being? Lewis’s answer might appear to be yes: for, setting aside twins and other 
such problems, each individual has an object in each world it is most similar to.194 
Indeed, if this is all necessary existence demands then every being turns out to be a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Necessary beings and the possibility of nothing are intimately connected. Supposing there were empty worlds 
– worlds with absolutely nothing in them – there would therefore be no necessary beings. In discussing necessary 
beings I assume for the time being, and with Lewis, that there are no empty worlds. I take our pre-theoretic 
opinion to take the possibility of nothing and of a necessary being seriously, and so appears to be in some 
tension. I discuss the possibility of nothing below. 
192 Lewis 1986, 75-76. 
193 It might be thought that the worlds themselves, not things in them, are the only things of which it can be said 
that they are necessary. Though of course Lewis’s analysis of necessity doesn’t allow for this.  
194 Is Lewis really committed to my having a counterpart in every world? One way to say no is to problematize 
the worlds: allow for worlds in which there is no unique individual most similar to me, for instance, by allowing 
perfect twins or ‘infinite worlds’ in which for any individual similar to me, there is another more similar. Another 
way to say no is to place restrictions on the counterpart relation. For instance, stipulate that any counterpart of 
mine must be human. Because there are worlds in which there are no humans, I have no counterparts in such 
worlds. So, if either the worlds are problematized or the counterpart relation restricted, there may be worlds in 
which I have no counterpart, and so I will be a contingent existent. If however, we set aside the problematic 
worlds and keep the counterpart relation unrestricted, then it appears I am a necessary being. Because Lewis is an 
anti-essentialist, he should take there to be no fact of the matter as to whether I am a necessary or contingent 
being. 
82	  
necessary being. But because this definition trivialises necessary existence, it cannot 
be what we mean by it. To detrivialise a counterpart-theoretic understanding of 
necessary beings, restrictions must be imposed on the counterpart relation. On this 
view of necessary existence, are there necessary beings? The only way there can be a 
necessary being x, is if x has relevant counterparts in every world. For instance, if we 
wonder whether The Queen is necessary, we wonder whether she has a relevant 
counterpart in every world, and a relevant counterpart must be a person etc. The 
Queen is, on this view, not a necessary being, for there are worlds where no human 
counterparts exist. Suppose we turn again to space-time points, might a single space-
time point be a necessary being by the above criteria? The problem again seems to 
be that Lewis allows for worlds with no space-time points, and so arguably no 
relevant counterparts for our point. And the same point appears to hold for any other 
candidate necessary being. And again, this puts into question the generality of The 
Principle of Recombination, for Lewis accepts there are non-spatio-temporal worlds 
which cannot be generated by it. 
 
What about abstract objects? The Principle of Recombination understood as the 
principle of plenitude, effectively excludes abstracta from having modal properties, 
and so necessary existence. As I argued above, Lewis has a problem reconciling 
philosophical opinion about modal features of abstracta with his framework of 
logical space as constituted by concrete worlds. At bottom, in my view Lewis must 
say that abstracta are not eligible to enjoy modal properties – such as necessary 
existence – at least, not in the same sense as concrete objects are eligible. For 
instance, to say sets necessarily exist is to say that they are included in the outer 
domain of each world – it isn’t to say, as per Lewis’s analysis, that the sets exist as 
part of each world.195 This suggests that Lewis can either deny that abstract objects 
can enjoy necessary existence, or accept it and be more explicit about the two senses 
of necessity, and the implications of this for his theory. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 This raises the question: are worlds themselves necessary beings? Lewis calls them  “non-contingent” (1986, 
130) and he says of the pluriverse “It could not have been different” (ibid., 80). But worlds cannot literally be 
necessary, for necessity is understood in terms what exists in every world, and worlds themselves do not exist in 
any world. If they are necessary in an extended sense it is one Lewis doesn’t explain. 
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V 
 
(3) Possibly nothing exists. The proposition “Nothing exists” appears to be possibly 
true, so an abundance of worlds should contain such a possibility. Yet it presents 
difficulties for a combinatorialist principle of plenitude, for it seems the very way 
such theories take possibilities to be constituted, excludes it. There are two brief 
points to begin. First, if there are any necessary existents – for instance, space-time 
points or sets – then the question of whether there is a possibility of nothing is 
answered in the negative. For if there is a being which exists in every world, then 
there are no worlds in which nothing exists – and the possibility of nothing at least 
requires this. Second, distinguish between the possibility of nothing at all, from not 
much at all existing. It is the former that is the possibility in question. Some 
mythological stories suggest the world came from nothing, and we might go the 
other way to make vivid the possibility in question. Suppose, if we can, that there 
exists an omnipotent God who destroys our universe together with anything else that 
may exist, and then kills Himself. Now nothing remains of what existed, so 
absolutely nothing exists. It is this final state which is the possibility in 
question.196,197 
 
I will now argue that The Principle of Recombination excludes the possibility of 
nothing. Note that in Lewis’s framework, the possibility of F is analysed in terms of 
the existence of Fs in some world. So the possibility of a unicorn is a matter of there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Or, more mundanely, consider everything there is, and subtract one part of it after another until nothing is left.  
See Baldwin, 1996. These of course are just stories. And it is unclear whether in imagining these stories we are 
really conceiving of the possibility of nothing. Wittgenstein appeared to be ambivalent about our ability to think 
of or imagine this possibility. He writes: “Each thing is, as it were, in a space of possible states of affairs. This 
space I can imagine empty, but I cannot imagine the thing without the space” (1961, §2.013, my italics). But he 
later came to the view that: “it is nonsense to say that I wonder at the existence of the world, because I cannot 
imagine it not existing” (1965, 9, my italics). Other philosophers have thought there might have been nothing. 
Efird and Stoneham, for instance, go so far as to say that any view which denies the possibility of nothing “would 
run counter to both intuition and theory” (Efird and Stoneham 2005, 22). If we presuppose the possibility of 
nothing by taking seriously the question ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ then all the more so do 
metaphysicians need to make sense of the possibility of nothing. The question is taken seriously by a range of 
metaphysicians, such as Lowe and others (in Goldschmidt 2013), Rescher (1984), Nozick (1981), and Van 
Inwagen and Lowe (in their 1996). For critical discussion about Nozick and Rescher’s theories see Kusch 1990. 
197 It has been pointed out to me by my examiners that there are two ways of understanding the view that there 
might be nothing at all. The first is the possibility of the absence of anything material, the second is the 
possibility of the absence of anything material and anything immaterial. The first possibility is plausibly an 
intuitive claim, the second possibility less so, for pre-theoretic intuition has little to say with respect to the 
existence of non-material objects. Further, there are theoretical reasons to think that the latter is impossible. In 
particular, the widespread view that some abstract objects such as numbers or sets enjoy necessary existence. If 
(i) a possible world exists in which there are no numbers or sets, and (ii) necessary being is understood as 
existence in every possible world, then (iii) numbers or sets would be contingent beings, not necessary beings. 
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being a unicorn in some world. Plausibly, the possibility of nothing is a matter of 
there being nothing in some world, that is, a world with no things as parts. Yet it 
appears that Lewis cannot countenance such a world. According to Lewis’s 
definition of a world, it is a fusion of its parts. Where there is a world, there are parts 
which constitute it (combined as per The Principle of Recombination). Because parts 
are somethings, where there is a world, there is a something. This shows that ‘there 
being nothing in some world’ is a contradictory condition. Complete possibilities 
are, for Lewis, worlds, yet the possibility of nothing is nothing, and necessarily, no 
world is nothing.198  
 
It appears that if (a) the possibility of nothing is correctly understood as a world 
which has no things as parts, and (b) this is impossible in Lewis’s system, then 
Lewis must deny that there is such a possibility, and in the following wonderful 
passage, this is what he does: 
 
If a world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated 
things, that makes no provision for an absolutely empty world. A world is not 
like a bottle that might hold no beer. The world is the totality of things it 
contains, so even if there’s no beer, there’s still the bottle. And if there isn’t 
even the bottle, there’s nothing there at all. And nothing isn’t a very minimal 
something. Minimal world there can indeed be. There can be nothing much: 
just some homogeneous unoccupied spacetime, or maybe only one single point 
of it. But nothing much is still something, and there isn’t any world where 
there’s nothing at all. That makes it necessary that there is something. For it’s 
true at all worlds that there is something: it’s true whenever we restrict our 
quantifiers to the domain of parts of a single world, even if the only part of 
some world is one indivisible nondescript point. Of course, if we don’t restrict 
quantifiers from the standpoint of one world or another, then all the more is it 
true that there is something rather than nothing: there is logical space, the 
totality of the worlds in all their glory.199 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 It’s worth stressing here that on Lewis’s view, worlds are not representatives of possibilities, they are 
possibilities (see §3.2). Our world could on some scheme represent nothing – but it is not that very possibility. 
So, while the possibility of nothing plausibly requires a world with nothing in it, Lewis’s conception of worlds as 
fusions of parts under The Principle of Recombination, seems unable to provide for it. 
199 Lewis 1986, 73. 
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I have noted above that it is not clear whether Lewis thinks there is any common 
denominator between worlds, be it points of space-time or just some spatio-temporal 
stuff, because it allows that there are non-spatio-temporal worlds. Yet it is true that 
given what a world is for Lewis, there can be no worlds where there is nothing. An 
ontological conception of possibility, according to which modal claims describe 
possibilities, and possibilities are objects, simply doesn’t allow for the possibility of 
nothing. Combinatorialism is such an ontological conception of possibility, and no 
combinatorial view of possibility would seem able to capture the possibility of 
nothing (for discussion, see §6.1). 
 
What worlds are and what they do are tightly connected for Lewis. Worlds are 
spatio-temporal objects which ‘take up’ or ‘fill’ logical space. They leave no room 
for the possibility of nothing. As Lewis put it, 
 
there are no gaps in logical space; no vacancies where a world might have 
been, but isn’t.200 
 
VI 
 
We have seen that the Principle of Recombination commits Lewis to the 
impossibility of necessary connections, necessary beings and nothing. Therefore it is 
revisionary of both ordinary modal belief and considered philosophical opinion, 
much of which appears to endorse the existence of some necessary connections, 
while being undecided about necessary beings and nothing. Further revisions of 
ordinary opinion should be expected from Lewis’s theory, given its Humean picture 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Ibid., 86. Nothings haunt Lewis’s materialism, for instance, holes (1983, 3-9) and the void (2004, 277-90). 
Absences, he counsels, are: “spooky things, and we’d do best not to take them seriously” (ibid, 283). There is 
another approach, I haven’t discussed, that Lewis appears to take towards the possibility of nothing, which 
results in the same conclusion. Roughly, it is that if there can be nothing, there is a proposition to the effect that 
there is nothing. However, Lewis holds that “truths must have things as their subject matter” (1999, 206) and that 
“[a]ny proposition has a subject matter, on which its truth value supervenes” (2003, 25). He writes: “truths are 
about things, they don't float in a void” (1999, 207). But truths about the nothing do seem to float in a void, for 
no positive characterisation of their subject matter is possible. For Lewis, all truths are about reality understood 
as constituted by what exists, and how what exists exists. He writes: “There is a most inclusive subject matter: 
being. Differences in being come in two sorts. There are differences in whether something is, and there are 
differences in how something is” (2003, 25). The proposition that nothing exists isn’t about something which 
exists, and so there are no ways for it to exist. Lewis’s rejection of the possibility of nothing is part of his general 
rejection of any view in which there are brute facts of reality, modal or otherwise, that conflict with this 
conception of the subject-matter of propositions (1999, 207). The possibility of nothing is a possibility without a 
subject-matter, and so for Lewis no proposition corresponds to it. 
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of what is and is not possible. For such a picture is really a narrowly logical view of 
what is possible: anything is possible, so long as it isn’t contradictory. Ordinary 
belief takes there to be fewer possibilities and more necessities than this picture 
allows.  
 
Furthermore, it seems to me to be problematic that a theory of modality says so 
much about what is and is not possible. It would be better were such a theory to 
remain neutral on topics of substantial philosophical controversy, particularly a 
theory that aims to accurately capture our concept of modality.201 For instance, if 
God is defined as a necessary being, Lewis’s theory allows us to conclude that the 
possibility of such a being is at best merely epistemic – ignorance masquerading as 
possibility.202 But should a theory of modality so easily pronounce on the existence 
of God – or the existence of anything else, for that matter?  
 
A final note about this theory is that its impossibilities (of necessary connection, of 
necessary existence and of nothing) must ultimately be brute facts of the pluriverse. 
For though we can in a sense explain why they are impossible by reference to The 
Principle of Recombination and the analysis of modality, why the pluriverse is this 
way is ultimately a datum we must accept. 
 
3.6 Assessment  
 
Lewis’s theory of modality needs a principle of plenitude. A central problem with 
Lewis’s use of it, I have argued, is that every way the principle is formulated appears 
to lead to conflict with one of two minimal conditions placed on theories of 
modality: (a) the reduction condition, and (b) the material adequacy condition (see 
§1.2).  
 
With regard to the reduction condition, in §3.3 and §3.51 I suggested that any way to 
state that there is an abundance of worlds appears to require irreducibly modal 
notions, and so to violate that condition. The point applies to both of Lewis’s 
formulations of the principle of plenitude, but is more problematic for The Principle 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 For this point see Hale 2013, Chapter 3. 
202 I paraphrase Lewis 1999, 198. 
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of Recombination, because Lewis takes it to be the correct principle of plenitude for 
his Modal Realism. We should expect this problem to arise for any reductive attempt 
to, as Fine put it,  
 
extend the arena upon which the possibilities are realized to include what goes 
on in each possible world.203 
 
If the actual world doesn’t provide the resources to yield the full abundance of 
worlds, then the only reason I can see to think that the non-actual will do is if the 
non-actual is thought of in modal terms. Lewis’s theory in particular appears 
paradoxical: for it uses an ontology of worlds – specified by covertly and irreducibly 
modal principles – to reduce modality, thereby giving with one hand what it takes 
with the other.204 
 
With regard to the material adequacy condition, in §3.52 I argued that Lewis’s 
theory requires revision of a range of our modal beliefs, treating some propositions 
we take as true to be false (and vice versa), and deciding on propositions we remain 
undecided about. This appears to mean that Lewis’s theory fares badly with respect 
to the material adequacy condition. I suggested this is due to Lewis’s theory being 
combinatorialist, and so reflects a Humean conception of what is possible, which is 
not in conformity with common belief. Not only is this a problem as registered by 
the material adequacy condition, but revision of modal belief is an internal problem 
for Lewis, whose conservative methodology prizes the preservation of belief and 
treats revision of belief as serious cost (see §2.2 and Chapter 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Fine 2005, 1. 
204 Compare with Shalkowski 1994, 675-76. 
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Chapter 4: Analysis    
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
I 
 
Lewis’s ontology postulates an array of worlds, which according to his conceptual 
analysis, we unwittingly talk about when we speak modally. In the previous chapter I 
suggested that there is a tension between his ontology of worlds and his analysis of 
modality: the only way, it seems, to design an abundant ontology of worlds is by 
appeal to irreducibly modal resources which undermine the reductive ambitions of 
the theory. In this chapter I ask: does Lewis’s analysis capture our concept of 
modality? I therefore focus on Lewis’s analysis rather than his ontology, and so on 
the conceptual rather than material and reductive adequacy of his theory.205 
 
Can a theory of modality be reductive and materially adequate but nonetheless 
conceptually inadequate? I think so. For suppose a given theory is reductive and 
provides a non-modal definition of our modal notions in terms of the existence of 
worlds and what is true of them. The fact that an analysis of modality usefully and 
creatively exploits a model of worlds doesn’t mean that it correctly captures our 
modal notions. An analysis of modality may both be materially adequate and 
reductive but still wrong.206 We can, after all, propose to define any concept any way 
we like. The question is: what basis is there for thinking the concepts are connected 
in the way proposed? With respect to Lewis’s theory we must ask: even supposing 
there is an abundant ontology of worlds describable in non-modal terms that could 
be used to reduce modality, should it be so used? It is not enough to provide a 
methodological justification along the lines ‘it is fruitful, let us define things so’, for 
not only will such an appeal be limited to those who share the same view of what 
counts as fruitfulness, but it seems reasonable to think that there is a fact of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 I take for granted that Lewis’s analysis is reductive. On the question whether it is a conceptual analysis, see 
the following section. 
206 I assume that there is a matter of fact which makes definitions correct or incorrect, but I leave as an open 
question what the nature of such facts are. Are they, for example, facts about how we use words, or facts about 
concepts, or facts about the natures of the things defined? 
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matter which definitions answer to and which such a justification ignores (see §5.4 
for more reasons why this methodological justification is problematic). 
 
I approach the question of conceptual adequacy as follows. In §1.2 I explained what 
I meant by a conceptually adequate analysis as a matter of the analysans and 
analysandum saying the same thing. How do we test for this? Three criteria that 
might be applied are as follows: First, if two propositions say the same thing, it 
should be a conceptual a priori matter that they do. In our case, modal claims and 
claims about worlds should be connected by a priori conceptual truths. There may 
be metaphysical connections between things which fall under some given concepts, 
but such connections are not purely conceptual because they cannot be discovered 
merely by reflection on the concepts in question. A physicalist analysis of mind, for 
instance, aims to reveal metaphysical connections, as it depends on certain non-
conceptual truths which are revealed in the argument for it (for instance, a causal 
closure principle). A conceptual analysis on the other hand must reveal two concepts 
as conceptually connected, a connection which can be discovered a priori.  
 
Second, if two propositions say the same thing, our understanding of one is 
sufficient for our understanding of the other. Sider may be right in advising a healthy 
scepticism about  
 
the extent and value of definitions. Philosophical concepts of interest are rarely 
reductively defined. Still more rarely does our understanding of such concepts 
rest on definitions.207  
 
Yet if a definition of a concept k is correct it must allow us at least to understand k, 
and the contribution k makes to truths involving it. Whether our understanding is 
constituted by grasp of the correct definition is another question. 
 
Third, if two propositions say the same thing, they should have the same ontological 
commitments. The analysans of a conceptual analysis is typically understood as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Sider 2011, 9. 
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giving the real content of the analysandum, as such, the ontological commitments of 
the analysans are the same as the true ontological commitments of the analysandum. 
In this chapter I provide evidence for the view that the reasons Lewis gives to 
connect modal claims with claims about worlds do not pass these tests. To the extent 
to which the tests are reliable, Lewis’s analysis is unsatisfactory. 
 
II 
 
Lewis’s analysis is a conceptual analysis which analyses modality in terms of 
quantification over worlds (see §4.1).208 Modal words and sentences are taken to 
disguise the deep quantificational structure of the concepts or thoughts they express. 
Modal claims, on this view, just are disguised quantifications over worlds.209 We 
need a good reason to think this is so, that is, a reason to think not merely that the 
connection between worlds and modality can be made out, or is fruitful for some 
purpose, but that it is correct.210 
 
The requirement for a justification of the analysis is made all the more pressing 
because there are several reasons to be suspicious of it, including the following two: 
 
(A) The analysis suggests that modal concepts, which we do not take to be 
ontologically committing, are in fact so. We can see Lewis’s analysis as following 
into a pattern Stephen Yablo has observed: 
 
The problem with these analyses [which bring in objects to analyse concepts 
not overtly existence involving] is not just the unwelcome ontology; it is more 
the ontology’s intuitive irrelevance to the notions being analysed.211 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Recall that when I talk about Lewis’s treatment of modal concepts as quantificational, I always mean the 
analysis in terms of first-order quantification over worlds, as per §2.0. 
209 Lewis writes: “[I]nsofar as we understand modal reasoning at all, we understand it as disguised reasoning 
about possible beings” (1983, 10). The model for Lewis’s understanding of ‘disguise’ is Russell’s Theory of 
Descriptions, according to which sentences involving definite descriptions “are disguised existential 
quantifications” (ibid., 88, my italics). 
210 I already in §2.1 looked at one argument, which I called ‘Lewis’s Argument’, for his analysis of modality. In 
this chapter I look at other of this arguments. 
211 Yablo 2008, 191. Compare with Morton 1973, 394. 
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The definition of modal notions in terms of existence seems deeply unintuitive. This 
is very clear from Lewis’s analysis. Suppose S says ‘Trolls don’t exist but they 
could’. Lewis treats what S says by applying two steps: first, he treats the first 
conjunct as having a hidden world parameter. It means ‘Trolls don’t exist in the 
actual world’. Second, he treats second conjunct as analysed as per his analysis to 
mean ‘There is a world in which Trolls exist’.212 Now a fair reply by S to Lewis 
might go as follows: ‘When I say that Trolls don’t exist I simply mean they don’t 
exist – there are no hidden parameters, I am not talking about any worlds. Likewise, 
when I say that Trolls could exist, I’m not talking about any worlds either. I don’t 
believe that Trolls exist, so a fortiori, I don’t believe they exist in other worlds.’ If S 
explicitly denies there exist other worlds in which Trolls exist, and Lewis interprets 
him as saying that they do exist in other worlds, then Lewis makes S’s beliefs 
inconsistent. Lewis’s analysis appears to attribute implicit beliefs to subjects whom 
explicitly deny them. In this circumstance Lewis must either say that we don’t know 
what our own beliefs really are, or that those beliefs should be revised. 
 
Even when it appears we can analyse a notion in a theoretically fruitful way, and 
when we think that fruitfulness is a reason to think the analysis is right, there are 
strong non-theoretical reasons not to. Suppose it were discovered that a certain kind 
of insect exists in such variety and number to match quite precisely the structure of 
moral truth. A great philosopher proposes defining moral notions as quantifiers over 
insects. Perhaps it could be done, and a naturalistic account of moral notions could 
finally be accomplished. But could it be right that in making moral claims we were, 
all along, just talking about insects? Could ‘cutting edge’ philosophy really discover 
what historiography and hermeneutics could not, that the Sermon on the Mount was 
about…insects? That we can quantify over insects to obtain a materially adequate 
analysis, doesn’t mean we should define the moral in entomological terms.  
 
To convince those of us who have a powerful and palpable sense – not a theory – 
that morals are not insects, the theorist would need to advance a good reason to think 
a conceptual connection holds between moral notions and quantifiers over insects. 
For a revisionary picture of the content of our moral claims is being proposed, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 If Lewis only interprets the second conjunct as containing a hidden parameter, then he will interpret S as 
believing the contradictory claim that Trolls don’t exist (simpliciter) but there is a world in which Trolls exist. 
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indeed it is an error theory of that content. It treats us as right about the truth-value 
of modal claims, only because we are wrong about their content – they do not 
concern, say, sui generis moral properties, but are rather non-moral predications 
about insects.213 Given that this interpretation is revisionary, it needs justification. 
 
(B) Even supposing that modal discourse really is a quantificational discourse – and 
so modal claims purport to be about some things – suspicion remains about 
identifying these things as worlds. First, worlds other than the one we inhabit do not 
appear to be part of our ordinary ontology. Given we don’t ordinarily think there are 
other worlds, we are reluctant to accept a theory which both postulates them. 
Second, given we don’t believe there are other worlds, a theory that interprets us as 
talking about them is not only suspicious, it lands us in outright contradiction as I 
suggested above. To avoid contradiction, we must either deny that this worldly 
interpretation of modality is correct, or else revise our beliefs about the existence of 
worlds to fit the interpretation of their content as being about worlds. Third, if modal 
discourse is accepted as quantificational discourse, we would want a reason to think 
the quantifiers range over worlds rather than one of the other available candidates. A 
central part of Lewis’s reason for preferring worlds, is that only worlds allow for a 
reduction of modality, and no other candidate does. Appeal to the value of reduction 
in justifying Lewis’s theory is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Lewis’s theory is usually rejected because it is committed to the pluriverse, which is 
regarded as an untenable ontology. But I see as even more problematic the fact that 
his theory treats our modal discourse as quantification over worlds, which I take to 
be an untenable analysis. For just as we may be unable to accept a theory whose 
ontology we cannot bring ourselves to believe214 – because it is so widely at odds 
with our ordinary ontology – so we cannot accept a theory whose interpretation of 
the content of our beliefs we cannot bring ourselves to believe, because it is so 
widely at odds not only with what we take to exist, but what we take ourselves to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 An error theory of the content of a class of claims says that we are in error about their content; an error theory 
of the truth-value of a class of claims says that we are in error about their truth-value. Whether a theory is an 
error theory is relative to what we take the truth or content of a class of claims to be. 
214 Lewis employs a similar argumentative strategy in arguing for why he doesn’t take seriously the idea that 
possible worlds are constituted by numbers or sentences. See 1973, 84-89. 
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believe.215 This problem of content isn’t, as it is sometimes thought, reducible to the 
ontological problem, but is a problem in its own right. 
  
Lewis takes the subject-matter of our modal discourse to be about worlds – which 
we have been unwittingly talking about worlds our whole lives. And equivalently, 
when anyone has spoken of genuinely different worlds – as perhaps physicists or 
priests or philosophers have – they have thereby unwittingly been speaking of 
different possibilities. However not only (a) do we not take our modal beliefs to 
incur ontological commitments to worlds, but more importantly, (b) we do not see, 
in general, our modal beliefs as incurring such special commitments, or indeed any 
special commitments at all. 
 
III 
 
The plan for this chapter is as follows. I first provide evidence for the view that 
Lewis’s analysis is a conceptual analysis, that is, an analysis which alleges a 
conceptual connection between modal and quantificational concepts. Lewis accepted 
that argument is required to show that the analysis is correct. I examine three of his 
arguments for the existence of this conceptual connection (§4.2). I find, and this is 
my first conclusion of this chapter, that none of his arguments clearly succeed. 
Further, I argue that there are good reasons to think that there is no conceptual 
connection between modality and quantification over worlds (§4.3). First because 
what we understand when we understand modal claims and what we understand 
when we understand existence claims about worlds appears to be different (§4.31), 
and second, because while existence claims about worlds bring with them 
commitment to worlds, modal claims do not appear to (§4.32). Failing these tests of 
conceptual adequacy suggest, if the tests are reliable, that Lewis’s theory is 
unsatisfactory. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 What it is that prevents us from believing this latter claim, that is, what it is that we know or believe that 
makes such a view implausible is an important question. Some kind of intentional knowledge is certainly a 
candidate explanation. 
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4.1 Lewis’s analysis is a conceptual analysis 
 
I 
 
Lewis’s analysis does not logically follow from his ontology (see §2.1). So we can 
treat it separately and inquire into its conceptual adequacy, independently of whether 
there are the worlds it purports to speak of. In this section I argue that Lewis’s 
analysis is a conceptual analysis.216 This prepares the ground for the rest of the 
chapter, where I ask: is it the correct conceptual analysis of modality? The reason for 
stressing the point in this section is that it is not obvious that just because Lewis 
offers an analysis of modality, he is thereby offering a conceptual analysis. 
 
At a certain distance, analyses in philosophy all look the same, having the same dull 
form: s iff r. Such statements are often glossed as ‘giving the truth-conditions of’ or 
‘giving an analysis of’ a class of sentences. But this clarifies things very little, given 
that very different projects are presented in this form. They include: giving the 
meaning of a class of claims, saying what objects or facts make them true217, saying 
what kind of facts constitute a target class, or saying which facts the target class 
supervene on.218 
 
To briefly illustrate the current diversity of views about analysis, I take two recent 
philosophers of modality. First, Williamson’s analysis of modality in terms of 
counterfactuals is intended neither to directly given the meaning of our modal 
concepts nor explain the source of their truth. His analysis occurs in an 
epistemological setting, and its point is to show that modal statements are logically 
equivalent to counterfactuals. He takes this to demonstrate that creatures with the 
“ability to handle” one kind of statement, can also “handle” the other kind.219 
Second, by contrast Shalkowski is interested in the plausibility of what he calls 
“wholly metaphysical” analyses of modality, which aim to show that modal facts are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 I don’t say it is only a conceptual analysis. It may have other, perhaps explanatory, roles in addition, but it is 
at least a conceptual analysis. 
217 These two projects are sometimes assimilated, perhaps for the reason that meaning and truth-conditions are 
often equated. 
218 Note that it is not that any analyses strictly say these things – strictly speaking, an analysis says nothing 
beyond the bi-conditional it expresses. It is what analyses are used for in the context of a philosophical theory 
which has a theoretical goal, which makes it permissible to speak loosely of what an analysis says. 
219 Williamson 2007, 160. 
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“ultimately, complexes of non-modal facts”.220 This understanding of analysis is not 
about relationships between concepts, but about relationships between facts. 
 
The projects Williamson and Shalkowski discuss couldn’t be more different – one 
logical or epistemological, the other metaphysical – but both are presented with the 
same superficial gloss: ‘giving an analysis of modality’ or ‘giving the truth 
conditions of modal claims’. The different theoretical settings yield different kinds 
of analysis with different roles in their respective theories. The difficulty of 
understanding, just by looking at it written out, what kind of analysis is being put 
forward by a theorist and what its purpose is in their theory, motivates clarifying 
what kind of analysis Lewis is putting forward, and what its purpose is. 
 
II 
 
The enterprise to which Lewis’s account of modality is a contribution – giving an 
analysis or defining modality – is not at all clear. This is for two reasons. Firstly 
because of the difficulty of specifying what it is to give an analysis of something. To 
identify a theory as ‘giving an analysis’ is, as Ian McFetridge forcefully put it, 
 
…merely to locate, in the vaguest way possible, a perhaps empty class of 
putative philosophical projects. For we have, I think, no clear view of what the 
task, peculiarly philosophical, of defining, explaining, analysing or explicating 
words, notions or concepts, actually is: no single unchallenged account of the 
constraints to which…in general, a project thus delineated, should be 
subject.221 
 
Secondly, because Lewis himself does not clearly state how he thinks his analyses 
should be understood or what their purpose (or purposes) are. As Daniel Nolan 
points out,  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Shalkowski 1994, 671. 
221 McFetridge 1990, 29-30. For similar concerns see Oliver 1996, 50. 
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[o]ften Lewis just goes ahead and produces an analysis, without telling readers 
exactly what he thinks he is doing.222 
 
For instance, nowhere in OPW does Lewis say clearly: ‘I am giving a conceptual 
analysis of modality, by which I mean thus-and-so, for the purpose of such-and-
such’. Indeed, he instead uses evasive descriptions of what his analysis achieves. For 
instance, he writes that according to his analysis “modality turns into 
quantification”223 or “necessity amounts to universal quantification”224 or “modality 
de re…is quantification over possible individuals.”225 But without explanation, such 
statements clarify little. Further, Lewis takes the manifesto of OPW to be showing 
the  
 
many ways in which systematic philosophy goes more easily if we may 
presuppose modal realism in our analyses.226 
 
And so appears to be justifying his analyses – including that of modality – more by 
the reductive and explanatory work they can do for systematic philosophy, than by 
their getting things right conceptually. 
 
III 
 
Despite this lack of clarity, from the little that Lewis says explicitly, it is fair to say 
that he takes philosophy to be tasked with giving conceptual analyses and he takes 
the analyses he gives to be conceptual analyses, including the analysis of modality. I 
now provide evidence that this is how Lewis saw things. First, he says that the object 
of analysis is twofold, to 
 
reduce our burden of primitive notions, and to make tacit understanding  
explicit – not to bootstrap ourselves into understanding what we didn’t 
understand at all beforehand.227  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Nolan 2005, 213. 
223 Lewis 1986, 5, my italics. 
224 Ibid., 7, my italics. 
225 Ibid., 8, my italics. 
226 Ibid., vii. 
227 Ibid., 154. 
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The two objects of analysis are two reasons to think of Lewis’s picture of analysis as 
conceptual. (i) Analysis aims to reduce the ‘burden’ of primitive concepts, that is, 
decreasing the number of concepts required to understand some subject-matter. 
Primitive notions are the concepts contained in, but not definable in, a theory (see 
§5.1). Lewis sees the aim of analysis being driven by the need to show that certain 
concepts which are thought to be primitive can, in fact, be reductively defined, and 
so our understanding of them can be illuminated. By tying them both to definitions, 
Lewis connects the motivation for conceptual analysis with that of reduction. (ii) A 
condition on that definition is that it does not revise or eliminate our concepts – nor 
does it seek to justify or undermine them –  but aims merely to make “tacit 
understanding explicit”. The analysis thereby aims to reveal the concepts in terms of 
which we ordinarily, though implicitly, understand the target concept.  
 
Second, discussing his analysis of mind, Lewis writes that “conceptual analysis” can 
 
reveal the simple formula — or anyway, the much less than infinitely 
complicated formula — whereby, when we know enough, we can pick out a 
mental feature of the world from all the countless other features of the world 
that likewise supervene on fundamental physics.228 
 
And similarly  
 
[m]ental features of the world…are not at all beyond our ken. Finite assemblies 
of particles – us – can track them. Therefore there must be some sort of 
simplicity to them. Maybe it will be a subtle sort of simplicity, visible only if 
you look in just the right way. (Think of the Mandelbrot set: its overwhelming 
complexity, its short and simple recipe.) But somehow it must be there. 
Revealing this simplicity is a job for conceptual analysis.229 
 
Analysis here appears to be conceptual. We understand a subject-matter F, but how 
we do so, that is, by means of which concepts, is unclear. Analysis should reveal the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Lewis 1999, 303. This can be compared to the similar question of what simple formula is grasped whereby 
finite beings can grasp an infinitely complex thing as our mother tongue. See Foster 1976, 1. 
229 Lewis 1999, 297-98. 
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conceptual means by which we actually understand F – not those by which we 
should understand it.230 
 
Third, in Counterfactuals Lewis writes that  
 
I believe there are worlds where physics is different from the physics of our 
world, but none where logic and arithmetic are different from the logic and 
arithmetic of our world. This is nothing but the systematic expression of my 
naive, pre-philosophical opinion that physics could be different, but not logic 
or arithmetic.231 
 
The ‘nothing but’ can be read conceptually: the content of the modal belief just is the 
quantificational proposition. Whether this is the correct reading of the passage above 
depends on exactly what the ‘systematic expression’ relation preserves, which Lewis 
doesn’t explain. 
 
Fourth, Lewis makes fairly clear in OPW, despite the hedging mentioned above, that 
his analysis is conceptual: 
 
I myself, of course, do think that modal operators are quantifiers over possible 
worlds…I believe that there exist frames which afford correct interpretations 
of the modal operators.232 
 
Lewis is not just after a useful interpretation, he wants one which gets our modal 
concepts – which are often expressed by modal operators – right. 
 
Fifth, we know Lewis was sensitive to the different functions analysis can play in 
different theoretical settings. For instance, he makes this good point about 
Armstrong’s use of analysis: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 Note that the picture of our concepts that emerges from Lewis’s passage cannot simply be extended to any 
other concept. According to this passage, our simple concept of mind reflects a pattern in nature. But concepts 
which are not about natural objects – such those of number or modality – cannot easily be understood in terms of 
‘tracking’ patterns in nature. Having said that, and despite the absence of a plausible epistemology for it, Lewis’s 
analysis of modality is probably the nearest thing we have to such a ‘tracking’ treatment of modality. 
231 Lewis 1973, 88, my italics. See also ibid., 92. 
232 Lewis 1986, 20, my italics. 
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Armstrong has an unfamiliar notion of analysis. Analysis is not, primarily, a 
quest for definitions. Rather, it is a quest for truth-makers.233 
 
Armstrong’s notion of analysis is unfamiliar to Lewis because it is not primarily a 
quest for definitions. This indicates that for Lewis analysis is ordinarily a quest for 
definitions. An analysis which is a quest for a definition – in the sense that it is an 
attempt to provide a correct interpretation, not a stipulation or revision of its 
meaning – is a conceptual analysis. 
 
IV 
 
That Lewis provides a conceptual analysis of modality is the standard view among 
his commentators.234 Chihara is perhaps the most explicit. He asks – in fact, is the 
only one who directly asks – the right question: “Is Lewis proposing an analysis of 
our modal concepts?”235 And answers:  
  
Lewis is not advocating replacing our crudely characterized pre-analytic modal 
concepts by his realistic possible worlds ones. No, he takes himself to be 
providing the correct analyses of these concepts and “correct interpretations” 
of the modal operators.236 
 
To back up this interpretation, he adds that Lewis’s endorsement of a reading of The 
Principle of Recombination – understood, psychologically, as the basis by which we 
form our modal beliefs (see §3.4) – is 
 
additional evidence that Lewis regards his possible worlds account as giving us 
a correct analysis of our modal concepts.237 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Lewis 1999, 203. 
234 One dissenting voice appears to be Shalkowski. He thinks Lewis “appeared to flirt with conceptual analysis” 
in his Paraphrastic Argument in Counterfactuals. But that “Though he continued to endorse the argument, it 
confers no serious epistemic warrant on his key ontological thesis and, so, plays no role in the mature 
development of his metaphysical programme in OPW. There the main general strategy was to use something like 
an inference to the best explanation” (Shalkowski 2010, 170). It should be emphasised however, that Shalkowski 
is discussing arguments Lewis gave for the existence of worlds, not for the legitimacy of his analysis of modality. 
235 Chihara 1998, 81. 
236 Ibid., 82. 
237 Ibid. 
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Melia likewise frames Lewis’s analysis as conceptual: 
 
The extreme realist promises to provide a reductive analysis of the concepts 
necessarily and possibly…238 
 
John Divers and Melia take the  
 
major explanatory ambition that is associated with…[Lewis’s theory is] that of 
providing an analysis of the concept of possibility.239 
 
In his review of OPW, Stalnaker takes Lewis to hold that 
 
our modal discourse…is discourse about this plurality of worlds….Lewis’s 
arguments will make us think more than twice about how to understand modal 
discourse, as well as the many other conceptual phenomena to which the 
possible worlds framework has been applied…[Lewis makes a] semantic claim 
that statements about what might or must be true are to be analysed as 
quantifications over these universes.240 
 
McFetridge treats Lewis’s analysis as both giving a conceptual analysis and also as 
explaining the truth of modal claims, at once. He interprets Lewis as saying that 
 
our various modal operators are to be interpreted as various kinds of 
quantifiers over…worlds. Our modal judgements, when true, are true in virtue 
of how things stand in this domain of possible worlds. The aim of modal 
thought is accordingly to represent how things are in this realm.241 
 
Ralph Wedgwood holds Lewis’s analysis to belong to a species of analysis 
according to which 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 Melia 2003, 110. See also ibid., 109. 
239 Divers and Melia 2002, 17. 
240 Stalnaker 1988, 117-18, my italics. Also see page 122 and his 2003, 40 for related points. 
241 McFetridge 1990, 141. 
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modal claims are really only abbreviations of statements about what worlds 
there are, and about what is the case at those worlds.242  
 
William Lycan wrote that 
 
Lewis intends his possible-world analyses of modal sentences to give those 
sentences’ respective truth-conditions in this Davidsonian sense or something 
relevantly like it…[where ‘this Davidsonian sense’ is characterised as “the 
core component of the sentence’s locutionary meaning”].243 
 
Finally, Michael Loux interprets Lewis as saying that a  
 
realistic interpretation of possibilia is merely a formalisation of our common-
sense thinking about modality.244 
 
Though differing in detail – including perhaps the employment of different notions 
of ‘concept’ – each of these commentators takes Lewis’s analysis to be some kind of 
conceptual analysis which defines modal notions in quantificational terms. 
 
4.2 Lewis’s arguments for the conceptual connection 
 
In the light of the view that his analysis is a conceptual analysis, we can ask: what is 
Lewis’s reason for connecting our modal and quantificational concepts, as per his 
analysis? He doesn’t appear to think the connection is obvious, or that we can 
discern it by introspection. Rather, he takes it to require argument. He proposes two 
kinds of argument, which provide two different ways of connecting modality to 
quantification over worlds. The first kind aims to justify the analysis of modality 
indirectly, by justifying the whole theory of which it is a part. I postpone discussion 
of this argument until Chapter 5, where I ask what the justification for the whole of 
Lewis’s theory of modality is. The second kind of argument is a direct argument 
which aims to justify the analysis in the face of doubts we may have about defining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 Wedgwood 2000 413, my italics.  
243 Lycan 1979, 294. 
244 Loux 1979, 10, my italics. 
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modality in terms of worlds (as in §4.0). It comes in two varieties: translation 
arguments and theoretical identification arguments. The first variety uses the 
putative translatability of modal discourse as quantification over worlds to justify the 
conceptual connection. This can be done in two ways: with explicit rules of 
translation (see §§4.21-4.22), or without such rules (see §§4.3-4.4). The second 
variety of argument uses the identifiability of possibilities with worlds to justify the 
analysis (§§4.25-4.26). In the following sections (§§4.21-4.26) I examine whether 
either of these two varieties of argument succeed in establishing an a priori 
conceptual connection between modal claims and quantification over worlds. 
 
4.21 Translation with explicit rules 
 
Lewis appeals to the following evidence, in attempting to establish the translatability 
of modal discourse as non-modal quantification over worlds: that modal discourse, 
as formalised by Quantified Modal Logic (QML), can be translated by some fairly 
simple explicit rules into sentences of Counterpart Theory (CT), a first-order non-
modal language which quantifies over worlds and their parts. In his ‘Counterpart 
Theory and Quantified Modal Logic’245 Lewis proves the translatability of QML into 
CT by means of a translation scheme. He elaborates the idea behind the scheme as 
follows: 
 
Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic seem to have the same subject 
matter; seem to provide two rival ways of formalizing our modal discourse. In 
that case they should be intertranslatable; indeed they are. Hence I need not 
give directions for formalizing modal discourse directly by means of 
counterpart theory; I can assume the reader is accustomed to formalizing 
modal discourse by means of modal operators, so I need only give directions 
for translating sentences of quantified modal logic into sentences of 
counterpart theory….If the translation scheme I am about to propose is correct, 
every sentence of quantified modal logic has the same meaning as a sentence 
of counterpart theory, its translation; but not every sentence of counterpart 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Lewis 1983, 26-38. I assume some familiarity with the arguments of this paper in this and the following 
section. 
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theory is, or is equivalent to, the translation of any sentence of quantified 
modal logic.246 
 
Based on this passage, we may attribute the following argument for the correctness 
of his analysis to Lewis. ‘The justification for analysing modal notions in terms of 
quantification over worlds (and their parts) is that for every modal claim, there is a 
non-modal claim which quantifies over worlds (and their parts) which has the same 
meaning. What is the evidence for this view? It is the proof that QML can be 
translated by CT by a small number of simple rules. The fact that QML is taken to 
formalise at least a significant chunk of our ordinary English modal discourse, means 
that for that chunk CT provides non-modal translations of it. For the remainder of 
our modal discourse that QML cannot formalise, CT can directly translate and 
without rules. We thus have good reason for thinking the analysis of modality in 
terms of quantification over worlds and their parts correctly reflects the connections 
which hold between our modal concepts. The proof provides the main reason, and 
the direct translation fills out the rest of the picture.’ I now both clarify and critique 
this argument. 
 
4.22 Clarification and critique 
 
I 
 
Does translation by means of explicit rules provide a foundation for the analysis of 
modality? Lewis certainly thinks so, and rather than trading intuitions about what the 
correct analysis is, he takes his translation scheme to demonstrate that the meaning 
of modal sentences is given by non-modal sentences quantifying over worlds and 
their parts.247 I suggest that this interpretation of his proof makes three assumptions 
about the epistemology of translation, which are, if true, not a matter of proof, and 
this makes his argument appear much weaker than it initially seems, and requires 
Lewis to say much more than he does in its defence.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 Ibid., 29. 
247 Ibid. 
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II 
 
To be used as evidence for the view that counterpart theoretic claims provide the 
meaning of our modal discourse, Lewis’s argument assumes: (i) that we can 
determine that a class of ordinary modal claims have the same meaning as sentences 
of QML248, (ii) that we can determine there are sentences of CT which have the same 
meaning as English modal sentences, but for which there exists no formalisation in 
QML249, and (iii) no other rival translation scheme is as good as his. I first discuss (i) 
and (ii) together, and then come to (iii). 
 
Without (i) holding, a proof that QML can be translated by CT may just be a game 
of symbols. It is only because we can determine that QML is itself taken to translate 
our modal discourse, that a proof of the translatability of QML to CT is significant 
for the conceptual analysis of modality.250 With respect to (ii), it is assumed that we 
can determine that for a significant sub-class of modal sentences of English, that 
each member can be paired with a sentence of CT, which gives the meaning of the 
English sentence. The basis of Lewis’s claim that CT gives the real content of modal 
claims, is in part due to the existence of the class of sentences of English that CT can 
but QML cannot translate.251  
 
What is important here is the epistemic point, that our ability to determine whether 
English sentences can be – as in (i) – translated into QML or – as in (ii) – into CT, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 Lewis writes: “I can assume the reader is accustomed to formalizing modal discourse by means of modal 
operators” (ibid.). This formalisation is a translation of a fragment of natural language modal discourse into 
QML. It is clear that Lewis doesn’t think that all modal discourse can be so translated, because he takes there to 
be some modal sentences of English which have no correct formalisation in QML (see ibid.). 
249 CT can translate sentences which QML cannot correctly formalise. Lewis writes: “If the translation scheme I 
am about to propose is correct…not every sentence of counterpart theory is, or is equivalent to, the translation of 
any sentence of quantified modal logic. Therefore, starting with a fixed stock of predicates other than those of 
counterpart theory, we can say more by adding counterpart theory than we can by adding modal operators” (ibid., 
29-30). The evidence for this is found by using English as a ‘neutral’ language, and showing that there are 
sentences of it which CT can translate and QML cannot translate. 
250 There is however some evidence that Lewis doesn’t think that QML formalises our modal discourse. He 
writes: “What is the correct counterpart-theoretic interpretation of the modal formulas of the standard language 
of quantified modal logic? – Who cares? We can make them mean whatever we like. We are their master. We 
needn't be faithful to the meanings we learned at mother’s knee – because we didn’t” (1986, 12). This is puzzling 
on my interpretation, for if QML simply formalises a fragment of modal discourse, then its symbols inherit their 
meaning from that discourse, and so we are not their master, any more than we are of any word of English that 
we did learn at mother’s knee. Perhaps Lewis’s point in the above passage is that it is the symbols box and 
diamond which may be used to mean what we like. Once, however, they have been defined in terms of our 
original modal concepts, we are no longer their master. We are masters of what meaning we may associate with 
arbitrary symbols, but not of symbol-meaning pairs. 
251 Lewis 1983, 29. 
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exploits our powers of judgement, and is not a matter of proof. Determining the truth 
of (i) appears to depend on intuitive judgements about when a sentence of English is 
correctly translated by QML. Determining the truth of (ii) appears to depend on 
intuitive judgements about (a) when a sentence of English is incorrectly translated 
into QML, and (b) when a sentence of English is correctly translated into CT. The 
kind of intuitive judgements required to sustain (i) and (ii) go well beyond intuitions 
about truth-values of sentences.252 For in judging that some sentence of English has 
the same meaning as a sentence of QML or CT is not the same as judging that the 
two sentences have the same truth-value. The judgements required are about 
meaning or, at the very least, truth-conditions. And no explicit rules govern or guide 
translation from English into an artificial language, or the other way round, and 
arguably no rules could. In the absence of rules, we make an unaided intuitive 
judgement about when two sentences have the same meaning. (As Quine pointed 
out, in a discussion about the interpretation of temporal discourse – specifically, 
about whether it is really a matter of quantification over times – a central “difficulty 
of establishing a mechanical routine for translating words into symbols” is the 
existence of “ambiguous statements of ordinary language” which “call for [a] 
sympathetic reading and an element of implicit psychologizing; and these are 
essential factors in translating words into rigorous symbolism.”253 It seems that for 
Quine, the existence of ambiguity in natural language means that if sentences of 
artificial languages are to translate what we mean in a natural language, unaided 
judgments as to the correctness of a proposed translation from natural language to an 
artificial language are often necessary in determining whether a given sentence of 
natural language is ambiguous, and whether the translation into an artificial language 
is correct.) 
 
The following diagram represents Lewis’s picture of the translational relations of 
English, QML and CT. The arrows denote the ‘is translated by’ relation, where hard 
lines mean that every sentence of the language, or the relevant fragment of it, can be 
translated in the direction of the arrow, and the dotted lines mean that some 
sentences of the language can be translated in the direction of the arrow. The basis 
for the translation – intuitions or explicit rules – is indicated. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 See Hazen 1979, 319-24. 
253 Quine 1965, 91, my italics. 
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Lewis seems to accept the centrality of intuition in determining correct translation. 
For instance, in ‘Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies’,254 as part of an 
argument that his translation of a certain modal sentence in counterpart-theoretic 
terms is correct, Lewis brings into play the consideration that  
 
if I contemplate the propositions I express by means of…[the target sentence, 
and its putative translation]…it seems to me that they are the same.255 
 
In OPW, Lewis makes explicit his abandoning the formalisation of modal claims in 
QML when such translations break down, and rather to use “the resources of modal 
realism directly,”256 This means increasing the reliance on intuitive judgments of 
whether modal claims of English and quantifications over worlds have the same 
meaning. Following Lewis’s ‘direct’ method, we first contemplate the propositions 
expressed by the two sentences, and then use introspection (that is, ask ourselves) 
whether they have the same meaning. I suggested in §4.2 that Lewis’s appeal to 
argument to found his analysis was supposed to avoid appeal to introspection – it 
now seems that he may still require use of it, and so the journey from introspection 
to proof has come full circle. 
 
To summarise the main point about (i) and (ii): Lewis’s translation scheme is 
relevant to determining the meaning of our modal discourse only if we accept the 
reliability of our intuitions about: (a) the meaning of our modal discourse in English, 
(b) the meaning of sentences in QML and CT, and (c) the truth of sentences stating 
the synonymy of sentences of English and QML or of English and CT. Such 
intuitions are direct, in the sense that they appear unmediated by a (readily 
articulable) translation scheme, and so not dependent on explicit rules. As a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Lewis 1983, 47-54. 
255 Ibid., 53. For other examples of this method see his ‘Anselm and Actuality’ in ibid., 10-12. 
256 Lewis 1986, 13. 
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consequence, the translation scheme alone doesn’t provide irrefutable proof that the 
real meaning of modal claims is quantification over worlds and their parts. The 
translation scheme is, rather, part of an argument that depends on our intuitive 
verdicts on a range of semantic questions, none of which are straightforward. Lewis 
would need to have said more about how the epistemology of translation for it to be 
clear how he came to these verdicts and how they can be verified. 
 
III 
 
I now turn to problems for (iii), the view that no other rival translation scheme to 
Lewis’s is as good as his own. Suppose that the above problems vanish, and that we 
accept that Lewis has provided a translation of our ordinary discourse in counterpart-
theoretic terms. What precisely has been shown? Has it, in particular, been shown 
that modal claims quantify over worlds and their parts? There are two interrelated 
problems with thinking so: (1) there are rival counterpart theoretic translations, 
quantifying over entities other than Lewisian worlds and their parts, (2) connectedly, 
counterpart-theoretic translations may themselves be translated back into a modal 
language which would leave the primacy of the counterpart-theoretic translation in 
doubt.257 (1) and (2) would have to be ruled out to have confidence in Lewis’s 
theory. I now say more about these two points.  
 
(1) While CT translates modal claims as being about worlds, worlds in Lewis’s 
understanding of them as concrete entities, are inessential to his proof. Hazen makes 
the point that 
 
adoption of a counterpart-theoretic semantics is compatible with taking 
possible worlds to be purely abstract structures, with the same ontological 
status, whatever it may be, as the structures studied in pure mathematics.258 
 
So even if CT is right to the extent that modal claims quantify over something, and 
that their truth-conditions involve counterparts, we need a further reason to prefer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 I have until now used ‘counterpart-theory’ or ‘CT’ to refer to Lewis’s counterpart theory. In recognition of the 
various versions of the theory, I now use ‘counterpart-theory’ to refer to any theory which analyses de re 
modality in terms of counterparts of some kind. ‘CT’ continues to refer to Lewis’s counterpart theory. 
258 Hazen 1979, 319-20. 
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Lewis’s version of the theory rather than another, which quantifies over something 
other than worlds and their parts. There are many different views about what entities 
a counterpart theory should be understood as quantifying over – so many, that the 
mere fact that any one of them can translate our modal discourse provides no reason 
for thinking that that translation gives the meaning (and so the subject-matter) of the 
discourse.259 Fara and Williamson ask 
 
What reason is there to suppose, independently of a translation scheme that 
demonstrates it, that de re modal claims have anything to do with an object’s 
counterparts?260 
 
But it seems that even if a translation scheme did demonstrate a connection between 
CT and QML, this isn’t sufficient reason for thinking that de re modal claims have 
anything to do with an object’s Lewisian counterparts, until it is also shown that CT 
provides a better translation of modal discourse than do non-Lewisian counterpart 
theories. 
 
Lewis could reply that CT is superior to any other counterpart theory because it, and 
no other such theory, provides the basis for a reductive treatment of modal claims. 
However there are three problems with this reply. (A) in order that Lewis’s 
translation is materially correct, we must look to its ontology too. In setting out CT, 
Lewis writes that  
 
the domain of quantification is to contain every possible world and everything 
in every world.261  
 
In other words, there must be an abundance of worlds and their parts – every world 
there could be, and every part of a world there could be, must exist. CT requires a 
principle of plenitude if it is to provide the basis for a materially adequate translation 
of modal discourse. In the last chapter I outlined some problems involved in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 For a survey of some of those theories see Melia 2003. The point just made is similar to Quine’s complaint 
that “Models afford consistency proofs; also they have heuristic value; but they do not constitute explication. 
Models, however clear in themselves, may leave us still at a loss for the primary, intended interpretation” (Quine 
1972, 492). 
260 Fara and Williamson 2005, 453. 
261 Lewis 1983, 27. 
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specifying a principle of plenitude for worlds, one of which was that no satisfactory 
reductive principle is available. This weakens the advantage Lewis’s theory has over 
his rivals, if that is, reduction is taken to be advantageous. (B) if we take possible 
worlds to be purely abstract mathematical structures or some other non-modal 
entities, as some believe we can, then Lewis’s isn’t the only reductive semantics on 
offer. (C) we must ask whether reductive translations are indeed superior. It is hard 
to see how the project of discovering what we mean by our modal claims and the 
project of producing the simplest non-modal account of the source of modal truth 
could possibly converge, such that finding the best reductive translation would take 
us closer to discovering what we mean. I discuss this further in Chapter 5. 
 
(2) Let us now suppose that CT provides the best counterpart-theoretic translation of 
modal discourse – could we now take this translation to establish the correctness of 
his analysis? No, for we would also have to establish: (a) the priority of the non-
modal translation of modal discourse over the original English or QML discourse as, 
for instance, a better representation of its true logical form. So for a given reductive 
analysis, p iff q, there is a reason for taking the non-modal q to be an illuminating 
analysis of p, but not the other way round. (b) It must be established that no better 
non-counterpart-theoretic translation of modal discourse is available, including that 
there is no way to translate the counterpart-theoretic claims back into a modal 
language.262 These two points must be established before Lewis may legitimately 
claim his to be the best counterpart-theoretic translation of modal discourse, and so 
the most credible theory; so there is much more work to be done before that claim 
may be made. And so much more work remains to be done before it can be said that 
translation with explicit rules can be recruited to justify Lewis’s analysis of 
modality. 
 
4.23 Translation without explicit rules 
 
We have just seen that the rigorous translation of modal discourse, which connected 
modal claims to quantificational claims by means of explicit rules, turned out to 
require a range of unaided intuitive judgements about the content of both kinds of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 See Lowe 1995, 10. And see Fara and Williamson 2005 for the view that in a sufficiently rich modal 
language, counterpart-theoretic sentences can be translated into it. See also Prior and Fine 1977. 
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claim, and so turned out to depend on assumptions about the epistemology of 
translation which were not susceptible to proof, which meant the argument for the 
analysis of modality turned out not to be as rigorous as first thought.  
 
Why not, rather than attempting to establish the connection between worlds and 
modality via the putative connection between artificial languages, instead argue for 
this connection in a natural language, the original home of our modal concepts. And 
rather than trying to rigorously prove the connection, aim to establish the connection 
by appeal to intuitions about the meaning of sentences in this natural language? The 
reliance on intuition could even be seen as advantageous if presented as an ‘ordinary 
language’ or ‘paraphrastic’ argument.263 This is precisely what Lewis does in his 
infamous argument in Counterfactuals, which I now discuss. 
 
His argument runs as follows: 
 
I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit. 
If an argument is wanted, it is this. It is uncontroversially true that things might 
be otherwise than they are. I believe, and so do you, that things could have 
been different in countless ways. But what does this mean? Ordinary language 
permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have been besides 
the way they actually are. On the face of it, this sentence is an existential 
quantification. It says that there exist many entities of a certain description, to 
wit ‘ways things could have been’. I believe that things could have been 
different in countless ways; I believe permissible paraphrases of what I 
believe; taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe in the 
existence of entities that might be called ‘ways things could have been’. I 
prefer to call them ‘possible worlds’.264 
 
The argument begins with what is presented as a paradigm case of uncontroversial 
modal belief: that things could be otherwise than they are. Via a chain of 
paraphrases, the content of that belief is identified with that of a non-modal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 I follow convention in sometimes referring to the following argument as ‘The Paraphrastic Argument’ 
264 Lewis 1973, 84. 
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quantificational claim about entities called ‘possible worlds’.265 Because these 
paraphrases are in English, no explicit rules can be given to prove their correctness. 
Rather, in the absence of a rigorous proof, the force of the argument depends on: (a) 
the intuitive force of each paraphrase in the chain; that two claims mean the same is 
thought to be intuitively recognisable, and (b) the entitlement to interpret what is 
said at face-value. The argument is based around a paradigm case of modal belief, 
but it is clearly expected to be extendable to any modal belief. 
 
It is important to note that Lewis presents this as an argument for the existence of 
worlds: because the real content of our modal discourse is quantification over 
worlds, and because we hold some modal claims to be true, we are thereby 
committed to the existence of worlds. Its point is to combat the view that worlds are 
“suspect foundations” for his analysis.266 The argument is aimed at convincing us 
that worlds– though they are not normally recognised as such – are homely entities 
which we all accept under other names or descriptions. Lewis takes himself to be 
making explicit what we ordinarily implicitly understand – quantification over 
worlds is the ‘systematic expression’ of our ordinary modal discourse.267 Worlds are 
then not a theorist’s dream, they are what the ordinary person’s modal beliefs are  
about. Lewis’s point is that given we all believe in worlds, if there is a problem with 
them, it is a problem for us all. I, by contrast, am interested in this argument as an 
argument for a view about the content of modal claims. Lewis takes us to be 
committed to worlds because he takes the real content of modal claims to be 
quantifications over worlds. So his argument for the existence of worlds crucially 
involves an argument about the content of modal claims. This means we can use 
Lewis’s argument for our ontological commitment to the existence of worlds as an 
argument for the view about the content of modal claims. This argument can then be 
taken to justify his analysis of modality.  
 
The central differences between this translation argument, and the argument on the 
basis of explicit rules, is that in this argument (i) no explicit rules support the 
translation of modal discourse proposed, and relatedly, (ii) no rigorous proof is given 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 A paraphrase, like a formalisation, is just a translation of a certain kind. 
266 Lewis 1973, 84. 
267 Ibid., 88. 
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of the translation. Instead, paradigm cases are given, which are taken to be 
extendable throughout our modal discourse. 
 
Based on Lewis’s argument above, the following argument for the correctness of his 
analysis may be attributed to him: ‘The justification for analysing modal notions in 
terms of quantification over worlds is that for every modal claim, there is a non-
modal claim with the same meaning. What is the evidence for this analysis? It is the 
translatability of paradigm ordinary modal sentences of English, by ordinary non-
modal sentences of English, which can be immediately recognised. The 
translatability of modal sentences of English to non-modal sentences quantifying 
over worlds provides good reason for thinking the analysis of modality in terms of 
quantification over worlds correctly reflects the connections which hold between our 
modal concepts.’ I now both clarify and critique Lewis’s attempt to found his 
analysis of modality on The Paraphrastic Argument in Counterfactuals. 
 
4.24 Clarification and critique 
 
I 
 
We can represent Lewis’s Paraphrastic Argument as follows: 
 
 (0) S believes that things could be otherwise than they are. (Assumption)268 
(1) Things could be otherwise than they are iff there is a way things could be 
which is different from the way things actually are. (Analytic truth) 
(2) ‘There is a way things could be’ is correctly interpreted as ‘there is an 
entity which is a way things could be’; ‘the way things actually are’ is 
correctly interpreted as ‘the entity which is the way things actually are’ – call 
this last entity ‘a’ for short. (By the ‘principle of face-value interpretation’, for 
which see below.) 
So, (3) things could be otherwise than they are iff there is an x which is a way 
things could be and x ≠ a. (By 1, 2) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 I leave out of this representation of Lewis’s argument his premise that things could have been different in 
countless ways. Lewis needs this for his argument that we are committed to a plurality of worlds. This premise 
can be removed, thereby simplifying the argument, without derailing the current focus on content. 
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(4) ‘A possible world’ means an entity which is a way things could be. 
(Stipulative definition) 
(5) Things could be otherwise than they are iff there is a possible world x and  
x ≠ a (By 3, 4) 
 So, (6) S believes that there is a possible world x and x ≠ a. (By 0, 5) 
 
II 
 
The steps in this argument are as follows. The argument develops the content of the 
initial modal belief. The argument can perhaps run smoother without the embedding 
of the modal proposition in a belief context and the problems about opacity that 
come with it. Lewis emphasises the belief context because he wants to argue we are 
committed to the existence of worlds. It isn’t enough for this purpose to show that 
the modal proposition p is in fact a quantificational proposition q. He also needs the 
premise that we hold p true. In the context of an argument about content, however 
the belief setting in (0) and (6) is an unnecessary distraction, and can be treated as 
stage setting. 
 
(1) is meant to be obvious, and so not to require argument. Lewis says ‘ordinary 
language permits’ this paraphrase.269 This indicates that he takes the truth of (1) to be 
analytic and our recognition of its truth to be based on our understanding of the 
sentence. (2) is not meant to be obvious. Lewis thinks we should take the apparent 
existential quantification in (1) at ‘face-value’. He appeals to the  general maxim of 
‘face-value interpretation’: unless we have good reason to think otherwise, if some 
quantificational locution appears to be an existential quantification, it is.270 Lewis 
takes there to be no good reason not to interpret the quantification in (1) at face-
value, so he treats there being ways things could be to be a matter of there being 
entities of some sort. By similar reasoning, we should treat the apparent singular 
term ‘the way things actually are’ as denoting the unique entity which is the way 
things actually are.271 (3) follows by defining the relevant expressions in (1) as per 
(2). (4) is intended to be a matter merely of stipulation, resolving to call entities 	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which are ways worlds could be, ‘possible worlds’. (5) follows by defining the 
relevant expression in (3) as per (4). Finally, (6) then defines the initial content of the 
modal belief in (0) ‘things could be otherwise than they are’ as ‘there is a possible 
world x and x ≠ a’, as per (5). 
 
III 
 
The Paraphrastic Argument is often dismissed as an argument for the existence of 
worlds. But does it work as an argument for the quantificational content of modal 
claims? There are three problems, (i)-(iii) below, I see with the argument: the first 
two concern ways the world could be, the third concerns what ‘possible worlds’ 
means. 
 
(i) Lewis’s principle of face-value interpretation, underwrites (2). This principle 
instructs us to take “seeming existential quantifications in ordinary language at their 
face value” unless the following conditions hold: (a) the interpretation is known to 
“lead to trouble” and (b) there exists another interpretation which is known not to.272 
However, this principle offers little guidance; what counts as trouble is unclear, so 
what leads to trouble is too. To illustrate this point, consider the following example 
of Jonathan Lowe’s. If ‘The grin on John’s face is broad’ is true, then the apparent 
singular term ‘The grin on John’s face’ denotes, on the face-value approach, an 
existing object. Furthermore, if treated at face-value ‘John is wearing a broad grin’ is 
to be regimented along the following lines: ‘For some x, x is a grin and x is broad 
and John is wearing x’. According to Lowe this “grossly overinflated ontology” of 
grins certainly counts as trouble.273 Consider the parallel with ways. ‘The way things 
are’ also appears to behave like a singular term274, but just as we may be sceptical as 
to whether ‘the grin on John’s face’ denotes an object, we may also be sceptical as to 
whether ‘the way things are’ denotes an object. ‘There is a way things could be 
which is different from the way things actually are’ appears to quantify over ways.275 
But just as we may be sceptical about the first-order regimentation of ‘John is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 Lewis 1973, 84. 
273 Lowe 1995, 510. 
274 Yablo, for instance, writes: “‘The way the world is,’ ‘the way it would have been if so and so had happened,’ 
‘the ways it could have been’ – these look for all the world like noun phrases. It stands to reason then that they at 
least purport to denote entities of some sort” (2008, 195). 
275 Lewis 1986, 13. 
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wearing a broad grin,’ so too we may worry about the first-order regimentation of 
the ways-sentence.276 The principle of face-value interpretation appears unable to 
guide interpretation; it doesn’t provide for a way of navigating the range of different 
views as to what counts as trouble. For this reason, it seems unable to support (2). 
Furthermore, because the principle is not obvious, and nor is it justified, its use in the 
context of an ‘ordinary language’ argument raises some suspicion. 
 
IV  
 
(ii) Lewis appears to endorse the view that we can quantify over objects only if we 
have a criterion of identity for them. A criterion of identity is to be understood as a 
condition the grasp of which is required in order to determine whether, for objects x 
and y and kind K, x is the same K as y. For instance, if x and y are sets and K=sets, 
then x is the same K as y iff x and y have the same members. With respect to ways, 
Lewis appear to juggle two thoughts: we do not ordinarily appear to have a criterion 
of identity for ways277, but at the same time, given that we quantify over them we 
must have a criterion of identity for them. He writes: 
 
it might happen in three different ways that a donkey talks iff three possible 
individuals, very different from one another, are donkeys that talk. It scarcely 
seems possible to cover the entire infinite family of numerical modalities 
unless we resort to the pre-existing apparatus of numerical quantification. Then 
we need some entities to be the ‘ways’ that we quantify over. My candidates 
are the possible worlds and individuals themselves, or else sets of these.278 
 
The ‘apparatus of numerical quantification’ is first-order logic, and Lewis takes that 
apparatus to require entities with a criterion of identity with which to identify with 
ways.279 In this manner, discourse about ways is rehabilitated as discourse about 
entities.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 A similar point applies to mass terms, such as ‘water’. Quantification over water is not quantification over an 
entity which is water. 
277 See Lewis 1986, 86-87. 
278 Ibid., 13, my italics. It is the attempt to identify ways things could be with some entity that prevents Lewis 
stating a principle of plenitude. See §3.3. 
279 Lewis’s treatment of ways things could be can be seen as an answer to Quine’s point about the possible fat 
man in the doorway (Quine 1961, 4). Lewis recognises this: “Quine has complained that unactualized possibles 
are disorderly elements, well-nigh incorrigibly involved in the mysteries of individuation. That well may be true 
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There are two connected questions about ways which are worth distinguishing: first, 
is it plausible to identify ways things can be with worlds? and second is there a 
general criterion of identity for ways? Starting with the first, Lewis appears to hold 
that ways things could be x and y are identical just in case x is the same possible 
world as y.280 Note that if ‘possible world’ were to mean, as it appears to mean in 
Lewis’s Paraphrastic Argument, ‘a way the world could be’ this obviously provides 
only a circular criterion of identity for ways, which would not allow for the reduction 
of modality. Lewis must take ‘possible world’ to mean world, and so the criterion of 
identity for ways things could be is the criterion of identity for worlds: x and y are 
the same way just in case they are the same world, and they are the same world just 
in case they are maximal spatio-temporal fusions of the same parts in the same 
spatio-temporal relations (see §2.1). However, ways things could be and spatio-
temporal fusions appear to have very different properties, and so seem not to be 
identifiable. We can bring this out by considering four Rylean intuitions:  
 
(i) A world is a piece of real estate, and while coffee can be spilt on a piece of real 
estate (by being spilt on some of its parts), it cannot be spilt on a way things could 
be. The property of being-spilt-on-by-coffee seems to be exemplifiable by worlds 
but not by ways, so worlds and ways things could be appear distinct.  
 
(ii) Van Inwagen, in a similar vein, asked: 
 
How could one suppose that the (unrealised) possibility that the universe be 
thus-and-so is a thing that has a mass of 3.4x1057 grams and is rapidly 
expanding?281 
 
A way things could be seems to have no mass or size and so seems not to be 
correctly identified with something which has mass and size. Indeed, the explanation 
for why ways things could be seem unable to be identified with worlds is that ways 
appear to be non-concrete. Consider the way you look tonight. You may weigh eight 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of any unactualized possibles who lead double lives, lounging in the doorways of two possible worlds at once. 
But I do not believe in any of those. The unactualized possibles I do believe in…do not pose any special 
problems of individuation” (1973, 87). 
280 This approach idealises ways for things to be as complete. Incomplete ways for things to be are understood in 
terms of the complete ways. 
281 Van Inwagen 1986, 199. 
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stone, but does it even make sense to ask how many stones the way you look tonight 
weighs? 
 
(iii) Worlds have proper parts – indeed these parts come into their criterion of 
identity – but ways do not appear to have any proper parts. Take, again, the way you 
look tonight. What are its parts? Of course you have parts (legs, shoulders, etc.) but 
the way you look tonight is not you. If beautiful is the way you look tonight, then the 
way has parts only if being beautiful does, but seems hard to make sense of the view 
that being beautiful has parts. Or take the way Christoph plays the organ on Sunday 
– say, with gusto. Though the performance has parts – a beginning, a middle and end 
– it is hard to makes sense of the idea that the way he plays – with gusto – has 
parts.282 
 
(iv) If ways things could be are identical to worlds, then they must have the same 
modal properties (those of worlds). But the way the actual world is and the actual 
world itself differ in their modal properties: the actual world could have been a 
different way, but the way the actual world is couldn’t have been a different way – it 
is that way!.283 Compare: the table could be a different colour than it is, a certain 
shade of brown, but that certain shade of brown couldn’t be a different colour than it 
is – it is the colour that it is. 
 
I now turn to the second question: whether there is a general criterion of identity for 
ways. We often speak as if there are answers, in particular contexts, to the question 
of whether two ways are identical. For instance, the way the weather is today is the 
same is it was yesterday, viz. rainy; or the way he walks is the same as the way she 
walks, viz. vigorously; or the way you look tonight is the same as the way you 
always look, viz. beautiful. It seems doubtful, however, first, that we can supply a 
criterion of identity even for each of these ways. For a criterion of identity is a 
principle, but there seems no principled way to determine, for any way, whether it is 
the same or different from any other.284 Ways don’t seem determinate enough and 
alike enough for questions of their identity to be settled by a general principle. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 For a similar point, see Block and Stalnaker 1999, 18 fn. 5. 
283 This is similar to a point Fine makes in his 2005, 216. 
284 On this point see Lowe 1995, 511-13. 
118	  
Identifying ways things could be with worlds appears unpromising, and similar 
problems would appear to beset any attempt to identify ways with entities for which 
we possess a criterion of identity. The reason is that any such attempt will make 
arbitrary stipulations about when any two ways are the same way. Identifying ways 
with entities for which we possess a criterion of identity will mean we will be able to 
answer questions about whether two ways are one and the same, which are ordinarily 
unanswerable. So criteria of identity may be supplied, but they will be arbitrary, and 
would appear to require the revision of beliefs about the identity of ways. This is not 
to say that ways do not have associated criteria of identity, nor is it to say that there 
is no fact of the matter about their determinate identity conditions.285 Just that we 
seem unable to say what this may be in a principled manner which reflects our 
thoughts about ways. 
 
V 
 
(iii) Lewis takes The Paraphrastic Argument to show that we are committed to 
possible worlds, because he takes modal beliefs to quantify over them. Yet were his 
argument successful, the most it could show is that there are entities which are ways 
the world might be. This is because it treats our modal beliefs as quantifying over 
possible worlds only insofar as they are entities which are ways the world could 
possibly be. Nothing in the argument suggest that we should treat our modal 
discourse as quantifying over worlds, that is, spatio-temporal systems. (4) merely re-
labels the entity which is the way a world might be, it doesn’t introduce a new kind 
of entity with which to identify it. As Loux put it, ‘possible worlds’ in Lewis’s 
mouth is “the philosopher’s name for the different ways things might have been”.286 
 
But this interpretation of Lewis’s argument is puzzling for two reasons. The first 
reason is that Lewis takes ways to stand in need of identification with a kind of 
entity for which criterion of identity can be supplied, so that the ‘apparatus of 
numerical quantification’ can be deployed to specify the content of modal claims. If 
‘possible world’ is ultimately defined in terms of ways worlds could be – and not in 
terms of some entity with which these ways are identified – then this cannot be done, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 For this distinction see ibid., 511. The main point here was made by Stalnaker 2003, Chapter 1. 
286 Loux 1979, 30. 
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for independently of being identified with some entity, ways worlds could be appear 
not to have a criterion of identity. 
 
Second, Lewis wants the entities that modal claims quantify over to be used in a 
reduction of modality. But if those ways are specified as ways the world could be, 
they appear unsuitable candidates in terms of which to reduce modality. For if the 
content of modal discourse is characterised in terms of ways the world could be, and 
the source of modal truth is explained in these terms, then no reduction is achieved. 
It is clear from the context of the argument that Lewis takes it to show that worlds 
exist and so it is clear that Lewis takes it that the content of modal belief is 
quantification over worlds. It appears that Lewis’s interpretation of his argument 
goes beyond what the argument seems to show. Expanding on this last point, the 
context of the argument treats ‘possible world’ as meaning an entity of the same kind 
as the world we live in.287 Lewis is clear that the point of The Paraphrastic Argument 
is to dislodge the “common suspicion of possible worlds” and to show that “there are 
possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit”.288 Note that the suspicion 
concerns the existence of more worlds like our own – for there is little suspicion of 
ways the world might be, the only question is what they are. In the pages following 
the Paraphrastic Argument in Counterfactuals, Lewis emphasises his treatment of 
possible worlds as worlds, by distinguishing between a genuine possible world – a 
universe like our own – and a so-called possible world, which is an ersatz object, a 
representation of a universe.289 The Paraphrastic Argument can be understood as a 
defensive operation to show that we are committed to genuine possible worlds by 
our modal discourse, and to resist the “common suspicion” of these entities. It does 
so by arguing that we cannot consistently deny there are other worlds while 
affirming modal claims, because our modal claims are committed to these worlds. If 
such worlds are problematic entities, then the argument is meant to show that this is 
a problem for all of us, not just Lewis.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 Lewis 1973, 85-90. 
288 Ibid., 84. Note, it is only possible worlds in Lewis’s sense of ‘worlds of the same kind as our own’ that were, 
in 1973, taken by Lewis’s peers to be suspicious, while the possible worlds framework was used widely used and 
accepted (as Lewis points out in his 1986, 3). 
289 Lewis 1973, 85. 
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The Paraphrastic Argument is ordinarily read as trying – and failing – to establish 
that our modal discourse brings with it commitment to worlds. The trouble with the 
argument is that, on this strong interpretation, encouraged by the context of the 
argument, it is invalid – for at no point in the argument is warrant provided for 
identifying ways worlds could be with worlds, and so no conclusion about worlds 
can be drawn. Indeed, such a conclusion would go way beyond the modest ordinary 
language status claimed for the argument. But on a weaker interpretation in which 
‘possible worlds’ are take to be entities that are ways worlds could be, it doesn’t go 
far enough. For nothing has been said about what these objects are – they may be 
irreducibly modal entities, or set-theoretic entities or something else. It seems to me 
that Lewis encourages us to splice the weaker argument and stronger conclusion 
together, so that it seems that the innocent ordinary language argument has an 
extraordinary conclusion. This is really just an equivocation on ‘possible world’, and 
it is this which makes it seem that the innocent ordinary language argument supports 
the view that modal belief is about non-actual worlds. 
 
In sum, the context of The Paraphrastic Argument, understood as an argument about 
content, leads us to read it as the argument that the content of modal beliefs are about 
worlds. Yet the argument doesn’t appear to sustain the stronger reading that Lewis 
encourages. And on the weaker reading, it doesn’t seem to support his analysis. So 
on neither reading can we say that the argument supports Lewis’s analysis of 
modality as quantification over worlds.  
 
4.25 The Theoretical Identification Argument 
 
The thought behind the last two arguments (§4.21 and §4.23) has been that the 
translatability of modal claims by non-modal claims quantifying over worlds – 
either with or without explicit rules – supports Lewis’s analysis of modality as 
quantification over worlds. The Theoretical Identification Argument also aims to the 
support Lewis’s analysis, but instead of starting with what we say, appears to start 
with ontology, specifically the identification of possibilities and worlds; and this 
identity is used to ground the conceptual analysis. I will focus my attention in the 
following section on the grounds for this theoretical identification. 
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I will read Lewis’s argument for the identification of possibilities with worlds via his 
well-known theory of mind. Specifically, I take the reasoning by which he justifies 
psycho-physical identification to be of the same pattern as that which justifies 
identifying possibilities and worlds. The reasoning is as follows: for a given concept 
there is an implicitly known ‘Folk Theory’ which defines it. The theory gives us a 
description, à la Russell, of the thing which as a matter of fact fits the description. 
Thus it is a ‘conceptual’ truth that pain causes avoidance, for that is an axiom of the 
implicit theory of mind. It is an empirical fact, let’s pretend, that in humans C-fibre 
firing fits the description. Can a similar story be told, mutatis mutandis about the 
implicit ‘Folk Theory’ of modality?290  
 
Lewis does not make explicit The Theoretical Identification Argument I attribute to 
him, but it can be read between the lines, particularly in OPW: 
 
What actually is the case, as we say, is what goes on here. That is one possible 
way for a world to be. Other worlds are other, that is unactualised, 
possibilities. If there are many worlds, and every way that a world could 
possibly be is a way that some world is, then…modality turns into 
quantification.291  
 
We can formulate The Theoretical Identification Argument more precisely as 
follows: 
 
 (A) Possibly p iff there is a possibility at which p (analytic truth) 
 (B) Possibilities are worlds (theoretical identification) 
 So (C) Possibly p iff there is a world at which p (by substitution) 
 
I take the following line of reasoning to be a plausible way for Lewis to use The 
Theoretical Identification Argument to support his analysis of modality: ‘The 
justification for analysing modal claims in terms of quantification over worlds is that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 Thanks to Keith Hossack for this formulation of the problem. Note there is an important difference between 
the two theories: while the psycho-physical identity is thought by Lewis to be contingent, he must take the 
possibility-world identity to be non-contingent. For Lewis modal notions, unlike mental notions, are not multiply 
realisable. 
291 Lewis 1986, 5. 
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given both that possibilities just are worlds, and that modal claims quantify over 
possibilities, then modal claims are quantifications over worlds.’ We can think of 
this argument as a re-formulation of The Paraphrastic Argument, which rather than 
label as ‘possible worlds’ the entities it treats as possibilities, identifies possibilities 
with worlds. The argument reverses the expected order of identity claim and 
analysis. For it might ordinarily be thought that the success of Lewis’s analysis of 
modality is a reason to think that possibilities are worlds, whereas this argument 
uses the identity in support of the analysis. 
 
4.26 Clarification and critique 
 
I 
 
The question I focus on in this section is: what is the argument for the identification 
of possibilities and worlds? We can approach this via the question: what are Lewis’s 
general grounds for making theoretical identifications? He suggests two: first, 
theoretical identifications are theoretically fruitful, and second, they are entailed by 
other propositions we believe.292 It is the second ground that Lewis, eventually, takes 
to be the decisive one. He writes that  
 
theoretical identifications are not voluntary posits, made in the name of 
parsimony; they are deductive inferences.293  
 
And that  
 
theoretical identifications in general are implied by the theories that make 
them possible – not posited independently.294 
 
If theoretical identifications are conclusions of arguments, what argument has the 
identification of possibilities with worlds as its conclusion?  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Lewis 1999, 248. 
293 Ibid., 257, my italics. 
294 Ibid., 249. 
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Theoretical identifications, as Lewis understands them, are, in the most interesting 
cases, points of contact between two theories. In the two cases below, the first 
premise of each is drawn from our ‘Folk Theory’, and the second premise drawn 
from ‘scientific’ theory. I begin with a familiar example, Lewis’s psycho-physical 
identification argument:   
 
 [i] Mental state M = the occupant of causal role R (by definition of M). 
 [ii] Neural state N = the occupant of causal role R (by physiology).  
 ∴ [iii] Mental state M = neural state N (by transitivity of =).295 
 
Lewis’s possibility-world identification can be formulated similarly, as follows:  
 
 (1) Possibility a = the occupant of metaphysical role R (by definition of a). 
 (2) World w = the occupant of metaphysical role R (by metaphysics). 
 ∴ (3) Possibility a = world w (by the transitivity of =).296 
 
I now elaborate the premises of this style of argument for theoretical identities, 
focusing on the second possibility-world identification. 
 
II 
 
The first premise in an argument for a theoretical identity – of the form ‘t=the F’ – is 
an identity statement, which is thought to be grounded in the meaning of the singular 
term t and so, if true, is analytic a priori. Lewis takes t to be implicitly defined by the 
definite description ‘the F’.297 This definite description is gleaned from the role t 
plays in our ‘Folk Theory’, and is for Lewis ultimately to be understood à la 
Russell.298 The truth of the first premise of such arguments depends not on how the 
world is, but on the relations between expressions in our theory of it. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Ibid., 248-49. The following example is also familiar: (i) Water is the occupant of the causal role R (by 
definition), (ii) H2O is the occupant of the causal role R (by the discovery of chemistry), so (iii) Water is H2O (by 
the transitivity of identity). 
296 Note that possibilities are idealised in this argument as complete or fully determinate. 
297 Lewis 1999, 251-52, 255. 
298 See 1983, 78-95 and 1999, 248-61. 
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Lewis has a general theory of the meaning of theoretical terms, according to which 
any non-logical theoretical term t abbreviates a definite description which expresses 
the role of t in the theory in which the term occurs. More precisely, this ‘role of t’ is 
what the theory takes the object the term denotes to do in the world. If, for instance, 
t=particles, and the theory is physics, then according to physics having mass is one 
of the various facets of particle behaviour or function, according to that theory. Non-
logical terms are not defined by what the object t denotes is, but what it does, or 
more precisely, what it is taken to do in the theory in which ‘t’ occurs. 
 
Lewis thinks our ‘Folk Theory’ contains modal expressions, expressed in English by 
words such as ‘could’, ‘must’, ‘necessity’ etc. Such expressions are identified as 
non-logical terms of ‘Folk Theory’, and so, according to his view about their 
meaning, are definable by their role in it, as specified by definite descriptions. So for 
instance, in the schematic premise (1), ‘Possibility a’ abbreviates ‘the occupant of 
metaphysical role R’ which is taken to express the role ‘Possibility a’ plays in the 
theory. If ‘the occupant of metaphysical role R’ denotes some entity, and if 
‘Possibility a’ abbreviates that definite description, then necessarily the two terms 
denote the same entity.  
 
Finally, a note about the expression ‘metaphysical role R’, which appears in premise 
(1) and (2). In premise [i] of his argument for psycho-physical identity, Lewis says 
that what we mean by ‘mental state M’ is that thing which plays a specified causal 
role. ‘Mental state M’ is taken to have a functional definition, in which its function is 
specified by its causal role in terms of its relevant causes and effects.299 With respect 
to the possibilities-worlds identification, possibilities are not taken to be identified 
with occupants of causal roles, but rather occupants of metaphysical roles, which are 
not reducible to causal roles. Nolan sees the need for some theoretical terms to be 
understood in terms of objects which play non-causal roles: 
 
In early applications, Lewis emphasised the construction of causal roles: roles 
specified largely in what the typical causes and effects of entities and states 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 Compare with Armstrong: “the concept of a mental state is primarily the concept of a state of the person apt 
for bringing about a certain sort of behaviour [and secondarily also, in some cases] apt for being brought about 
by a certain sort of stimulus” (1968, 82). 
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are. While that seems appropriate for some philosophical projects, it does not 
seem crucial to the method, and applications of the method to e.g. 
mathematical objects, or possibilities, or values, seems a feasible thing to try 
even if we doubt the roles taken from available theories will have much to do 
with what sets or possibilities or values cause.300 
 
Lewis insists that there are objects which do not stand in causal relations, but do play 
non-causal theoretical roles, which define the meaning of terms in our theories. For 
instance, Lewis writes: 
 
Understand that I am not opposed to states of affairs, ways things might be, 
possibilities, propositions, or structures. I believe in all those things. That is to 
say, I believe in entities that deserve the names because they are well suited to 
play the roles. The entities I put forward as candidates are the same in every 
case: sets of worlds.301  
 
It is because neither worlds nor sets stand in causal relations that none of the entities 
Lewis takes to be defined in terms of sets of worlds do either. For Lewis, each such 
entity is taken to play a theoretical role, each is named by terms in our theory, and so 
each is defined in terms of the metaphysical role they play in that theory. Lewis 
appears to think a natural way of specifying the role possibilities play in our ‘Folk 
Theory’ is as ways the world could possibly be.302 Lewis is clear about the general 
methodology: 
 
‘Property’, and the rest, are names associated in the first instance with roles in 
our thought. It is a firm commitment of common sense that there are some 
entities or other that play the roles and deserve the names, but our practical 
mastery of uses of the names does not prove that we have much notion what 
manner of entities those are.303  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 Nolan, forthcoming. 
301 Lewis 1986, 185. Also see ibid., 86 where Lewis suggests it is ‘beneficial’ to identify ways worlds could be 
with worlds (or at least it would be if it didn’t trivialise Ways (see §3.3)). 
302 Lewis 1973, 84. 
303 Lewis 1986, 189. See also 184. 
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While, for Lewis, the meanings of terms in our theory are tied to role the theory 
takes the objects they denote to play, knowing this role doesn’t itself tell us anything 
about the kind of object that plays it – it just narrows down the class of objects to a 
range which are capable of playing that role. The next stage of The Theoretical 
Identification Argument moves from carving out roles, to filling them with objects 
that play them. 
 
The second premise of a theoretical identification argument states an identity claim 
which is not grounded solely in the meaning of the expressions constituting the 
statement of identity. Whereas the first premise is, if true, analytic and so necessarily 
true, the second premise is not analytically true and is, if true, ordinarily only 
contingently so.304 The second premise claims that a type of object plays the non-
defining role specified by a definite description. The premise can be thought of, 
roughly, as a postulate of scientific theory. For instance, ‘H2O’ = the stuff that plays 
the watery role. ‘The stuff that plays the watery role’ does not define ‘H2O’, which 
has a chemical definition, and so it is not necessary that H2O played the watery role. 
The initial identity will hold contingently just in case H2O turns out to uniquely play 
the watery role.305 
  
Finally, the conclusion of a theoretical identity argument should follow from the two 
premises by the transitivity of identity. It is essential to the argument for a theoretical 
identity of the form ‘t=the F, r=the F; so t=r’, that the definite description which is 
used to give the meaning of t, in the first premise, is the very same description used 
to specify the role of r in the second premise.306 It is only if the role which gives 
meaning to t is the very same role which r uniquely plays, that t=r. Lewis, writing 
about psycho-physical identification, says  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 However, the world identification is a special case note, because if worlds are the objects which play the role 
of being the way worlds could be (or whatever precisely the metaphysical role of possibilities is) then they non-
contingently play that role. 
305 Whereas the first premise is, if true, analytic, the second premise, if true, is not. Suppose, for instance, that a 
physiological theory says that the object denoted by ‘neural state N’ is the very object which does such-and-such. 
Its truth is dependent on whether the world is as the theory says it is, and so it is non-analytic. Whether its truth is 
knowable a posteriori or a priori depends on the subject-matter of the theory in question. Physiology, for 
instance, deals in objects we know a posteriori. Metaphysics is generally understood to be an a priori discipline, 
and if so, premise (2) can be known a priori. 
306 Note that the two Ts in question – in the first and second premises – may well be distinct. For instance, the 
theory in which the salient term of the first premise occurs may be our ‘Folk Theory’, whereas the theory in 
which the salient term of the second premise occurs may be metaphysics or some other science. 
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Physiology [premise [i]] and the meanings of words [premise [ii]] would leave 
us no choice but to make the psychophysical identification [[iii]].307 
 
The identity is not made by choice, due perhaps to its perceived fruitfulness to 
theorising; it is compelled by logic. If a mental term ‘M’ abbreviates a definite 
description ‘the F’, and if ‘the F’ is satisfied by a object which a neurological term 
‘N’ denotes, then it necessarily follows that M = N. Thus theoretical identities are 
factored into two parts: an analytic part which is necessary, and an empirical part 
which is contingent. 
 
III 
 
Having elaborated the general argument for theoretical identification, I now turn – 
focusing on the possibility-world identification – to three of its problems. First, 
premise (1) presupposes the answer to delicate questions about the nature of our 
modal notions and the nature of possibility. By treating modal expressions (i) as 
referring terms, (ii) whose meaning is specified by a definite description understood 
à la Russell, it is presupposed that whatever modal notions are, they are first-order 
quantifiers, and whatever possibilities are they are the kind of entity that can be 
quantified over by first-order quantifiers. This assumption corresponds to what I 
took to be an unjustified move in Lewis’s Paraphrastic Argument, in which he treats 
quantification over ways things could be, as quantification over entities that are those 
ways (§§4.23-4.24). This move, in both cases, requires justification. In the current 
argument, the justification is based on a general account of the meaning of 
theoretical terms in terms of definite descriptions. Whether it is right to think of 
expressions drawn from ordinary discourse as theoretical terms I come to below. 
 
Second, even if (1) were true, it is hard to see how we could know it to be so. For it 
relies on the assumptions that we can recognise that (a) our ordinary modal 
expressions are part of a theory, specifically ‘Folk Theory’ (b) which has a canonical 
form, such that (c) modal expressions are terms of the theory, which (d) abbreviate 
definition descriptions of the theory, such that (e) (1) is entailed by that theory.308 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307 Lewis 1999, 249. 
308 See §5.4 for a related point, concerning whether a global axiomatisation of ‘Folk Theory’ is possible. 
128	  
Yet I take it that all of these claims are controversial, and much more needs to be 
said in defence of them, which Lewis doesn’t appear to provide. In particular, even if 
we accept that our modal expressions are part of an implicit ‘Folk Theory’ how are 
we to determine which is the correct canonical form of it and whether in that 
canonical form (1) is entailed by it?309  
 
This same epistemic problem also strikes at (2). For if (2) is thought to be entailed by 
a metaphysical theory, it will only be on certain formulations of that theory that (2) 
follows from it. So whether we have a reason for thinking (2) is correct will depend 
on what we take to be the correct canonical form of the theory which is supposed to 
entail it. Consider, for instance, that the question of what the role associated with 
H2O in chemistry is, can be answered only given a particular formulation of 
chemistry. Providing this, however, seems less problematic than for providing the 
right form of the theory which entails (1), given that there is greater agreement as to 
what the correct form of statements of chemical theory are than ‘Folk Theory’. 
Further, chemists may legitimately stipulate a meaning for novel terms that may 
figure in claims like (2), whereas the canonical theory that entails (1) is constrained 
by the meaning of our discourse which precedes theory. 
 
The above epistemic problems arise because the premises of theoretical 
identification arguments are thought to be entailed by our theories, but that 
specifying the form those theories take on which the premises are entailed seems to 
be more troublesome that sometimes realised. This is particularly problematic with 
respect to premises in which ordinary English expressions are used, and it is 
assumed that there is a single definite description which defines it.310 Until there is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 One way of answering what the correct canonical theory is, is to appeal to intuitions about the correct use of 
modal expressions, another is to appeal to purely theoretical considerations. While appeal to intuitions may get us 
somewhere, we will in any case require a theory to determine which intuitions to take seriously, and which to 
disregard. Theoretical considerations include prioritising the simplest account or the one which coheres best with 
the rest of our beliefs. However, if we appeal to purely theoretical considerations there is no guarantee these will 
respect what our expressions actually mean. It may be that for the sake of systematicity, some distortion of what 
we mean is acceptable. If so, the judgement that (1) is true by definition in the canonical theory will ring hollow, 
and may appear to be a convenient stipulation for the sake of a better overall theory, but its connection to our 
original modal discourse will be weakened. 
310 Papineau highlights a possible reason why we need to be cautious about tying the meaning of an expression to 
a particular theory: “Suppose that the concept of free will is a theoretically defined concept. If so, which theory 
defines this concept? It could be the theory that free actions are those which spring from the agent’s motives. Or 
it could be the theory that free actions are those which spring from the agent’s motives and are undetermined.” 
And “When some term is theoretically defined, there will in principle be a choice about how much to pack into 
the defining theory” (2011, 79). 
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reliable method by which to render canonical forms of our ordinary beliefs and our 
theories, resorting to specific canonical formulations of them will, it appears, only 
beg questions, not answer them (see §5.4, for connected problems). Nolan notes the 
importance of addressing this issue: 
 
One methodological purpose of this focus on roles and what realises them is to 
try to extract definitions that can provide analytic truths about the topics of 
interest….Using this method to extract plausible definitions is not entirely 
straightforward, however, especially once the issue of deciding which theory is 
canonical is taken seriously.311 
 
Third, what kind of claim is (2) how can we know if it is true? (2) asserts that worlds 
play the possibility role, or more precisely, worlds are identical to the objects which 
play the same metaphysical role as the role possibilities play. Lewis justifies this 
claim on the grounds that the theory which postulates worlds as playing this role is 
the most systematic theory available.312 The problem with this justification is 
threefold. First, Lewis wanted his Theoretical Identification Argument to show that 
theoretical identities are not introduced just because they are parsimonious, but 
because they follow from analytic and scientific claims we do or should accept. But 
if the basis for accepting (2) is that it follows from the most parsimonious theory of 
modality, then parsimony re-enters the argument for theoretical identity. Second, 
while Lewis takes the theory which entails (2) to be a priori, if the reason he thinks 
we should accept that theory is because it performs better than rival theories – that 
worlds are the best candidates for the role than rival objects – then the basis for (2) is 
in part dependent on knowledge of which rival theories exist, which is an a 
posteriori matter. Third, whether the basis for (2) is a posteriori or not, it is not 
purely conceptual. For the view that there are worlds to identify with possibilities is 
not a conceptual claim, but a postulate of Modal Realism. But if this non-conceptual 
claim is part of the argument for Lewis’s analysis – rather than the success of the 
analysis of modality being the basis for Modal Realism – then the grounds of the 
analysis will not be purely a priori conceptual claims as was required (in §4.0). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311 Nolan, forthcoming. 
312 E.g., Lewis’s 1973, 88 or his 1986, 135.  
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4.3 Arguments against the conceptual connection 
 
I have found Lewis’s arguments for his analysis of modality to be unsatisfactory. 
Each has been subject to objections which indicate that there is no a priori 
conceptual path connecting modal notions and quantification over worlds. Hence he 
appears to have given no arguments which do well with respect to the conceptual 
adequacy condition on theories of modality. I now turn to several reasons which 
strengthen this suggestion by focusing on the two other tests of conceptual adequacy: 
understanding and ontological commitment. I argue first (in §4.31) that it seems our 
understanding of modal concepts is not constituted by quantification over worlds. I 
then argue (in §4.32) that modal propositions are not committed to the existence of 
worlds, while propositions quantifying over worlds are. Together, these are two 
reasons to support the view that Lewis’s analysis doesn’t satisfy the conceptual 
adequacy condition. 
 
4.31 Quantification and understanding 
 
I 
 
It would be expected that if Lewis’s analysis of modality were correct, then our 
understanding of a claim quantifying over worlds would suffice for our 
understanding of the modal claim it is taken to analyse. In this section I investigate 
whether this holds. (A) I suggest that it is widely recognised that modal notions have 
a special intractable meaning. (B) I then argue that there are modal claims which 
make perfect sense, but which Lewis’s theory can make no sense of; and conversely, 
there are senseless modal claims which Lewis’s theory makes perfect sense of. 
Finally, in (C) I suggest that it is implausible to suppose that Lewis’s theory of 
modality is, as he suggests, our implicit theory of modality.  
 
II 
 
(A) There is a widespread recognition, perhaps especially from within the empiricist 
tradition that modal concepts are problematic; in particular those modal notions 
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which seem to bring with them commitment to mere possibilia. As Quine 
despairingly asked about merely possible objects,  
  
what sense can be found in talking of entities which cannot meaningfully be 
said to be identical with themselves and distinct from one another? These 
elements are well-nigh incorrigible.313 
 
The putative absence of a criterion of identity for objects which could exist but do 
not, leads Quine to the view that the very idea of such entities is incoherent.314 This 
means modal discourse is incoherent, at least to the extent that modal expressions 
such as ‘must’ and ‘could’ behave as quantifiers over such possible objects.315 
 
Quine takes expressions such as ‘could’, used in certain contexts, to supposedly 
invoke an immense range of possible objects. For instance, consider all the trees that 
there are in the universe – there is a finite number of them, probably all rooted in our 
planet. Now consider all the trees there could be – there is an infinite number of 
them, only the actual ones being rooted in our planet. Quine refers to this use of 
‘could’ to purport to invoke a plethora of possible objects, as the “vast 
supplementary force of ‘could’” which he casts as a “vestige of Indo-European myth, 
fossilized in the subjunctive mood.”316 Of course he rejects that ‘could’ and other 
modal notions really have the force they appear to. For Quine holds that while such 
notions may purport to quantify over mere possibilia, it turns out that we have no 
criterion of identity for such objects, and so quantification over possibilia cannot 
have its apparent sense. Instead Quine suggests that a sense can be given to modal 
notions as follows: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 Quine 1961, 4. 
314 Contrast Lewis’s approach which is to reduce possibilities to entities for which a criterion of identity is 
available. 
315 My examiners have brought to my attention two points here worth clarifying. First, the distinction between 
unactualised possibilities, and non-actual individuals. One might accept that there are unactualised possibilities, 
but reject the existence of non-actual individuals. Actualists, among others, take this view. Second, the claim I 
suggest we can draw from Quine’s work is that it is natural to think of some modal claims as appearing to incur 
commitment to non-actual individuals. I believe that Quine doesn’t hold that commitment to unactualised 
possibilities brings with it commitment to non-actual individuals (see Quine 1961, 4). Quine’s problems with the 
criteria of identity for possible individuals does however support the view that if any modal notion can be 
understood in terms of quantification over possible individuals, then such quantification would be incoherent. 
This conditional is distinct from the stronger claim that modal notions do in fact bring with them this 
commitment. 
316 Quine 1961, 54, my italics. 
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Our basis for saying what ‘could’ be generally consists, I suggest, in what is 
plus simplicity of the laws whereby we describe and extrapolate what is. I see 
no more objective way of construing the conditio irrealis.317 
 
This is an attempt to reconcile modality and empiricism, by taking modality to be a 
matter of regularity. This domesticated modality is meant to exclude possible bald 
men in doorways and such like from our ontology, unless they already figure in what 
is, or can be explained in terms of ‘extrapolations’ by simple laws from what is. But 
this is clearly to stipulate a meaning for some modal notions, consonant with Quine’s 
empiricism; not to give a general conceptual analysis of our modal notions. 
 
I want to stress that Quine’s objection to certain modal notions – not his replacement 
for them, but the original notions – expresses the recognition (a) that they can 
express a special sense and (b) that we use them for a special purpose. He rejects 
such notions as incoherent because, in part, he doesn’t think that an account can be 
given of their special sense. Such an account would have to treat these modal notions 
as referring to possibilia, and so would require that criterion of identity can be 
supplied for such entities. Our understanding of the meaning of such modal 
expressions would require grasp of this criterion of identity. Without us being able 
to supply such a criterion, the special sense associated with modal expressions – 
their ‘vast supplementary force’ – must be an illusion, and our use of them to express 
this sense must be misplaced. 
 
Quine wasn’t alone in thinking some of our modal notions appear to make special 
demands on the world that outstrip what there is. Wittgenstein wrote that  
 
A wish seems already to know what will or would satisfy it; a proposition, a 
thought, what makes it true—even when that thing is not there at all! Whence 
this determining of what is not yet there? This despotic demand? (“The 
hardness of the logical must.”)318 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 Ibid., 54. Compare Fine: “in so far as [empiricists] have been able to make sense of modality, have tended to 
see it as a form of regularity” (2005, 1). 
318 Wittgenstein 1953, §437. 
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Like Quine, Wittgenstein takes modal notions to be connected to non-existent 
objects. Wittgenstein’s view that necessity legislates over even that which is not yet 
there well captures our sense of the compulsion or “despotic demand” of necessity; 
just as Quine’s view that ‘could’ has a “vast supplementary force” captures our sense 
of the openness of possibility.319 Whether or not, as Quine thought, modal notions 
are ultimately illusions, I agree with Quine and Wittgenstein that some modal 
notions purport to talk about that which is not. So on their understanding of such 
modal notions, modality cannot be reduced simply to what is. For nothing that exists 
accounts for the “supplementary force” or “despotic demand” which some modal 
notions supply, and for which quantification over possibilia is invoked.  
 
III 
 
(B) Lewis’s project of rehabilitating modal notions in a Quinean framework requires 
him to recover the “vast supplementary force of ‘could’” by finding objects for 
which we have criteria of identity to identify possibilities with, such that ‘could’ can 
after all be understood as quantification over these entities. This is an attempt to 
meet Quine’s demand that modal notions be “explained in non-modal terms”.320 The 
vast force of modal notions is cashed out in terms of the vastness of the domain of 
quantification. As Fine put it,  
 
if there is not enough going on in the actual world to sustain the possibilities 
that we take there to be, then one strategy for the empiricist is to extend the 
arena upon which the possibilities are realized to include what goes on in each 
possible world.321 
 
The disagreement between Lewis and Quine is both semantic and ontological. Quine 
took the range of unrestricted ‘everything’ to reach to merely the ends of our own 
world; Lewis takes it to reach the edge of the pluriverse.322 By identifying 
possibilities with worlds Lewis takes himself to have provided the resources to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 More recently Sider has described modal notions as “point[ing] beyond themselves” (2003, 193). 
320 Quine 1947, 43. 
321 Fine 2005, 1. 
322 As I suggested in Chapter 3, the power that Lewis finds in the range of worlds really comes from an 
irreducibly modal notion (§3.3 and §3.51). 
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answer Quine’s charge that possibilia are illegitimate because they have no criterion 
of identity. While agreeing with Quine about what it would take for modal claims to 
make clear sense – that they must be formulable in a non-modal first-order language 
– Lewis disagrees that this cannot be achieved. By identifying possibilities and 
worlds, and then increasing the number and diversity of worlds postulated, Lewis 
hopes that modal notions can be rehabilitated in a non-modal first-order language. 
 
However, it appears that understanding existence claims about worlds is insufficient 
for understanding modal claims. If this is so, it would appear to undermine Lewis’s 
analysis, and so his project of rehabilitating modality. I provide three examples to 
illustrate this point, which concern the sense not the truth-value of modal claims. 
The first example is the following Euthyphronic Dilemma: 
 
is p necessary because p is true in all worlds or is p true in all worlds because p 
is necessary?  
 
This grounding question appears fairly clear, even if the precise grounding relation 
we are getting at may not be. Yet Lewis’s analysis trivialises the question. For it is 
equivalent, on his interpretation, to the question  
 
is p true in all worlds because p is true in all worlds or is p true in all worlds 
because p is true in all worlds? 
 
The original question has the form: ‘is p because q or q because p?’ Lewis’s 
interpretation of it has the form: ‘is p because p or is p because p?’ And so it has the 
form: ‘is p because p?’ Not only is Lewis’s interpretation incapable of capturing the 
genuinely disjunctive form of the original question, but it also trivialises it, and so 
fails to capture the sense of it. Our understanding of the original question cannot then 
run via our understanding of the worldly question. And any similar propositions 
which differentiate possibility or necessity from truth in a world face the same 
trivialisation. It is because Lewis’s analysis identifies worlds and possibilities, 
propositions whose sense depends on their non-identity – or which raise the question 
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of their non-identity – cannot be understood.323 Given that we understand the 
Euthyphronic Dilemma to be non-trivial, the analyses Lewis offers of them cannot 
provide for our understanding of these claims.324 
 
The second example is as follows. Suppose you know that a proposition p is 
(absolutely) necessary. From this knowledge of p’s necessity, you can infer that 
whatever else may be the case, p.325 Now suppose instead that that you know that a 
proposition p is true in all worlds. You cannot, with this knowledge alone, infer that 
whatever else may be the case, p. Our understanding of claims quantifying over 
worlds does not then suffice for understanding modal claims, for we can make 
inferences from modal claims which we cannot make from claims quantifying over 
worlds. 
 
I take the explanation for this difference of inferential power to be as follows. 
Nothing in the supposition that p holds in all worlds rules out that there may be a 
possibility – a possible world – at which p doesn’t hold. In which case it is not true 
that whatever else may be the case, p. It is only by confusing truth in all possible 
worlds with truth in all worlds, that we take truth in all worlds to imply that 
whatever else may be the case, p (see §4.24). For while truth in all possible worlds is 
logically equivalent to necessary truth, truth in all worlds is not. There is no 
contradiction involved in saying that p is true in every world, but not necessary. At 
least, not unless we have the additional belief that the domain of worlds is equivalent 
to that of possible worlds. That is to say, not unless the domain of worlds includes 
every world there could be, and nothing else. In order then to close the gap between 
p holding in all worlds, and p holding in all possible worlds, we must think that the 
worlds just are the possible worlds. Thus, for the understanding of quantification 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323 Another instance of this was the trivialising of Ways by Lewis’s analysis, which renders ‘every way that a 
world could possibly be is a way that some world is’ as ‘every world is identical to some world’ (see §3.2 and 
§3.3). 
324 Such a result is common to analyses which tie together concepts normally regarded as distinct. Such analyses 
close down our conceptual space, so we cannot ask certain questions that previously made sense. Rayo, who has 
developed a sophisticated view of ‘just is’ statements, considers the closing of conceptual space a cost to a 
theory, which must be weighed against its benefits, which of course depends on what the theory is trying to 
achieve (Rayo 2013). Lewis is explicitly trying to give a conceptual analysis of modal content which makes our 
implicit understanding of modality explicit (see §4.1). As such, if we can understand modal claims but whose 
quantificational analogues do not suffice for understanding of it, this appears to be a serious problem. 
(Interestingly see Rayo 2008, for the view that a metaphysical analysis of modality cannot serve as an account of 
content.) 
325 McFetridge 1990, 135-154. 
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over worlds to suffice for the understanding modal claims, it must be accompanied 
by a theory of worlds according to which, every world that could exist, does exist.326 
And such a theory is not the reductionist one Lewis aims to provide. 
 
The third example suggests that the propositions Lewis takes to constitute our 
understanding of modal claims (a) appear to say something different from the 
original claim and (b) seem either false or absurd, whereas the original claim seems 
true. Consider the question: ‘Are there worlds bigger than the actual world?’ This 
seems to make sense, but its modal analogue is: ‘Are there possibilities bigger than 
the actual world?’ which I take to make little sense.327 
 
What underlies this difference of sense seems to be that we think of worlds and 
possibilities as having different properties (see §4.24 for a similar point). Consider 
the question: ‘Is there a coloured world?’ which appears to make sense, but its modal 
analogue is ‘Is there a coloured possibility?’ which appears not to make sense, for 
while possibilities may be possibilities of colour, it is hard to make sense of coloured 
possibilities. The same point can be multiplied to cover a large range of properties 
which seem to hold of worlds and their parts but which don’t seem to hold of 
possibilities or ways things could be. It seems then that one of two consequences 
follows: either we must deny that our understanding of possibilities is constituted by 
our understanding of claims quantifying over worlds, and so do justice to the thought 
that we cannot make sense of the examples above; or, if we embrace Lewis’s view of 
what constitutes our understanding of modality, we must accept that we can, despite 
evidence to the contrary, make sense of such examples. 
 
The first view, which I take to be Lewis’s, is revisionary of our modal beliefs, for 
according to it, it makes sense to say – indeed it is a fact – that possibilities have 
sizes, masses, parts etc.! Such a view seems, in part, to be a consequence of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 Lewis’s principles of plenitude are attempts to say just that. I argued in Chapter Three that these principles 
bring with them irreducible modality, and so quantification over worlds can only suffice for understanding modal 
claims by presupposing modal notions in the first place. 
327 The previously quoted point of Van Inwagen’s is again relevant here: “How could one suppose that the 
(unrealised) possibility that the universe be thus-and-so is a thing that has a mass of 3.4x1057 grams and is rapidly 
expanding?” (1986, 199). Note that the ‘thus and so’ must be a fully specific property of the universe or else the 
possibility will, on Lewis’s view, be a set of worlds, and the criticism, at least in its current form, will not work. 
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acquiescing in Quine’s demand for a criterion of identity for possible objects, in 
Lewis’s nominalist metaphysical framework.328 
 
IV 
 
(C) It is a common criticism of Lewis’s theory that it leads to an implausible modal 
epistemology, for it is a mystery how we can learn about what goes on in non-actual 
worlds, given we are, on his theory, causally isolated from them.329 A related, but 
less commonly made point, is that Lewis’s theory cannot be a description of the 
theory we all implicitly believe, because his theory is unknown to ordinary people.330 
If it is unknown to ordinary people, it cannot express our actual understanding of 
modal claims. Rosen writes in support of this criticism that according to Lewis  
 
we are committed to modal realism from the cradle, simply because we reason 
about what might have been. It seems clear, however, that with one or two 
exceptions, modal realists are made, not born.331 
 
Lewis takes his analysis to express the theory we implicitly believe, and which gives 
modal expressions their meaning. He presents this theory in a systematic and 
improved form, but it is, he thinks, our theory.332 So, in a sense, we unwittingly 
knew the content of Lewis’s book before we read it, before he wrote it; in fact 
understanding his book was really a matter of recall, for we already knew what it 
said.333 It is perhaps the principle of charity together with a conservative approach to 
systematising our beliefs which is responsible for the view that we are all implicit 
modal realists. On this approach it is preferable to say that we misunderstood our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 A further point of disconnect between our ordinary modal beliefs and Lewis’s account of them was pointed 
out by my examiners. It is plausibly part of our ordinary modal beliefs that each individual has a unique set of 
persistence conditions. These will be part of our modal beliefs because such conditions will state (or it will 
follow from them) what changes an individual of a certain kind can and cannot undergo. However, according to 
Lewis’s view, it arguably isn’t the case that each individual has a unique set of persistence conditions. For what 
changes an individual can undergo is a matter of what counterparts it has, which vary from world to world. This 
point is underlined by the fact that an individual of kind k may have counterparts in some world which are not of 
kind k (for instance, I may have a poached egg as counterpart in some worlds). Because persistence conditions of 
individuals are ordinarily understood at the level of kinds, Lewis's view appears highly revisionary. 
329 See Hale 1997, 487-515. Also see Stalnaker 2003, 40 and Lewis 1986, 108-14. 
330 For a similar point, see Block and Stalnaker 1999, 30. 
331 Rosen 1990 340, fn.20. 
332 Lewis 1986, 134. 
333 Note that like The Paraphrastic Argument, this point makes us accomplices in any guilt which belief in 
Lewis’s theory brings. Rhetorically, this serves to curb certain critiques of his theory. 
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modal beliefs – re-interpreting their content so as to maximise their truth – than it is 
to affirm that we do understand the content of our modal beliefs, but that they are 
false. 
 
A reason to refuse Lewis’s view is that it opens up a gap between what we take 
ourselves to understand by our modal claims, and what his theory takes our 
understanding to consist in. Other than seeming implausible, this view requires 
revisionary approach to what we might call ‘meta-modal’ beliefs, beliefs about the 
content of our modal beliefs. This includes revising our view of the content of beliefs 
and other propositional attitudes which take modal propositions as their objects. I 
return to this point at the end of the following section. 
 
4.32 Ontological commitments and modal concepts 
 
I 
 
Lewis faces a dilemma: he can affirm his analysis of modality as a description of the 
content of our modal beliefs, and so hold that our ordinary modal beliefs are 
ontologically committed to worlds; or he can hold that ordinary beliefs are not 
committed to worlds, but that the analysis should be affirmed, not as a description of, 
but as an improvement on, our modal beliefs. While Lewis is torn on the question of 
whether his theory is descriptive or normative,334 there is good evidence that he takes 
it primarily to describe our modal beliefs, and express our ordinary understanding of 
them (see §4.1). As such it then seems he must take our ordinary modal beliefs to 
incur commitment to worlds.  
 
In the last section I suggested that Lewis’s conceptual analysis is not correct, in part 
because we cannot make the same inferences from his quantificational claims as 
from their associated modal claims. I now argue (a) that his conceptual analysis 
seems incorrect because his analysans has different ontological commitments from 
those of the analysandum. For modal and quantificational concepts cannot be the 
same if they issue in propositions which have different ontological commitments. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Lewis 1986, 134. 
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And (b) that the interpretation of modal claims as ontologically committed to worlds 
requires large scale revision of our beliefs about the content of our modal beliefs, 
concerns, desires etc. The extent of this revision indicates that the analysis is not 
merely making our implicit modal theory explicit.  
 
I proceed in this section by suggesting there is a tension between the function of 
some modal claims and the view they are ontologically committing. I take this 
tension to indicate that modal claims don’t quantify over worlds. Then I suggest that 
Lewis takes the view that modal claims are ontologically committing, and that his 
view is more revisionary than often recognised. Finally I suggest he would do better 
by treating his theory of modality as a purely metaphysical theory, and abandoning 
his aspirations for giving a descriptive analysis of our modal concepts. 
 
II 
 
It is uncontroversial that we do not ordinarily believe that merely possible objects 
exist. We may be forced to by argument to do so, but we need force to get us there. 
For instance, we may reason that if it is true that x possibly exists, then there must be 
something which exists in virtue of which it is true. But force can sometimes ride 
roughshod over delicate concepts, distorting them as it makes way for a powerful 
theory. Our ordinary notion of merely possible objects seems to be of objects which, 
like fictional objects, do not exist.335 In other words, our ordinary concept of 
possibility appears to be ontologically neutral: it doesn’t follow from any statement 
asserting a mere possibility, that there exists something which is that possibility. So 
if possibility is to be analysed in a way which conforms to what I take to be ordinary 
belief, then it shouldn’t be analysed in terms of existence. Quine takes an even 
stronger view: that the concept of possibility cannot be ontologically committing 
because to be so it would require possibilities as suitable values of first-order 
variables, yet they are unsuitable.336 I however just want to point out that we appear 
to take our ordinary concept of possibility to be ontologically neutral. Morton well 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 Why do we not mourn the dead of merely possible wars? It is because they don’t exist, not because, e.g., we 
do not know them well enough. 
336 See, e.g., Quine 1961, 4. 
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captures the surprise we find on being told by some modal theorists that we are 
ordinarily committed to possibilia:  
 
Most of us do not believe that there are possibilia. We do not believe that ‘I 
could have been the father of six children’ is true by virtue of my or anyone 
else’s paternity of six possible, nonactual, children. It would therefore be 
disturbing to be told that when one uses such idioms one is referring to 
possibilia, even though one doubts that there are any.337 
 
One function of assertions of possibility helps to bring out this neutrality. Assertions 
of possibility can be as a device to withdraw ontological commitment. To illustrate, 
take any declarative sentence s. Now prefix a non-epistemic possibility operator to it, 
so we have the sentence ‘Possibly s’. ‘Possibly s’ we would expect is committed to 
no additional entities than s is committed to. If anything, in asserting ‘Possibly s’, 
the existential commitments that would ordinarily arise from the assertion of s are 
withdrawn.338 For instance, compare ‘There are unicorns’ with ‘Possibly there are 
unicorns’. The former sentence is committed to unicorns; the latter is not. The latter 
issues in, we could say, a possible or conditional commitment, that is, a commitment 
to unicorns were the possibility of unicorns realised or actual, but a possible 
commitment is different from an actual commitment to a possibility. Being able to 
assert possible existence without asserting existence seems precisely the point of 
many possibility claims. The limit case of the possibility of nothing brings this out 
(see §3.52). For this possibility to be coherent it is required that our concept of 
possibility is not existentially committing, for otherwise in saying there might have 
been nothing, we are committed to there being something which is that possibility. 
An ontologically neutral notion of possibility leaves room for making sense of such 
claims. 
 
The view that ordinary modal claims are, at least at face-value, ontologically neutral 
has its adherents. Williamson, for instance, clearly articulates it: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 Morton 1973, 394. 
338 I say ‘if anything’, because in context, it may be common knowledge that some entities which s is about, 
exist. In qualifying ‘s’ with ‘possibly’ we don’t withdraw our commitment to their existence. 
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take claims of possibility. If we try to put them in first-order terms, we may 
have to go to a first-order language in which we quantify over possible worlds. 
Then we’ll understand claims of possibility as claiming, amongst other things, 
that there is a possible world of a certain kind. But that is not a commitment of 
the original claim, which is in good standing before it’s regimented, and the 
regimentation may be unfaithful to what the philosopher is putting forward.339 
 
He elaborates on this point elsewhere: 
 
The modal realist’s postulation of an implicit argument place for worlds is not 
faithful to our understanding of modal vocabulary.340 
 
By contrast, for Lewis, modal propositions just are quantifications over worlds. 
There is no gap between the two claims. Hence our intuitions about the content of 
modal beliefs, according to which they do not incur commitment to entities which 
are possibilities, are wrong. For Lewis, the concept of possibility cannot be used to 
withdraw our commitments to things. For any true assertion of possibility brings 
with it a commitment to a world. You cannot use ‘possible’ to withdraw a 
commitment without making a new one. For instance, take the sentences ‘There are 
unicorns’ and ‘Possibly, there are unicorns’. Suppose you deny the former and assert 
the latter. You thereby deny there are any unicorns in the actual world, but assert 
there is a world in which there are unicorns.341 That modal concepts are not 
ontologically neutral is the explicit basis of Lewis’s theory of modality. He writes 
that his analysis of modality “presupposes” Modal Realism342 and is “Modal 
Realism ‘at work’”.343 Such ontological non-neutrality is natural in a theory in which 
modal concepts are defined in terms of the existence of a realm of worlds.344 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 Williamson in Antonsen 2012, 25. 
340 Williamson 2002, 240. For a connected but more general point, see Yablo 2008, 192. 
341 Merely possible de re modal claims are, on Lewis’s view, doubly committing: to the world of utterance in 
which x exists, and at least one other world in which a counterpart of x exists. 
342 Lewis 1986, vii. 
343 Ibid., 5. 
344 This is most clearly seen in the limit case of the possibility of nothing, which Lewis is forced to deny. 
Thinking of a central feature of Lewis’s theory as ontological non-neutrality with respect to modal claims can 
help us see the real force of the infamous ‘incredulous stare’ objection. It is not, as Lewis reads it, an 
unwillingness or inability to countenance an ontology of worlds, but rather an unwillingness or inability to 
comprehend that a theory could take what appears to be ontologically neutral discourse – which at times is 
employed precisely to avoid ontological commitment – to be ontologically committing discourse, whose content 
is to be interpreted as quantificational. 
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III 
 
I mentioned above a dilemma Lewis appears to face: either he can affirm his analysis 
of modality as a description of the content of our modal beliefs, and so hold that our 
ordinary modal beliefs are ontologically committed to worlds; or he can hold that 
ordinary beliefs are not committed to worlds, but that the analysis should be 
affirmed, not as a description of, but as an improvement on, our modal beliefs. 
 
Accepting the first horn of the dilemma means that our modal discourse commits us 
to the existence of other worlds. This approach is however more revisionary than 
usually recognised. It not only requires revision of our modal beliefs (see §3.52), and 
cannot makes sense of using modal claims to withdraw ontological commitments, 
but also it seems to require revision of our meta-modal beliefs about the content of 
propositional attitude ascriptions involving modal content. Take for instance the case 
of Hubert Humphrey.345 He cares about whether he could have won the election, but 
doesn’t care about whether his counterpart won a counterpart election in another 
world. This lack of concern about his counterpart is thought to manifest the belief 
that Humphrey’s counterpart is irrelevant to his possibly winning the election. For 
Lewis, the fact that Humphrey possibly won is constituted by his counterpart’s 
winning. This mean Lewis can then either say that Humphrey does care about his 
counterpart winning (but not under that description) and is just wrong that his 
counterpart’s doings are irrelevant to what he (Humphrey) believes – or else he must 
say that though Humphrey doesn’t care, he rationally should care.346 
 
On the horn of the dilemma I believe Lewis must take, he is committed to saying that 
Humphrey does in fact care whether his counterpart wins – which is contrary, I am 
supposing, to Humphrey’s own reflective judgment about himself, and what he takes 
himself to mean. This is the kind of revision that Lewis is committed to whenever 
ordinary views about the content of our modal beliefs run up against the verdicts of 
his conceptual analysis. He requires large scale revision of our view of ourselves, of 
our beliefs about the content of our beliefs, desires, concerns etc., whenever they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 Kripke 1980, 45 fn.13. 
346 For discussion see McFetridge 1990, 142-4, Hale 1986, 77-78, Rosen 1990, 349-51 and Hughes 2004, 127-
131. For a connected point, see Williamson 2000, 31. 
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take modal propositions as their objects. Revision of such meta-modal beliefs stand 
in the way of a smooth and costless treatment of modality as quantification over 
worlds.347 
 
The point can be compared to an ethical theorist who takes our basic moral concepts 
to be those described by utilitarianism. Such a theory comes up against what I take to 
be the jumble of values which constitute our ordinary ethical life, which cannot be 
squeezed into his monistic theory. Such a theorist must not only revise many first-
order ethical beliefs, but will also appear to require revision of meta-ethical beliefs 
about the content of propositional attitudes involving ethical belief. So, for instance, 
if the theory states that what we mean by ‘good’ is pleasure, then I must revise my 
understanding of beliefs such as my wanting to do good in the world, which I do not 
take to be concerned with the generation of pleasure. Indeed, as Moore pointed out, 
it is easy to determine that that is not what I ordinarily mean by ‘good’:  
 
whoever will attentively consider with himself what is actually before his mind 
when he asks the question ‘Is pleasure (or whatever it may be) after all good?’ 
can easily satisfy himself that he is not merely wondering whether pleasure is 
pleasant.348 
If the good is identified with pleasure and moral claims are analysed in terms of 
pleasure, then an error theory of the content of moral claims is being proposed: our 
ordinary picture of our moral discourse is, according to the theory, in error. 
 
Likewise, Lewis appears to be committed to the revision of very many beliefs we 
have about ourselves. On his view, in very many cases we do not know ourselves, in 
the sense that we do not know the content of our modal beliefs, desire and other 
propositional attitudes. He might go along with Wittgenstein’s remark that when we 
mean something  
 
one is oneself in motion. One is rushing ahead and so cannot also observe 
oneself rushing ahead.349  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347 See Rosen 1990 349-51, for support for the view that Lewis’s view here is very revisionary. 
348 Moore 1986, 16. 
349 Wittgenstein 1953, §456. 
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Lewis appears to think we need theory to tell us about what it is we believe when it 
comes to our modal beliefs, and presumably many others; we do not have some 
direct or intuitive access to their content, which may constrain our theory of what 
they are about. Though Lewis’s revisionary stance raises problems for the material 
adequacy of his theory, it isn’t simply a problem of material adequacy. The theory 
entails a picture of ourselves that strikes us as absurd, in which we are alienated from 
our own modal beliefs. For Lewis, and to put things in terms he would reject, what is 
in our minds when we affirm necessity is something we cannot directly recognise. 
He hopes that by re-interpreting the content of modal beliefs he can preserve their 
truth-value, in his framework, and so not have to revise them. That may be so, but 
there is still a cost to re-interpreting this content so radically, which is that a large 
class of meta-modal beliefs about the content of modal beliefs are false or must 
themselves be re-interpreted. 
 
IV 
 
Whatever virtues Lewis’s theory of modality might have: unified, reductive etc., if it 
isn’t ours – in our heads, grasped by us – then it cannot be the theory by means of 
which we actually understand modal concepts. Lewis appears to find the theory of 
modality that suits his theoretical requirements, and projects it back as the theory we 
use. But there is little evidence to think that his theory is our theory (see §4.31). Why 
not instead give up on the view that the analysis of modality is a conceptual analysis, 
as we have so far been supposing. Lewis could distinguish between the analytic and 
explanatory ambitions for his theory, and set aside the former, at least insofar as the 
analytic ambitions rest on conceptual analysis. This would then open up the 
possibility of thinking of his theory of modality as a theory of the source of modal 
truth, and so as a theory which it is plausible to say we should believe rather than the 
theory we do implicitly believe, and in this way accept the revisionary nature of the 
theory (as revising our beliefs about reality, not about the content of our thoughts).350 
This would be a more plausible view, and allow Lewis to explain the truth of modal 
claims in terms of worlds, while leaving open the question of what our modal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 See Lewis 1973, 88. 
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concepts really are. Having given up the conceptual analysis of modality, he can 
treat this theory as purely metaphysical.351 
 
Compare Lewis’s theory of modality with the correspondence theory of truth. The 
correspondence theory, roughly states that a sentence s is true iff s stands in relation 
R to a fact f. The theory can be taken one of two ways: as a metaphysical theory of 
truth or a conceptual analysis of truth. Treated as a conceptual analysis, the theory 
appears wrong. For it doesn’t seem correct to say that merely by saying something is 
true we commit ourselves not only to whatever  commitments s brings with it, but in 
addition, the relation R and the fact f. On this view we cannot consistently hold that 
some proposition is true, and deny that there are facts. Most correspondence theorists 
don’t offer the theory as a conceptual analysis, but as a metaphysical theory of truth. 
On this approach, we may or may not know what truth is, but if the theory is right, 
we should revise what we believe about truth to fit it. (Just as we would and should 
revise our beliefs about what matter is in the light of our best theories of it.) 
Likewise Lewis can propose his theory of modality as a metaphysical theory of what 
modality is or what makes modal claims true.352 
Lewis need not hold that this theory is our implicit theory of modality, by means of 
which we understand modal claims. He can instead separate out the analytic from 
the explanatory, that is, explain what makes modal claims true without analysing the 
concepts we use in grasping or making these claims. This would allow him to 
embrace the second horn of the dilemma above – either treat the analysis as 
descriptive or revisionary – while avoiding the trouble that comes with accepting 
both the second horn and the view that the analysis is conceptual. 
 
This approach would however deprive him of what he hoped to achieve in the 
arguments I reviewed in this chapter: to ground the conceptual analysis of modality, 
and illuminate our modal concepts in non-modal terms. It would also mean that 
Lewis would have to accept that his postulation of worlds is not a part of the theory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 This view is inspired by elements in Lewis’s own thinking. See Lewis (1986, 17, 19) where he seems to be 
after the metaphysical source of modal truth, rather than giving a conceptual analysis of modal concepts. 
352 Many have blurred the conceptual and metaphysical aspects of Lewis’s theory. E.g., Stalnaker writes: “Our 
modal discourse, Lewis believes, is discourse about this plurality of worlds. If it is true that there might have 
been talking donkeys, this is because there really are talking donkeys in one or more of these worlds”(1988, 117). 
Whether Lewis can separate the analytic and explanatory is a hard question, which McFetridge has an insightful 
discussion of in his 1990, 51. 
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we already believe, but a postulation by the theorist constructing a better theory of 
the world. Furthermore, given one of the central reasons to believe there are worlds 
is the success of the conceptual analysis of modality, giving up the analysis means 
this can no longer be appealed to as a reason. 
 
4.4 Assessment 
 
In this chapter I have argued that Lewis’s attempts at meeting the conceptual 
condition on analyses of modality are problematic, because his analysis doesn’t 
appear to meet the three tests of conceptual adequacy (see §4.0). First, neither of his 
translation arguments nor The Theoretical Identification Argument appear to 
establish an a priori conceptual connection between modal concepts and quantifiers 
over worlds. Second, I argued that we don’t appear to understand modal claims by 
virtue of understanding non-modal propositions quantifying over worlds. Several 
examples indicate there is a class of modal claims which we understand but the basis 
for understanding them appears not to be quantification over worlds, and there also 
appears to be a class of claims which we should understand, were our understanding 
of modality constituted by worldly claims, but do we not seem to understand. 
Further, I suggested that if Lewis’s analysis of modality is thought to be descriptive, 
not revisionary, then he seems committed to the view that we implicitly operate with 
his theory of modality. But this seems unlikely given that (a) we don’t take ourselves 
to have the beliefs that this theory attributes to us, and (b) a fortiori, we don’t take 
the theory to correctly ascribe the content of our modal beliefs. Third, there is good 
reason to think that modal claims are not committed to the existence of worlds but 
Lewis’s analysis of them treats them as being so committed. This indicates that 
modal claims are not correctly analysed as quantification over worlds. The basis for 
this view is twofold: firstly that the function of possibility claims is often to retract 
ontological commitment, whereas for Lewis to say that possibly x is F is always to 
bring commitment to an object which is that possibility. Secondly, Lewis’s theory 
requires an implausible divorce of what we take ourselves to be saying when we 
make modal claims, and what we are really saying. His view that we know not what 
we think, at least about our modal claims, is highly revisionary and so problematic 
with respect both to material and conceptual adequacy conditions, but especially 
implausible according to his own conservative methodology. 
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Chapter 5: Justification  
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
I   
  
What calls for a justification of Lewis’s theory of modality? Lewis appeared to take 
the following three points to do so. First, the ontology of Modal Realism appears to 
be in conflict with our ordinary conception of what there is (Lewis took this 
objection – which he called ‘the incredulous stare’ – to be among the most 
serious).353 Second, the conceptual analysis of modality in terms of worlds appears 
to conflict with our ordinary conception of the content of our modal beliefs (Lewis’s 
attempts, which I surveyed in the last chapter, to provide an argument to support his 
analysis are evidence that he took this objection seriously). This second reason is not 
emphasised as much as the first, but I take it to be a problem of at least equal 
significance. For both Lewis’s ontology and analysis would, if accepted, require 
substantial revision of our pre-theoretical beliefs, and it is this which Lewis takes to 
be so costly to his theory.354 Third, there is a variety of rival theories of modality to 
Lewis’s which claim not to have the first two problems, and which purport to satisfy 
the material, conceptual and reductive conditions which I suggested a reductive 
theory of modality should meet (see §1.2).355 So a justification of Lewis’s theory 
would be a reason to believe his, rather than one of these rival theories.356 
 
These three points are linked by Lewis’s view of philosophical methodology. 
According to this methodology, a theory of modality – indeed any theory – should 
cohere as much as possible with the rest of our beliefs. The fact that Lewis’s theory 
of modality appears to be inconsistent with some of our beliefs and the fact that 
some rival theories appear not to be, make the rival theories more appealing.357 In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 Lewis 1986, 133, 135. 
354 In one of the many places Lewis makes such a point, he writes: “A credible theory must be conservative” 
(ibid., 134). 
355 Ibid., 4-5, 136. 
356 It is worth being aware of a distinction which Lewis doesn’t always respect between a reason to prefer one 
theory to another, a reason to believe some theory. If you believe a theory T you think T is true, whereas you can 
prefer, accept, adopt T without believing it is true. 
357 Ibid., 136, 140. If these rivals treat possible worlds as abstract objects of a kind we already take ourselves to 
be committed to, then such theories can seem ontologically more appealing. Analytically, the story is perhaps not 
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this theoretical context, Lewis is under pressure to give reasons to prefer his theory 
over its rivals. Though he didn’t think these rival theories would ultimately work,358 
he took the threat seriously enough to come up with what he took to be his trump 
card, a decisive reason to prefer his theory over theirs: his theory does without modal 
primitives, theirs requires them.359 Underlying Lewis’s reason for preferring his own 
theory is the view that the benefits of unifying our system of the world by reducing 
modal notions outweighs the cost of revising the beliefs (about what there is and 
what the content of our modal beliefs are) required to achieve this.360 
 
Lewis thought of his theory as the best theory of modality there is, and therefore the 
theory most worthy of belief. Reducing modality is thought to be its central ‘best-
making’ feature which no other theory possesses. But we should remember that 
though the discussion of which theory is best is conducted in terms of which theory 
satisfies certain theoretical desiderata, the aim of justifying a theory is to give a 
reason to think it is true. The satisfaction of these desiderata is merely the means by 
which we approach the question of truth. It is important to keep in mind what the 
link is between the desiderata – such as reduction – and truth, that is, why their 
satisfaction is taken to be indicative of truth. The aim in this chapter is to understand 
Lewis’s justification of his theory of modality and to ask whether it constitutes a 
reason to think his theory is true.361 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
so different to Lewis’s. For if such theories treat our modal discourse as quantification over abstract objects, this 
appears perhaps almost as alien to our ordinary conception of what we think about when we think modally as 
Lewis’s theory does.  
358 See e.g., Lewis 1973, 88. 
359 While other theories, such as those Lewis calls ‘ersatz’, may postulate abstract entities to play some of the 
analytical roles Lewis’s worlds play, Lewis doesn’t think any of them can reductively analyse modality (Lewis 
1986, 140-41). According to Lewis, the benefits such ‘ersatz’ analyses may bring are outweighed by having to 
take modal notions as primitive. For Lewis it is a “fatal objection” against such theories as analyses of modality, 
that they do not reduce modality (ibid., 156). 
360 Menzel makes a similar point: “Perhaps the biggest — if not the most philosophically sophisticated — 
challenge to Lewis’s theory is “the incredulous stare”, i.e., less colorfully put, the fact that its ontology is wildly 
at variance with common sense. Lewis faces this objection head on: His theory of worlds, he acknowledges, 
“does disagree, to an extreme extent, with firm common sense opinion about what there is” [1986, 133]. 
However, Lewis argues that no other theory explains so much so economically. With worlds in one’s 
philosophical toolkit, one is able to provide elegant explanations of a wide variety of metaphysical, semantical, 
and intentional phenomena. As high as the intuitive cost is, Lewis [1986, 135] concludes, the existence of worlds 
“ought to be accepted as true. The theoretical benefits are worth it”” (Menzel 2013). 
361 Of course there may be several reasons to think a theory true, but when we justify a theory we often take 
ourselves to be giving what we think of as the reason, or the decisive reason, to think it true. (Bonjour notes: “It 
is difficult to give precise criteria for when a given reason is the reason for a person’s holding a belief” (Bonjour 
1978, 2 fn.6)). 
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II  
 
It is common for scientists to aim for simple, powerful, unifying theories. Richard 
Feynman, for instance, described physics as follows:  
 
we try gradually to analyse all things, to put together things which at first sight 
look different, with the hope that we may be able to reduce the number of 
different things and thereby understand them better.362 
 
Lewis, like Feynman, aims for simplicity in metaphysical theories – not only 
simplicity of the number of different kinds of things it postulates, but also the 
number of different kinds of primitive notions it uses. Lewis also takes simplicity to 
play a central role in the justification of theories, and so the apparent satisfaction of 
his theoretical aims become justifying reasons.363 In the case of his theory of 
modality, Lewis – though he is not always careful to distinguish these points – takes 
the putatively reductive nature of his theory both to be a reason to prefer it to rival 
theories, and also to provide a reason to think it true.364 The locus classicus of this 
view is found at the beginning of OPW:  
 
We have only to believe in the vast realm of possibilia, and there we find what 
we need to advance our endeavours. We find the wherewithal to reduce the 
diversity of notions we must accept as primitive, and thereby to improve the 
unity and economy of the theory that is our professional concern – total theory, 
the whole of what we take to be true. What price paradise? If we want the 
theoretical benefits that talk of possibilia brings, the most straightforward way 
to gain honest title to them is to accept such talk as the literal truth. It is my 
view that the price is right…The benefits are worth their ontological cost. 
Modal realism is fruitful; that gives us good reason to believe that it is true.365 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 Feynman 1998, 24. 
363 Some philosophers appear to collapse ideological into ontological parsimony. For instance, Michael Huemer 
writes that Lewis’s Modal Realism is justified “on the ground that the recognition of possibilia reduces the 
number of fundamental (unanalysable) kinds we must recognize in metaphysics” (2009, 217). See also Sider  
2011, 14-15. 
364 Lewis 1986, 140-41, 156. 
365 Ibid., 4. And the page before he writes: “Why believe in a plurality of worlds? – Because the hypothesis is 
serviceable, and that is a reason to think that it is true” (ibid., 3). Later in OPW Lewis writes: “Modal realism 
ought to be accepted as true. The theoretical benefits are worth it” (ibid., 135). 
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The belief in worlds is justified, according to Lewis, because of the theoretical 
benefits it brings. What are these? First of all, a range of important philosophical 
notions – such as property, content, proposition, and most importantly modality – 
appear to be definable in terms of worlds (apparently intensional notions turn out to 
be definable extensionally). Second, the diversity of notions we must treat as 
primitive can be decreased. If modal notions, which enter into the definition of so 
many other notions in philosophy can be reductively defined, then modality doesn’t 
have to be regarded as primitive. So Lewis here advances the analytical power of his 
ontology of worlds as a reason to believe it to be true.366 Third, belief in worlds 
doesn’t only seem to have analytic benefits, but explanatory benefits too: Lewis 
takes worlds to explain the source of modal truth.367 
 
III 
 
It is strange that despite Lewis placing the whole burden of justification for his 
theory on its fruitfulness, specifically, its distinguishing ability to “reduce the 
diversity of notions we must accept as primitive”, this fact has attracted little critical 
attention. Chihara is exceptional in treating Lewis’s justification explicitly and 
seriously. With italics in the original, he stresses that: 
 
the whole justification for belief in possible worlds rests on the supposed 
reduction in the diversity of the primitives of our total theory.368 
 
Lewis justifies his theory of modality as a whole – not merely Modal Realism, as 
Chihara seems to suggest – as an instrument to realise certain theoretical goals. The 
existence of worlds is primarily justified by their analytical services to theory; the 
analysis in turn is primarily justified by its role in decreasing the number of notions 
we must regard as primitive. This is not something the ontological or analytical part 
of the theory can accomplish alone.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 As Lewis says: “systematic philosophy goes more easily if we may presuppose modal realism in our 
analyses” (1986, vii). 
367 Shalkowski nicely summarises Lewis’s justification of his theory: “It is precisely in finding…[modal 
realism]…to be a simple, coherent, systematic, and extremely powerful metaphysics that leads Lewis to conclude 
that it has a greater claim on our assent than any competitors” (2010, 178). See also Rosen 1990, 338. 
368 Chihara 1998, 99. 
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Little detailed work has been devoted to Lewis’s justification of his theory of 
modality. Even Lewis himself, whose memorable methodological maxims litter his 
work, says very little of substance.369 However, even if vague and elusive, their 
central role providing Lewis’s theory both a goal and a justification means that they 
demand our attention. Particularly so because these maxims are widely appealed to 
in current discussions in metaphysics (see §1.1 and §2.2). This absence of detailed 
justification is, according to Huemer, part of a common pattern in which appeals to 
parsimony are “usually made…without discussion of the reasons for favouring 
simple theories”.370 Lewis’s justification of his theory of modality is a case in point, 
though luckily he does offer us some clues to his thinking. 
 
IV 
 
Lewis takes the distinguishing feature of his theory and the central reason for 
believing it true to be that it decreases the diversity of primitive notions. Why is this 
a reason to believe it? In other words, what is the connection between reduction and 
truth? The following chain of reasons can be discerned in Lewis’s work, which I will 
call ‘Lewis’s justification’.  
  
(a) The Modal Reduction Principle: all else being equal, it is better to reduce 
modal concepts which are taken to be primitive in a theory. 
 
This is grounded in, 
 
(b) The General Reduction Principle: all else being equal, it is better to 
decrease the diversity of concepts taken to be primitive in a theory. 
 
The grounding of (a) in (b) implies that from the point of view of reduction, there is 
nothing specially bad about modal concepts. They should be reduced because they 
can be reduced, and are taken to be primitive, so add to the diversity of primitives – 
not because they are modal. These two normative principles are grounded in the 
following two claims: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 See Oliver 1996 for a critical discussion of Lewis’s insubstantial methodology. 
370 Huemer 2009, 217. 
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(c) The Unification Principle: all else being equal, fewer primitives make a 
theory more unified. 
 
(d) The Truth Principle: all else being equal, the more unified a theory is, the 
more likely it is to be true.371 
 
The reason to prefer a theory with fewer primitives is that such a theory is, all else 
being equal, more unified than one with more primitives. Given that a theory which 
is more unified is, all else being equal, more likely true than a theory with more 
primitives, and given that truth is the goal of belief, we have reason for believing in a 
theory with fewer primitives. I say more about these principles in the following 
sections. 
 
V 
 
This chain of reasons drives Lewis into the counterintuitive theory that there is a 
plurality of worlds and our concepts of modality are quantifiers over them. It is in 
the context of the quest to reduce the diversity of primitives that it becomes plausible 
to even consider such a theory as a candidate theory of possibility. This context 
together with a widespread belief that modal notions come into the definition of 
many other philosophically important notions – what Fine called ‘modal mania’ – 
makes Lewis’s reduction of modality appear more plausible than it might otherwise 
seem.  
 
Lewis uses his justification to issue a challenge to opponents: ‘even if your theories 
are equal to mine in other respects, mine still has fewer primitives, and so my theory 
is more likely true than yours, and so has a greater right to be believed’. In this 
chapter I will suggest that Lewis’s justification leaves much to be desired. In 
particular, it is hard to see why it provides a reason to think his theory is true; that is, 
it is unclear that it satisfies the justification condition (§1.2). This of course doesn’t 
mean his theory isn’t true, just that his justification doesn’t appear to be a good 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 Lewis 1986, 3-5. 
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reason for thinking it is. In this chapter I proceed by aiming to answer the following 
questions:  
 
 (A) What, for Lewis, is a primitive concept? (§5.1). 
 (B) What does the General Reduction Principle say? (§5.2). 
 (C) What do the Unification Principle and The Truth Principle say? (§5.3). 
 (D) Does Lewis’s justification work? (§5.4). 
 
5.1 Lewis’s conception of primitives 
 
I 
 
‘Primitive’, in contemporary philosophical usage, means undefined. But beyond this, 
little is settled about the meaning of this term of art. There are at least as many 
different views about primitiveness as there are permissible combinations of answers 
to the following questions: 
 
(A) What is the primary bearer of primitiveness? Is it words, concepts, 
sentences, propositions, properties or objects – or something else?372 
(B) Is being primitive a property a concept has absolutely or only relative to a 
theory?373 
(C) Are primitive concepts merely undefined or indefinable? Are they concepts 
which, in some sense, merely stand in no need of definition or rather, do they 
in some sense resist any attempt at definition? 
(D) Are primitive concepts necessarily definers? That is, must a notion be an 
undefined definer to qualify as primitive, or may a primitive notion be 
undefined and remain idle, defining nothing?374 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372 I have and will continue to speak of ‘concepts’ or ‘notions’ as the primary bearers of primitiveness. 
373 See Hossack 2007, xi for what appears to be an example of an absolute conception. An absolute conception 
might be defined in terms of a relative one, e.g., as what is primitive in any theory, or in non-theoretical terms. 
An analogy: which colours are primary seems to be something theory-relative – there are colours which are 
primary in some colour theories, but derived in others. But we may ask whether there is an absolute matter of fact 
about which colours are primary. Note that one way of understanding primitives as theory-relative is to treat 
them as the concepts that occur in a theory’s axioms that are not defined elsewhere in the theory. On this 
conception see Burge 1998, 309. 
374 Whether there could be primitive concepts that do not define, is the question of whether primitiveness is 
defined in terms of the explanatory role of a concept. 
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(E) Do primitive concepts have special epistemic properties? For instance, are 
they innate? Are they concepts we understand immediately, under suitable 
reflective conditions? Or are they perhaps the notions possession of which is 
necessary for thinking of a certain subject-matter?375 
(F) Are primitive concepts the concepts of things with special metaphysical 
properties? For instance, are they concepts of simple, or fundamental things, at 
least from the point of view of the theory which treats them as primitive?376 
(G) Connectedly are primitive concepts themselves ‘things’ which are, in some 
sense, simple? 
(H) Are primitive concepts the concepts that play a special semantic role? For 
instance, in giving theories their content?377 
 
It is a huge and interesting topic what it is that drives different answers to these 
questions, and so different conceptions of primitiveness. It may well be that some of 
what we take to be genuine theoretical disagreement comes down to different 
conceptions of the roles that primitives play in a theory, and exploring this line of 
thought seems to me worthwhile. My focus here, however, is what Lewis’s 
conception of primitiveness is. 
  
II  
 
Lewis doesn’t explicitly answer this question, but appears to have a minimal 
conception of primitives, which remains neutral with respect to most of the questions 
above, and has the following features. First, he treats concepts, more precisely, types 
of concepts as the primary bearers of primitiveness (see §5.2). Second, he takes what 
it is to be primitive to be a theory-relative matter (which is connected to his view of 
the meaning of theoretical terms, see §§4.25-4.26). If primitives are theory-relative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 As, e.g., one might think the notions of space and time are in thinking of physical objects or the notion 
expressed by ‘∈’ is to our thought about sets. 
376 We may distinguish here the position of e.g., Hossack, for whom primitive notions are notions of simple 
things (2007, xi) from Sider for whom primitive notions are notions of fundamental structures (2012, 14) from 
Forbes for whom primitive notions k appear to “provide the fundamental means of expression of” k-facts. E.g., 
modal operators are the fundamental means of expression of modal facts (1989, 78). 
377 Frege wrote: “To be sure, that on which we base our definitions may itself have been defined previously; 
however, when we retrace our steps further, we shall always come upon something which, being a simple, is 
indefinable, and must be admitted to be incapable of further analysis. And the properties belonging to these 
ultimate building blocks of a discipline contain, as it were in a nutshell, its whole contents. In geometry, these 
properties are expressed in the axioms in so far as they are independent of another” (1952, 113). 
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then: (a) for some notion k to be primitive it must occur in a theory T, and (b) the 
relevant facts that determine whether k is primitive in T are facts about the 
definitional relations between k and other notions in T (for instance, that k is defined 
by a definite description). Third, if a notion k is primitive in T, it is indefinable in T. 
That is, there is no possible combination of concepts in T, such that k can be 
correctly defined in T. Putting the three points above together, we can say that for 
Lewis, a type of concept k is primitive in T just in case k occurs in T and k cannot be 
defined in T.  
 
The third point above opens up a gap between what theorists may take to be 
primitive in a theory T, and what is primitive in it. That is, an appearance/reality 
divide with respect to primitive notions. For one may think a notion k is definable in 
T, for instance, if we take ourselves to possess a definition of k in T, despite k being 
in fact indefinable in T. The distinction rests on the view that what is primitive in T 
is grounded in matters of fact about definitional relations in T. Two connected issues 
stand in our way of seeing which notions are in fact primitive in a given theory. 
First, theories are rarely presented in a form which reflects their conceptual structure. 
To see that structure, theories often must be reformulated, for instance, in an 
axiomatic form. This should allow us to see which are the axioms of the theory, and 
so which notions can and cannot be defined in it (though see §5.4). Second, and 
connectedly, though a theory may contain the resources to define some notion in it, 
it can require creativity to see what defines what. Lewis, for instance, thinks that all 
the resources are available to us in our ordinary theory of the world to reduce modal 
notions – but thinks it requires his explicit formulation of Modal Realism to see that 
this is so.378 
 
It may be objected that Lewis’s theory is a revision or, as he might say, an 
‘improvement’ on our ordinary theory. So showing that modal notions need not be 
treated as primitive in his revised theory doesn’t mean that modal notions are not 
primitive in our ordinary theory. I think this is a fair criticism, and whether it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 The Paraphrastic Argument (§§4.23-4.24) is the clearest expression of this view. It is, for Lewis, only because 
we have a mistaken idea as to what our own theory of the world is, and what our understanding of the meaning of 
our modal expressions come to – perhaps because we are blinded and dazzled by the box and diamond – that we 
incorrectly treat modal notions as primitives. This is, for Lewis, an illusion, as he believes that modal notions are 
in fact definable. 
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successful will depend on how extensive Lewis’s revision of ordinary beliefs is: that 
is, the extent to which the new resources he introduces make it implausible to hold 
that it is the theory we implicitly hold, and which, implicitly, provides the meaning 
of our modal discourse. This again raises the question: how can a theory we do not 
possess – a theory which improves on the theory we are taken to possess – be said to 
provide for our understanding of modality? I do not try to answer this question here. 
 
5.2 The Modal Reduction Principle and The General Reduction Principle 
 
I 
  
The Modal Reduction Principle says that, all things being equal, it is better to reduce 
modal concepts which are taken to be primitive. This means that a theory which 
defines the modal in terms of the non-modal is a better theory, all else being equal, 
than one which does not. Why is this so? In other words, why is it an objection to a 
theory that it employs irreducibly modal notions?  
 
According to Lewis, reducing modality is an instrument to “reduce the diversity of 
notions we must accept as primitive…”379 or “reduce our burden of primitive 
notions”380 or “cut down on primitives”.381 Here ‘reduce’ seems simply to mean 
‘decrease’. So the analysis of modality in non-modal terms is a means to decreasing 
the diversity of primitive notions we must accept. The Modal Reduction Principle is 
grounded in general considerations about the disvalue of excessive primitive 
notions, not special considerations about the concept of modality. So Lewis doesn’t 
think modal notions are intrinsically bad; if it turned out that reducing the modal to 
the non-modal didn’t decrease the diversity of primitive notions in a theory, he 
would have no reason to favour the reduction of modality. 
 
This at least is Lewis’s official line. We might remain suspicious that he is, at 
bottom, sceptical of modal notions, and this is why they are singled out for special 
treatment. Fine for instance hold that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 Lewis 1986, 4. 
380 Ibid., 154. 
381 Ibid., 157. 
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au fond, Lewis is as sceptical of modal notions as Quine. Neither can 
understand modality except as a form of regularity; and the only difference 
between them lies in the range of the regularities to which their respective 
ontologies allow them to appeal.382 
 
Lewis seems to find modal notions mysterious and not properly understood until 
they can be reduced in a non-modal language. In ‘Anselm and Actuality’ he made 
this explicit:  
 
The standards of validity for modal reasoning have long been unclear; they 
become clear only when we provide a semantic analysis of modal logic by 
reference to possible worlds and to possible things therein. Thus insofar as we 
understand modal reasoning at all, we understand it as disguised reasoning 
about possible beings.383  
 
But let us return to the official line, whose logic we are investigating. On this view 
there is nothing peculiarly bad about modal notions. The reason they provide such an 
attractive target for reduction is, on this view, that they ubiquitously enter into the 
definition of other important philosophical notions. It is this role modal notions have 
in our theories, rather than some feature of modal notions themselves, which makes 
them a good target for reduction. This goes together, of course, with the fact that a 
way can be seen to reduce them, unlike some other putative primitive notions, such 
as existence or truth.384 
 
The General Reduction Principle grounds the Modal Reduction Principle. According 
to the former, it is better to decrease the diversity of concepts taken to be primitive in 
a theory. It is worth noting that the question of why Lewis targets modal notions in 
particular arises because the Modal Reduction Principle doesn’t follow from the 
General Reduction Principle. Just because it is better to reduce the diversity of 
concepts in a theory doesn’t mean it is better to analyse modality in non-modal 
terms; a reductive analysis of another supposedly primitive notion might reduce the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 Fine 2005, 2. 
383 Lewis 1983, 10, my italics. 
384 Though see Stalnaker (2012, 4) for the view that modal notions are much like existence and truth, and are not 
reducible. 
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diversity of notions we must take as primitive just as well. Whether the Modal 
Reduction Principle is the best way of implementing the General Reduction 
Principle, and so reducing the diversity of primitive notions, may well vary from 
theory to theory depending on their resources. So to use the latter principle to justify 
the former in a particular theoretical context, we need to know more facts about the 
theory in question. Lewis sees the reductive analysis of modality as the best way of 
implementing the General Reduction Principle with respect to our shared theory of 
the world, because he believes that a vast range of philosophically important 
concepts in that theory can be defined modally, including the notions of content, 
property, proposition. And Lewis took the record of contemporary use of possible 
worlds to confirm this:  
 
philosophers have offered a great many…analyses that make reference to 
possible worlds, or to possible individuals that inhabit possible worlds. I find 
that record most impressive. I think it is clear that talk of possibilia has 
clarified questions in many parts of the philosophy of logic, of mind, of 
language, and of science – not to mention metaphysics itself.385 
 
If you are a ‘modal maniac’ then reducing modality may well appear to be the best 
way of implementing the General Reduction Principle.386 Nonetheless there may be 
other ways of satisfying this principle, by reducing notions other than modality. But 
supposing, as Lewis does, that reducing modal concepts is in fact the best way to 
decrease the diversity of putatively primitive concepts of our theory, then the 
General Reduction Principle appears to justify reducing them. 
 
II 
 
What, in more detail, does the General Reduction Principle say? To begin with, what 
is it to decrease the variety of notions a theory contains? Just as Lewis’s notion of 
ontological parsimony doesn’t count the number of token objects postulated by a 
theory, but the number of types of object, so the General Reduction Principle doesn’t 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385 Lewis 1986, 3. Sider supports this view, and writes that “possible worlds are ubiquitous in metaphysics, and 
are frequently utilized in semantics, ethics, probability theory, philosophy of mind, and many other contexts” 
(2003, 187). 
386 For “modal mania” see Fine 2005, 9. 
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count the number of occurrences of primitive concepts in a theory, but the number of 
types of primitive concepts.387 To illustrate, compare the following two modal 
theories of God’s existence: (a) it is necessarily necessary that God exists, (b) it is 
necessary that God exists. Assuming that it is a single notion of necessity which 
repeatedly occurs in the two theories, then in the first theory it occurs twice, while in 
the second only once; however, the number of types of concept occurring in the two 
theories is the same in both. Conceptual diversity of a theory is measured by the 
number of types of primitive concept that occur in it. 
 
And just as we speak of the ontological commitments of a theory, we may speak of 
the ideological or conceptual commitments of a theory. A theory T is committed to a 
concept type k if at least one occurrence of a concept of type k occurs in T; further 
occurrences of the same type of concept are disregarded. So counting the primitive 
concept types a theory is committed to is a matter of counting how many distinct 
primitive concept types have at least one occurrence in the theory. 
 
This gives rise to a problem which Lewis doesn’t address. How are we to determine 
what type a given concept falls under? I take it that we have rough and ready ways of 
recognising a concept as, say, a modal concept. But given the central justificatory 
role of The General Reduction Principle for Lewis’s theory, a principled and detailed 
answer seems required. For he justifies his theory of modality in cost-benefit terms, 
and he takes theories committed to more types of primitive to incur very serious 
costs.388 So great does Lewis take the cost of primitives to be, that he takes his 
theory to fare better than any plausible theory which takes modal notions as 
primitive. And so takes the ontological cost which his theory incurs to be 
outweighed by the ideological cost of excess primitives.389 
 
Implementing The General Reduction Principle requires counting the number of 
types of concepts a theory is committed to. The first step in reducing a supposed 
primitive concept of a theory is to identify the supposed primitive types in that 
theory. To use the principle, we must have a way of determining when a concept 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 For the ontological distinction see Lewis 1973, 87. For a useful discussion of ideological parsimony, see 
Cowling 2013. 
388 Lewis 1986, 4-5. 
389 Ibid., 134-135. 
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belongs to a type, what the concept types are in a theory, and how we can recognise 
them. To recognise if a concept belongs to a certain type we must possess a typology 
of concept types, that is, a principled account of what concept types there are and a 
way of determining which types a theory’s concepts fall under.390 But prima facie, 
every concept belongs to a variety of concept types. For instance, whatever a concept 
is a concept of, and so whatever type it belongs to, it also belongs to the concept type 
concept. So on one typology of concepts, there is a single basic type – concept – 
which they all belong to. This typology will not, of course, be useful in comparing 
the conceptual diversity of theories, given that they will all be equally diverse. 
 
Ordinarily it is no problem not to have an explicit typology of concepts – we all 
appear to get by fine without one. But when the justification for a theory depends on 
decreasing the number of concept types in it, more detail is called for, and here the 
details are lacking in Lewis’s theory. To see why this is important, consider two 
cases: (a) there is a single primitive modal concept type, and every concept we 
ordinarily count as modal falls under the concept type modal, (b) for each different 
concept we ordinarily count as modal, there is a distinct primitive concept type. In a 
particular theory T, in which there is a variety of occurrences of different modal 
concepts – for instance, necessity, essence, counterfactual etc. – on the first way of 
counting there is a single primitive modal concept type, on the second there appear 
to be at least three primitive modal concept types. 
 
It is clearly in Lewis’s interest to count in the second way, and hold that each type of 
modal notion adds to a theory’s diversity – for this weights the cost-benefit argument 
in his favour, so long as it can be shown that if you are committed to some modal 
primitives, you are committed to a lot of them. That this is Lewis’s view is apparent 
from the following quotes: “Primitive modality is bad news, and more kinds are 
worse than fewer.”391 And, 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390 For general discussion of typologies, see Bassett 2012. 
391 Lewis 1986, 242. 
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I suppose the moral for a friend of primitive modality is that he has more on 
his plate than he thinks he has: other primitive modal idioms than just his 
boxes and diamonds.392  
 
And finally,  
 
Mind you, it would be no small advance if we could explain modality in 
general by taking one very special case of it…as primitive. If that were to be 
had, the offer of safe and sane ontology with just a smidgin of primitive 
modality would indeed be hard to refuse. But it is not to be had…The 
ontological gain would have to be worth not a little primitive modality but a 
lot.393 
 
So Lewis’s answer to his own question “If you’re stuck with primitive modality, 
why not enjoy it?”394 appears to be that more primitive modal notions add to the 
conceptual diversity of theory, which, according to the General Reduction Principle, 
is a bad thing. It is fairly clear that Lewis treats each type of modal notion as a 
distinct primitive type, and so as each making a separate and additional contribution 
to the diversity of concepts in our theory. So despite providing no explicit guidance 
on these issues, Lewis has clear opinions concerning concept types.395 But saying it 
is easy; to justify these views much more must be said. More must be said, for 
instance, about whether occurrences of additional primitive modal concepts add to a 
theory’s burden of primitive types, or whether these occurrences are all typed at the 
level of being modal concepts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 Ibid., 13-14. 
393 Ibid., 155, my italics. 
394 Ibid., 242. 
395 Lack of guidance is a common complaint about Lewis’s methodology. See, e.g., Stalnaker 2012, 5 and Oliver 
1996, 2. 
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5.3 The Unification Principle and The Truth Principle 
 
I  
 
What is the source of Lewis’s desire to keep the number of primitive types in our 
theory as low as possible? The official line is that just as there is no intrinsic problem 
with modal primitives, there is no intrinsic problem with primitives in general. But if 
there is nothing intrinsically wrong with primitives, what is the motivation to keep 
their numbers down? There appear to be three reasons, which aim to account for 
their putative theoretical cost. 
 
First, understanding. If a theory is a tool to understand the world, it must itself be 
understood. Primitives stand the risk of being unintelligible, and so risk that a theory 
built using them is also unintelligible. If a concept cannot be defined, then the 
question arises how we understand it and grasp it in the first place. Granted there are 
some concepts which we understand and are primitive, perhaps for instance, the 
notions of truth and existence. But the more primitives there are in a theory, the more 
mysterious our understanding of the theory becomes, and the more the theorist must 
take up the slack left by the absence of definitions in the theory.396 By this, I mean 
that if the theory doesn’t explain what a concept means, the theorist must bring his 
prior understanding of the concept to the theory. Note that primitives become 
excessive, on this view, because of the nature of the mind of the theorist; different 
kind of theorist, different verdict on what counts as an excessive number of 
primitives. For a theorist who already grasps every concept, there would be no harm 
if a theory contained any number of primitives, for there would be no chance that the 
theorist would fail to understand some concept of the theory. 
 
Second, explanation. A reason to keep primitives to a minimum is that on a 
metaphysical view of primitives – e.g., according to which they are concepts which 
correspond to simple objects or contribute towards expressing basic facts – then the 
more primitive concepts there are in a theory, the more brute unexplained facts there 
are, according to that theory.397 For instance, in a theory which treats modal notions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 See Lewis 1986, 157, 178-79, 182, 188, 261. 
397 Ibid., 141. 
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as primitive, and the modal facts expressed by means of them as basic, modal facts 
must be accepted as brute and unexplainable.398 Or take knowledge. If the concept of 
knowledge is primitive in virtue of standing for a simple mental state, then nothing 
can be said about the inner workings of that state and so it must be taken as brute and 
unexplained why knowledge has the properties it does (such as, factivity).399 
Metaphysics, as an explanatory project, requires as few (metaphysical) primitives as 
possible, so as to keep the number of unexplained facts to a minimum. 
 
Third, unity. On this account of the cost of primitives, the more primitive types in a 
theory, the less unified it is. One of the measures of theoretical unity is how many 
basic axioms a theory contains, another connected one is how many primitive types 
of concept it contains. Both appear to contribute to theoretical unity in a similar way: 
the theory can be formulated more compactly, using fewer basic principles and fewer 
basic notions. It is a widely shared theoretical aim to construct as powerful a theory 
as possible, from as slender an ideological and ontological base as possible. Lewis 
appears to take achieving unity as the most serious reason to keep the number of 
primitives to a minimum. Ultimately, on this view, it is the connection of this kind of 
theoretical simplicity to truth that is to be the reason to favour ideologically 
parsimonious theories. 
 
II 
 
The Unification Principle expresses the concern of the third answer above, which 
provides the central reason behind Lewis’s drive to cut down on primitives. 
Reducing modality, in particular, is justified as the most effective way to decrease 
the diversity of notions in our theory. And decreasing this diversity is in turn 
justified by the fact that (a) fewer primitives make for a more unified theory, (b) 
unity makes for truth, and (c) truth is what we want a theory for. Unity, truth and 
reduction of primitives are, on this view, intimately related. Expressing the 
connection of reduction and theoretical unity, Lewis writes: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 See Kriegel 2013, 22 
399 See Williamson 2000, 21-48. 
164	  
We find the wherewithal to reduce the diversity of notions we must accept as 
primitive, and thereby to improve the unity and economy of the theory that is 
our professional concern – total theory, the whole of what we take to be true.400 
 
Decreasing the diversity of primitive notions is not valued in itself, but as a means to 
improving theoretical unity and economy. It is hard however to find in Lewis’s 
writing a precise account of what theoretical unity and economy are, and of why they 
constitute improvements to theory. Given that the aim of theorising is truth, it must 
be that Lewis takes theories which instantiate these virtues to be more probably true 
than theories which, all else being equal, do not. This is what the Truth Principle 
states. The link to truth is vital in order for the Unification Principle to provide a 
reason to not merely accept one theory rather than another, but to be a reason to 
believe that one theory rather than another is true. 
 
Why does unity make for truth? Clearly, not any unified set of propositions is true. A 
more or less unified fiction is, after all, still a fiction. The thought is that for sets of 
propositions which we already take to be by and large true, a more united version of 
them is more likely to be true. In Counterfactuals, Lewis describes the method of 
reflective equilibrium as expanding “preexisting opinions” into an “orderly 
system”.401 Likewise, he describes how a doctrine may “command our belief by its 
systematic beauty and its agreement with more important common opinions”.402 In 
OPW Lewis writes:  
 
it is pointless to build a theory, however nicely systematised it might be, that it 
would be unreasonable to believe. And a theory cannot earn credence just by 
its unity and economy. What credence it cannot earn, it must inherit.403 
 
And  
 
[We] began with our abundant modal knowledge, particular and general. We 
know that there might be a talking donkey; and we know a general principle 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 Lewis 1986, 4. 
401 Lewis 1973, 88. 
402 Ibid. 
403 Lewis 1986, 134. 
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which tells us, for instance, that if there might be a talking donkey and there 
might be a philosophising cat, then there might be both together side by side. I 
want to incorporate this knowledge into a systematic theory. Accordingly, I 
uphold modal realism.404 
 
A theory must, on this view, be conservative to be credible (conservative not only 
with respect to the beliefs the theory directly concerns, in this case modal beliefs, but 
all our beliefs). Unification only makes a theory more credible when it is applied to a 
theory which is conservative with respect to our beliefs, and so is already credible. If 
a variety of conservative theories are each systematisations of our beliefs, then their 
unity would become relevant in working out which, if any, to believe. It is hoped 
that the theoretical tools applied to our pre-theoretical beliefs (which are thought to 
be, by default, broadly true) are truth-enhancing. 
 
The two forces here which provide reasons for belief are Neurathianism and 
Quineanism. The former brings the background assumption of this conservative 
approach which is a principle of charity as a matter of theoretical necessity, not 
choice. The metaphysical version of this principle is that most of our beliefs are true; 
a weaker epistemic version is that we must treat most of them as true in order to 
improve our theory of the world.405 The latter brings a holistic picture of belief and 
the view that ontological and ideological parsimony are central theoretical virtues. 
Philosophy is then given a role in bringing unity to our body of belief, so improving 
our theory of the world while leaving it substantially as we found it.406 Specifically, 
philosophical analysis is, for Lewis, a tool for cutting away notions regarded as 
primitive by showing them to be definable within the theory. Conceptual analysis 
thereby contributes towards decreasing the number of primitive concepts in our 
theory, thereby making it more unified, and so, if the Truth Principle is correct, 
increasing the likelihood of its truth. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404 Ibid., 108. 
405 See Williamson (2007, 5) for the good point that the Neurathian starting point isn’t our epistemic situation. 
Our epistemic situation also includes “significant knowledge of the world”. 
406 Lewis 1986, 134. 
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III 
 
The Unification and Truth principles make appeal to theoretical unification. Lewis 
takes the theory which is unified to be our theory of the world, that is, all our 
beliefs.407 But what is it to bring unity or systematicity to our beliefs? 
 
First, what are ‘our beliefs’? ‘Our beliefs’ must be understood as time- and person-
relative. Time-relative because what we take to be true changes over time. Whose 
beliefs are ‘our beliefs’? I understand ‘our beliefs’ to be the beliefs which the 
speaker has in common which a community to which she belongs. And this is why 
‘our beliefs’ is person-relative. So ‘our beliefs’ refers to a snapshot of the beliefs the 
speaker shares with a community at a time.408 
 
Second, what is it to systematise belief, in pursuit of the truth? It must at least mean: 
to render it consistent, for if a theory is inconsistent it is necessarily false. More 
substantially, it seems to mean: to axiomatise. A systematic theory of what we 
believe will then be an axiomatic theory in which our beliefs will count among its 
axioms or theorems. A central reason for thinking of systematising as axiomatising is 
that it is only if theories have an axiomatic form that it makes sense to ask precise 
questions about unity or economy which can be measured, and compared. For 
instance, questions about the number of primitive concepts, and the number and 
length of axioms.409 
 
Third, how is our theory to be systematised? Typically, it occurs in piecemeal 
fashion. A theory is proposed to deal with a small part of our beliefs. Take our modal 
beliefs. The theory should account for our modal beliefs, without disturbing the rest 
of our beliefs. It provides translation rules or conceptual analysis, so that we can 
recognise the new theory as a correct systematisation of our modal beliefs. With 
respect to Lewis’s analysis of modality some questions arise, including: does its 
ontology disturb our ordinary beliefs too much? Is the conceptual analysis correct? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 Lewis 1986, 4. 
408 Many more questions can be asked about ‘our beliefs’, including: How is the relevant community of the 
speaker to be specified? How are ‘common beliefs’ to be differentiated from other beliefs? 
409 Axiomatisations of mathematics are the paradigm here, which doesn’t escape Lewis’s notice. See 1986, 3-5. 
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Does the analysis itself lead to a revision of our beliefs about the content of modal 
and meta-modal propositions? 
 
IV 
 
Systematisation is partly motivated by theoretical goals, such as unity. But it can also 
be seen to satisfy Lewis’s goal for his analysis to contribute towards our 
understanding (see §2.2).410 Systematising our theory can be thought of as a way of 
coming to better understand what we already believe. This may just be the common 
thought that axiomatising our knowledge of a subject-matter, is a way to understand 
better what we already know, whether or not this effects a reduction.411 I take Lewis 
to see three different senses in which systematising a theory is good for 
understanding. 
 
First, reducing a theory’s central concepts in a systematic theory allows us to define 
what was previously undefined. That a concept is undefined doesn’t mean we do not 
understand it – it better not, if as some think, all concepts rest ultimately on 
primitives. However, defining a concept provides an explicit means of understanding 
it. Lewis seems to endorse the view that, with respect to notions treated as primitive, 
‘I reduce in order to understand, unless I reduce I shall not understand’. For Lewis, 
systematising a theory appears to aid our understanding by providing definitions for 
concepts regarded as primitive (a) whose intelligibility is in question and (b) which, 
because they are regarded as primitive, are unexplained in more basic terms. 
 
Second, sometimes Lewis appears to mean by ‘understand’, ‘render in a first-order 
language’. In this sense, by showing modal discourse to be expressible in a first-
order language he can take it to be better understood.412 This Quinean idea is based 
on the thought that we understand the workings of first-order languages better than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 See Lewis 1986, 4, 164 and 1983, 10. 
411 Wayne Davis writes that: “One way to increase our understanding of a subject is to systematize what is 
known about it. One way to systematize a body of knowledge is to organize it into a deductive system. In such a 
system, some terms are taken as primitive and others are defined. Some principles are taken as postulates and 
others are derived as theorems. Other things being equal, the greater the completeness and economy of the 
system – the greater the proportion of the knowledge incorporated, and the fewer the number of primitive terms 
and principles – the better the systematization. To the extent that it increases the integration of our knowledge, 
systematization increases our understanding” (2003, 11). 
412 Or, perhaps better put, we have a better understanding of our understanding. Lewis’s starting point is that we 
do understand modal discourse – the question is how. It is the how which he wants to make explicit. 
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any others – so by formulating a claim in this language, we thereby understand better 
what the original claim meant. If a notion is resistant to formulation in the language 
which is the hallmark of understanding, it is on this view a suspect notion. 
 
Third, Lewis certainly thinks that if we can understand a subject-matter with fewer 
primitives we understand it better than we do if we understand it using more 
primitives. This may be explained psychologically, by a theory of mind and the 
mental resources a thinker has to muster to grasp the subject-matter. It is, after all, 
more psychologically plausible to attribute to us a simpler rather than a more 
complex theory.413  
 
Lewis can take his theory of modality to aid our understanding of modality in all 
three ways.414 This doesn’t justify his theory – doesn’t give any further reason for 
thinking it true – but it is, for Lewis, another important effect of unifying it, and 
making our implicit understanding of modality, explicit. This reflects the thought 
that Lewis takes his two goals of analysis – of increasing unity and understanding – 
as two sides of the same coin. 
 
5.4 Objections to Lewis’s justification 
 
I 
 
There may be reasons to believe p that we do not know, and so cannot be reasons we 
can use to justify p. In appealing to a reason to justify a theory, that reason must be 
available and if it is general, it must be clear how it applies to justify the particular 
theory in question, such that the probability of the truth of that theory is raised. I 
argue Lewis didn’t develop his justification enough for it to provide a reason to 
believe his theory of modality. Further, there are a number of problems with his 
justification, which I now outline. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 There is of course a trade-off to be made between conceptual complexity and computational complexity. 
414 Whether any of these senses of ‘understand’ correspond to our ordinary notion of understanding I leave an 
open question. But there may be a difference because what Lewis seems to want is an overall increase in our 
understanding of our theory. If this comes at the cost of distorting our original beliefs, then it would be a case of 
misunderstanding, despite a reduction in primitives. 
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There are three problems with Lewis’s justification. First, the Quinean ideal that 
drives Lewis’s understanding of the costs and benefits of theories is that our beliefs 
form a coherent theory of the world, and philosophy’s aim is to refine and improve 
that theory. To think that there is a single theory in which all human theoretical 
endeavour fits in, requires thinking that there are three unities: of science, of 
ordinary belief and of the two together. I argue that there are reasons to think that the 
three unities are mythical. Second, in order to judge that one theory of modality is 
more or less costly than another, there must be some way to compare rival 
systematisations of our modal beliefs. I argue that it is hard to see how such 
comparisons can be made. Third, there appears not to be a consensus in philosophy 
about what it is about a theory that counts as a cost and benefit. Lewis tends to 
assume that, in the case of the theory of modality, the value of theoretical unity 
outweighs the disvalue of revising our conception of what there is, to encompass the 
pluriverse. Without this weighting of costs and benefits being something everyone 
agrees to, we would expect an argument to explain why they are as Lewis takes them 
to be. But Lewis not only doesn’t give one, but doesn’t appear to think an argument 
can be given. This restricts the audience who can accept his justification to those 
who are already convinced that Lewis trades-off ontology and ideology in the right 
way. The rest of us may be understandably unmoved by his justification. 
 
II 
 
(1) Lewis assumes that our beliefs form a whole, a single body of belief. This 
conception of our beliefs as being a single interconnected whole is the same as 
Quine’s holistic vision of our “system of the world” or “web of belief”.415 On this 
view, we may speak of our theory of this or that, but these are really ways of 
restricting attention to areas of our system or web. Lewis’s project of systematising 
belief – which in practice is carried out piecemeal – aims at unifying all our beliefs. 
This is reflected in the way Lewis treats the costs and benefits of a theory, which 
takes into account both the question of whether it validates our beliefs about its  
subject-matter, but also the whether it mutilates our other beliefs. For instance, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415 This picture of belief can be thought of both as a conception of the psychology of believers or as a more 
abstract or idealised conception of the structure of belief. 
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Lewis is concerned that his theory of modality disagrees with our beliefs about what 
there is, even though he takes his theory to do its job of validating our modal beliefs. 
 
For consistent conservative systematisations of all our beliefs to be possible, it must 
be that our beliefs ultimately form a unity. For were any substantial part of our 
beliefs inconsistent with any other then there would be no way to systematise them 
without leading to substantial revision, and so any systematisation would be 
unconservative. I suggest that to consider our beliefs as unified, we must assume 
three unities: of science, of ordinary belief and of the two together. Each unity makes 
possible a systematic theory of those beliefs; the last, makes possible a unity of all 
our beliefs.416 How plausible are these unities?417 The first unity appears implausible. 
For Feynman, science aims 
 
to see complete nature as different aspects of one set of phenomena….[I]s it 
going to be possible to amalgamate everything, and merely discover that this 
world represents different aspects of one thing? Nobody knows.418 
 
Though Lewis doesn’t subscribe to the view that there is only one thing, he does 
think that it is possible to amalgamate all beliefs – including scientific beliefs – into 
a one theory. However, not only is it conceivable that there exist inconsistencies in 
the sciences, but it is a fact at the time of writing. We can divide the inconsistencies 
into the intra- and inter-scientific. Some of the intra-scientific inconsistencies are 
well known, such as those within physics.419 Inter-scientific inconsistencies are 
harder to pin down, but it is hard to believe that as things currently stand in science, 
all the sciences are consistent with each other. Take the following example: 
metaphysics, according to Lewis, postulates a plurality of spatio-temporal worlds, 
some of which break physical laws. Whatever worlds physics may postulate, it does 
not postulate worlds which break physical laws. Given that physics quantifies over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 This assumes artificially that all our beliefs are either ordinary or broadly scientific. This is artificial partly 
because no clear line can be drawn between the two, and partly because there may be beliefs that are not rightly 
classified by either. Further, I should say that I use ‘scientific’ in its broad sense, not as restricted to the natural 
sciences. 
417 Thanks to Ian Rumfitt who pointed me in the direction of this question. 
418 Feynman 1998, 26 
419 E.g., Sushkov writes “It is remarkable that two of the greatest successes of 20th century physics, General 
Relativity and the Standard Model, appear to be fundamentally incompatible” (2011, 171101-1). For 
philosophical discussion of alleged inconsistencies in science, and how we may think about them, see Vickers 
2013. 
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all of spatio-temporal reality, there is an inconsistency between the verdicts of 
Lewisian metaphysics and physics.420 Were Lewisian metaphysics the standard view 
in metaphysics and the multi-verse theory the standard view in physics, this would 
be an example of an inter-scientific inconsistency. 
 
The reason the two kinds of inconsistency are problematic for Lewis is that they 
stand in the way of the view that our beliefs can be systematised without a great deal 
of mutilation. If science is inconsistent, then any systematisation of our beliefs must 
take sides on matters of scientific controversy. Not only are philosophers not in a 
position to do this, but any attempt to do so would require wholesale revision of 
belief. We cannot both preserve our scientific beliefs and have a consistent 
conception of science, when science itself is not consistent. Given science is 
inconsistent, it appears that the view that it can be systematised is based more on the 
hope that, beneath apparent contradictions, there lies unity. Feynman-like modesty 
about such projects seems to be the correct position in our current state of 
knowledge. 
 
The second unity, of current common belief, likewise appears implausible. Take for 
instance the following commonly held beliefs: that it is wrong to do things that cause 
harm to animals, that it is not wrong to eat animals, and that eating animals in 
various ways causes harm to animals.421 These beliefs appear to be inconsistent. I 
take it that there are many similar sets of inconsistent beliefs among our common 
beliefs. Just as systematising our scientific beliefs requires decisions to be taken 
about which scientific theories are correct, and so requires radical revision of our 
scientific beliefs, so too with our common beliefs. 
 
With respect to the third unity, it follows from the inconsistency of either scientific 
or common belief that the unity of them both must too be a myth.422So I conclude 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420 This is roughly Williamson’s argument in his 2013, xiii. 
421 Widespread discrepancy between explicit belief and action may also reveal unobvious contradictions in our 
ordinary belief system. 
422 An example of a special inconsistency of common belief and science is the view that the movement of 
material entities can be deterministically explained by physical laws, and the view that we are material entities 
whose movement is free and so non-deterministic. Whether this is a good example depends on whether 
compatibilism is true; but the very existence of compatibilism reflects a recognition of a real tension in our 
thought. 
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that the three unities appear mythical. The project of constructing a single 
conservative systematisation of our beliefs requires that any inconsistency among 
our beliefs is not fundamental, and disguises a single unity. But this seems to be a 
view caused more by a wish fulfilling projection than it is grounded in the nature of 
our beliefs. 
 
Lewis might respond that the initial beliefs which are systematised should be 
understood to be cleaned up or idealised prior to, as laying the groundwork for, 
systematisation.  
 
Our beliefs will be idealised so as to include only consistent beliefs. Then the work 
of systematisation will be to take a consistent construal of our beliefs and unify it. 
However, though cleaning up relatively trivial inconsistencies seems unproblematic, 
how are we to clean up substantive inconsistencies? If current physics is inconsistent 
it is so for good reason. The attempt to idealise away such inconsistencies would 
land as squarely back into the problem dealt with above, of how a systematic 
philosopher is to pronounce on issues of scientific controversy in order to unify our 
beliefs, and how this is to be done in a conservative fashion. The substantive point is: 
idealisation is a form of systematisation, so the proposal to idealise away substantial 
inconsistency before systematisation begins seems implausible. 
 
III 
 
(2) For Lewis’s justification to be persuasive it requires first, that we can make 
judgements about whether systematisations of our beliefs are more or less unified 
than the initial beliefs themselves, and second that we can make judgements about 
rival systematisations so that they can be ordered from the most to least costly. The 
first requirement arises because Lewis takes his theory to reduce modality and so 
decrease the diversity of notions we must take as primitive. The second requirement 
arises because Lewis takes his theory of modality to be better than his rivals’ 
theories in virtue of his theory requiring fewer primitives than theirs and so being 
more unified, and so being less costly. I now turn to problems with each 
requirement.  
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Comparisons of our beliefs to systematisations of them must be made in order to 
determine whether a systematisation is more or less unified than the original beliefs. 
After all, the whole point of systematisation is to improve our beliefs.423 Recall that 
for Lewis the question of the unity of a theory is only relevant if the theory is 
conservative with respect to our beliefs not only about the subject-matter in question, 
but also the rest of our beliefs.424 To determine if a putative systematisation 
improves our beliefs we must find out whether (a) it is conservative with respect to 
the target beliefs, and (b) whether it is more or less unified than them. Suppose T0 is 
all our beliefs about some subject-matter, and T1-Tn are rival systematisations of T0. 
To determine the extent to which T1-Tn are conservative with respect to T0, we need 
to compare T0 with T1-Tn. To determine the extent to which T1-Tn are more unified 
than T0, we need to compare the diversity of primitives in T0, with those in T1-Tn; 
and likewise, any other measure of unity.425 How, though, do we make such 
comparisons between our beliefs and systematisations of them? To begin answering 
this I now look in more detail at what Lewis takes to be the two most important 
properties of systematisations of belief: conservativeness and unity. 
 
(A) Conservativeness. A conservative systematisation of our beliefs contains as few 
propositions as possible that disagree with the original beliefs, and as many as 
possible that agree with them.426 To determine whether a systematisation is 
conservative then requires comparing the propositions we believe to the propositions 
of a given systematisation. Given that Lewis doesn’t take us to have a perspicuous 
understanding of the content of our own beliefs (see §4.32) – his conceptual analysis 
of modality is evidence of this – it isn’t clear how this comparison is to be made. For 
to compare T0 with, say, T1, we must first be clear about what the propositions are 
which constitute T0. It is, however, only by systematising belief that Lewis takes us 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 Lewis 1986, 134. 
424 I will simplify this below by assuming that a theory must only be conservative with respect to relevant beliefs. 
So .e.g., a theory of modality must be conservative with respect to modal beliefs. The simplification is harmless 
here because we are looking at questions of unity alone. Below I bring back considerations of conservativeness 
with respect to all our beliefs when I look at questions of trade-offs between ontology and of ideology. 
425 For instance, if the theories are axiomatised, the number and length of axioms. 
426 Of course the situation with respect to our actual beliefs is more complex than this. First our beliefs come in 
degrees. Second, there may be beliefs or propositions of a theory which neither agree nor disagree with each 
other, if the theory and our beliefs do not pronounce on everything the other does. Third, not all beliefs are 
equally important, and the more important (say, the more general) beliefs are more important to conserve. So we 
shouldn’t just look at number of propositions conserved, but also their importance. Lewis writes on this: “Some 
common sense opinions are firmer than others, so the cost of denying common sense opinion differs from one 
case to the next” (1986, 134). 
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to have a reflective understanding of what our initial beliefs are. To systematise our 
beliefs then appears to require a prior systematisation, and this seems regressive. 
This problem is compounded by the fact that many of our beliefs are too uncertain or 
vague and too hard to articulate without context to undergo systematisation. If 
systematisation is to be conservative it must respect these features of belief; if it 
idealises such features away, it risks setting aside a large chunk of our epistemic 
life.427  
 
(B) Unity. Worse still, we don’t seem to have a way of determining how unified our 
ordinary system of beliefs are. For supposing unity is measured in terms of diversity 
of types of primitives, if we do not have a perspicuous access to the propositions 
which constitute our beliefs, we do not have access to which concepts of our theory 
we treat as primitive, and so we do not know how many primitive concepts there are 
in it.428 It seems that precise comparisons about diversity of primitives can only be 
made between already axiomatised theories429, and so again, to compare our beliefs 
with systematisations of them presupposes prior systematisations of our beliefs, 
which appears regressive. If that is so, then while the systematisations T1-Tn might 
be compared if they are axiomatised theories, none of them can be compared with T0 
in order to determine if any is more or less unified than it, for T0 isn’t yet 
axiomatised. Deciding, then, on whether any systematisation of T0 is more unified 
than it, cannot get started if such comparisons can only take place between 
axiomatised theories. We can perhaps discuss which of two axiomatisations are more 
unified, but not which is more unified than the theory they purport to axiomatise. We 
cannot say, for instance, that T1 reduces modality which is primitive in T0, unless 
some reliable method is found which tells us how things stand with T0 with respect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 See Chihara (1998, 99) for a similar point. Interestingly, Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium also throws 
out vague beliefs in a bid for systematicity. Bonevac describes Rawls’s method as follows: “We begin with a 
set…of considered judgements. We examine our moral intuitions, that is, and throw out those that are unstable, 
vague, or in which we lack confidence. We retain only those we are willing to affirm confidently after careful 
thought. We provisionally adopt a decidable set…of principles from which, we conjecture, the considered 
judgments might be derived” (2004, 366). Bonevac, in a footnote on this passage takes the set of principles to be 
axiomatisable, and that “the set of principles is decidable to capture the idea that we should think of them as 
ethical axioms…” (ibid., 366 fn. 10). While systematisation of our belief relies on treating them as an implicit but 
precise folk theory lying behind our thought and talk, it is more accurate to think of our view of the world as a 
picture, some parts of which are in focus, other parts blurred, and most somewhere in between. 
428 Indeed, if we understand systematisations of our beliefs as revealing the true folk theory that lies behind them, 
then it is only through systematisations of belief that we can know what is primitive in them. 
429 And even here things are not so simple. For even looking at the concepts used in the axioms of an axiomatised 
theory doesn’t show us which concepts are primitive. For it is not easy to distinguish concepts in a theory with no 
definition from those which are implicitly defined in it. See Kriegel (2013, 19) for problems with objectively 
measuring theoretical simplicity. 
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to its primitive concepts (the point here is similar to one made in §4.22 about 
translation). Chihara echoes this concern, which is brought out in a discussion of 
whether Lewis’s ‘worldmate relation’ is primitive. He writes: 
 
I do not see how one can determine with any degree of confidence whether the 
total number of primitives needed to spell out Lewis’s theory of 
worldmatehood will be less than or no more than a competing theory that takes 
the worldmate relation to be primitive, in the absence of anything like a total 
theory in which these competing theories are to be placed…How can one tell if 
the set of primitives of the new theory is more or less than that of the old 
theory, if one has no clear idea of just what primitives the old theory has?430 
 
It appears that to judge whether a given theory has fewer/greater number of 
primitives than our ‘folk theory’ or that it conserves or fails to conserve our beliefs, 
is harder than one might think. Indeed, it is only by treating our beliefs as a kind of 
theory, that it even makes sense to think there can be such comparisons. But calling 
it a ‘Folk Theory’ doesn’t make it amenable to these comparisons; and we cannot 
assume that it is anything like an axiomatised theory, which would make such 
comparisons possible. If such comparisons cannot be made, then while axiomatised 
theories may be compared for numbers of primitives, it can be said of no theory that 
it better conserves our beliefs, or has fewer primitives than the totality of our beliefs, 
and so it cannot be said that such theories improve on our beliefs because they 
decrease the number of notions we must accept as primitive.  
 
IV  
 
I now turn to the second assumption about comparison, that we can make 
judgements about rival systematisations so that they can be ordered from the most to 
least costly. For even if we suppose we could make the comparisons I question 
above, so that we have an answer as to the relative conservativeness and unity of 
theories T0-Tn, can we then compare theories T1-Tn so they can be ordered most to 
least costly, and so determine which is (or are) the winning theory (or theories)? The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430 Chihara 1998, 80. 
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winning theory, assuming they are equal in other respects, should be the one which 
makes the least revision to T0, while achieving the greatest unity. 
 
Lewis certainly thinks that we can compare different systematisations and order 
them in terms of cost. This is vital to his view of how his theory of modality, and in 
particular, his ontology of Modal Realism, is justified; it is, he thinks, the least costly 
systematisation available.431 He accepts that while postulating the pluriverse is costly 
because it revises our belief that there is only one world, it is worth it because it 
makes our theory so much more systematic. He writes, objecting to the view that 
Modal Realism is implausible, and “at variance with commonsensical ideas about 
what there is” that  
 
I take this to be a fair and serious objection, but outweighed by the systematic 
benefits that acceptance of modal realism brings.432  
 
And again, hinting at what he takes his theory of modality to achieve, he writes  
 
[s]ometimes common sense may properly be corrected, when the earned 
credence that is gained by making theory more systematic more than makes up 
for the inherited credence that is lost.433 
 
This ‘trade off’ presupposes that the costs that arise from unconservativeness and the 
benefits that arise from unity can be weighted and ‘traded’ in the same coin. But how 
are such trade-offs to be carried out, what is to guide us in making them? Lewis says 
that such trade-offs are “matter[s] of balance and judgement”.434 But he provides no 
rules or guidance for deciding when, for instance, a belief is too important to 
relinquish in exchange for decreasing a theory’s primitive notions.435 What he 
provides is, as Oliver has noted, more “gestures than explicit rules”.436 In the end, 
Lewis resorts to personal authority. Discussing the ‘incredulous stare’ objection to 
his theory he writes:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
431 Lewis 1973, 88 and 1986, vii, 135, 141. 
432 Lewis 1986, vii. 
433 Ibid., 134. 
434 Ibid. 
435 As Stalnaker wrote “the reflective equilibrium method does not offer much guidance” (2012, 5). 
436 Oliver 1996, 2. 
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I suggest…a simple maxim of honesty: never put forward a philosophical 
theory that you yourself cannot believe in your least philosophical and most 
commonsensical moments. The incredulous stare is a gesture meant to say that 
modal realism fails the test. That is a matter of judgement and, with respect, I 
disagree. I acknowledge that my denial of common sense opinion is severe, 
and I think it is entirely right and proper to count that as a serious cost.437 
 
However the judgments about what is worth what are not backed up with principles 
or criteria of application. And in the end Lewis appears to concede that he cannot 
provide grounds for his cost-benefit assessment. He continues,  
 
How serious is serious enough to be decisive? – That is our central question, 
yet I don’t see how anything can be said about it.438  
 
But then, dogmatically, sticks to his guns: 
 
I still think the price is right, high as it is. Modal realism ought to be accepted 
as true. The theoretical benefits are worth it.439  
 
We are left, in my view, with little understanding of how to compare the cost caused 
to theories by unconservativeness and disunity. Lewis tells us that it is better to have 
all his worlds and a unified theory, than a less unified theory and just our world. But 
no grounds can be given for why this is so.  
 
It may be objected that judgements about such trade-offs are an art for which no 
recipe or governing principles can be given. Just as judges of blancmange contests 
the world over reliably weigh the lightness, taste and wobblyiness of the gelatinous 
desert without being able to formulate explicit rules by which they make trade-offs 
to reach final verdicts, so too theorists weigh the theoretical properties of theories, 
such as conservativeness, unity, beauty etc., and likewise, no explicit rules governing 
the trade-offs can be given.440  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437 Lewis 1986, 135, my italics. 
438 Ibid., my italics. 
439 Ibid., my italics. 
440 Thanks to Keith Hossack for this response and example. 
178	  
The problem with this response is that it is only because blancmange competitions 
produce reliable winners that we accept the verdicts of blancmange judges without 
understanding how they come to their results (we accept the art without the 
mechanism). Were such competitions to always end in disagreement, we would not 
accept that there is an art to such judgements. In philosophy, while there may be 
consensus about what the desirable theoretical properties are, there is no consensus 
as to how particular competitions are to be judged, and who the winners are. Indeed, 
to the extent to which there is consensus on the case in question, it urges us against 
Lewis’s view of the results, towards the view that in the trade-off of worlds against 
modal primitives, the former are worse than the latter. For Lewis to convince us that 
our assessment of the trade-off is wrong, we would need details about how he took 
trade-offs to generally work, and in particular how it works in the case of his theory 
of modality – details which he never supplies. If Lewis’s justification is to be 
convincing then it must be transparent, and the appeal to the authority of a ‘good 
judge’ or to ‘you’ll recognise a good trade off if you see it – so long as you’re an 
expert’ doesn’t help. Perhaps he is right about trade-offs, but we cannot know this, 
and so it cannot be a reason to believe his theory. 
 
V  
 
(3) I now turn to the final objection, and move from the question of how costs and 
benefits of theories may be compared to the basis for determining what the costs and 
benefits are to begin with. The use of Lewis’s justification in assessing trade-offs of 
ontology and ideology presupposes a certain view of what counts as a theoretical 
cost and benefit. He takes the proximate goal of theorising to be unifying our beliefs 
in order to conserve and improve them; and the ultimate goal to be discovering the 
truth, to ensure that all of our beliefs are true and that more of what is true and 
important is among our beliefs. However, there is no consensus on unity as the main 
proximate goal of philosophical theorising, in part because there seems to be no 
simple connection between unity and truth.441 This makes Lewis’s justification 
which expresses this connection unlikely to be accepted by those who take a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441 See e.g. Bennett 2005, 284 and Stalnaker 2012, 5, 131. 
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different view about what counts as a theoretical cost and benefit, or those who take 
a different stance on the connection between unity and truth. 
 
Bernard Williams once asked, concerning theorising about ethics,  
 
Why should theoretical simplicity and its criteria be appropriate? Whether they 
are must surely depend on what an ethical theory is for.442 
 
Williams’s point applies to Lewis’s theory too. Stalnaker is an example of a 
philosopher who has a different view of what the proximate aim of theorising is, and 
perhaps also what its ultimate aim is. It is not that he has anything against elegant 
theories, but doesn’t think that a more unified theory is always better. He writes, 
with respect to a theory of modality, that there are  
 
real tensions in our modal concepts. Sometimes the problems that a theory 
brings to the surface should count as benefits, rather than costs, of the 
theory…443 
 
This is a conception of philosophy which values giving a reflective, accurate account 
of our modal concepts and beliefs, even when they have “real tensions”. On this 
view, a more unified theory may be a worse theory, because it doesn’t reflect the real 
content of our modal beliefs. If Lewis’s theory of modality is thought of as our 
implicit ‘Folk Theory’, then Lewis has a very optimistic view of our concepts as 
being in perfect order; Stalnaker has a less optimistic view, and wants a theory of 
modality to mirror that, not improve it for the sake of unity. A representation of our 
concepts in perfect order is unfaithful to concepts in real tension. Stalnaker’s project 
aims not at systematising our modal beliefs in a more united theory, by reducing 
modality, indeed he writes  
 
if an account of modality were to meet this condition [of reduction], that would 
be a sure sign it was on the wrong track.444 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442 Williams 2006, 106 
443 Stalnaker 2012, 131. Compare to Bonevac on Rawls: “Other things being equal, simplicity is preferable to 
complexity, but a distorting simplicity is worse than none” (2004, 111). 
444 Stalnaker 2012, 4. 
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Rather than improving our modal beliefs, for Stalnaker the point of a possible worlds 
framework to be  
 
not reduction but regimentation…a procedure for representing modal discourse 
using primitive modal notions, in a way that helps reveal its structure.445  
 
So his aim is a theory by which we can represent modal content. Lewis’s 
justification, which incorporates the goal of systematising modal belief, simply isn’t 
going to persuade philosophers such as Stalnaker. Stalnaker’s view of the point of 
the possible worlds framework is a particular case of a more general approach 
masterfully summarised by Michael Dummett:  
 
Philosophy attempts, not to discover new truths about the world, but to gain a 
clear view of what we already know and believe about it. That depends upon 
attaining a more explicit grasp of the structure of our thoughts; and that in turn 
on discovering how to give a systematic account of the working of language, 
the medium in which we express our thoughts.446 
 
What Lewis needs is an argument to support his own determination of what counts 
as a cost, and what a benefit; without this, his justification has limited appeal. That 
is, he needs a reason to think that his own appropriation of philosophy’s role – “to 
improve the unity and economy of the theory that is our professional concern”447 – is 
persuasive, rather than a conception like Dummett’s. What grounds Lewis’s 
conception of what counts as a theoretical cost and benefit? It is his holistic 
understanding of our beliefs and his focus on unity which drives his view of what the 
theoretical costs and benefits are. And it is this which allows him to say that his 
theory is not only better than its rivals but also more likely true. But what the 
connection between unity and truth is is still unexplained. 
 
Lewis appears to face the following dilemma about unity as a ground for his 
conception of what the theoretical costs and benefits are. Take some theory T which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445 Ibid., 11, my italics. Compare with Rayo 2008 and 2013 who, inspired by Stalnaker, has as his primary aim 
for a theory of modality the representation of content. 
446 Dummett quoted in Pyke 1990. 
447 Lewis 1986, 4. 
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is justified in terms of its unity. Either there is a reason for the truth of T being 
justified in terms of unity or there is not. If there is a reason, it will either invoke 
unity or it will not. If it invokes unity the reason is circular. If it does not, then either 
there is a reason for the truth of T which doesn’t depend on unity or else there is no 
reason for the truth of T being justified in terms of unity.448  
 
Even if a systematisation of the kind Lewis desires were plausible, and our beliefs 
could be unified, this would only justify Lewis’s theory of modality insofar as unity 
is a reason to think a theory true in philosophy, not merely rationally acceptable.449 
What grounds could there be to think that unity plays a justificatory role? The 
standard reasons given to prefer unified theories are aesthetic and so don’t engage 
with the epistemic or justificatory question in hand.450 One possible answer that does 
is metaphysical: it is because reality is simple that a simple theory is more likely to 
reflect the way reality is.451 This, and other similar metaphysical reasons, are 
problematic in two ways. Firstly, given that the relevant form of simplicity we are 
discussing is ideological, and so concerns primitive notions, the view above relies on 
a metaphysical conception of such notions, according to which the diversity of 
primitives of a theory reflects the complexity of reality. But this is not the standard 
view of primitives and not (as I outline in §5.1) Lewis’s. Secondly, the metaphysical 
basis for the connection of unity to truth relies on a foundationalism according to 
which we have reason to believe in such a metaphysical thesis which is not 
ultimately grounded in considerations of theoretical unity. Yet this foundationalist 
strategy is contrary to Lewis’s Neurathianism. 
 
Lewis appears forced to either abandon his Neurathianism and accept that there is a 
reason that unity justifies which is not itself grounded in unity, or else accept that 
there is no reason for the connection of unity to truth. I believe he takes the latter 
option, and holds that there is no reason. This means there is no explanation that can 
be offered for the Truth Principle: for the view that the more unified a theory, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448 For a similar point see Williamson 2007, 8-9. 
449 On this distinction, see Kriegel 2013, 17, 21. He writes: “Some philosophers…have argued that the super-
empirical or theoretical virtues are one and all pragmatic rather than epistemic. By this it is meant that such 
virtues recommend the virtuous theory for acceptance as useful, but not necessarily for acceptance as true” 
(2013, 31). 
450 See Lewis 1986, 116 and Oliver 1996, 3-4 for the view that no aesthetic justification suffices to connect unity 
with truth. 
451 For discussion, see Kriegel 2013, 17-24. 
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more likely true it is. Lewis can still maintain that unity justifies, but no account of 
why is given.452 In particular, no explanation in terms of unity is to be given of why 
he takes his reductive theory of modality to be more likely true than a primitivist’s 
theory of modality. Support for the view that Lewis takes there to be no justification 
of the connection between unity and truth is suggested by the following: 
 
when all is said and done, and all the tricky arguments and distinctions and 
counterexamples have been discovered, presumably we will still face the 
question which prices are worth paying, which theories are on balance 
credible, which are the unacceptably counterintuitive consequences and which 
are the acceptably counterintuitive ones. On this question we may still differ. 
And if all is indeed said and done, there will be no hope of discovering still 
further arguments to settle our differences.453 
 
This Neurathian picture of us afloat in the seas of philosophical opinion gives no 
answer as to why unity justifies; certainly Lewis takes there to be no ultimate 
answer. Indeed, Lewis, like Quine ultimately appeals to aesthetic reasons (or 
metaphors) and in the last analysis takes the ultimate ‘reasons’ we adopt to justify 
our theories to express matters of taste. He writes that   
 
Once the menu of well-worked-out theories is before us, philosophy is a matter 
of opinion….[And later he writes that even] simplicity is a matter of taste, and 
simplicity at one place trades off against simplicity elsewhere…[And later still, 
discussing intensional and extensional rules, he writes that it] is a matter of 
taste whether this gain outweighs the waste of using needlessly intensional 
rules. For me it does.454 
 
Even if there is no reason to support it, Lewis doesn’t take his assessment of what 
the costs and benefits are to be arbitrary. It can he thinks still be reasonable, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452 DeRosset supports this interpretation. He writes: “His [Lewis’s] reductions are not metaphysically motivated. 
In fact, they are not motivated at all. The methodological principle here seems to be that reduction needs no 
motivation” (DeRosset 2011, 144). 
453 Lewis 1983, x. 
454 Ibid., 191, 253. 
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Lewis still takes there to be a reasonable project common to philosophers with 
different tastes: 
 
[A] reasonable goal for a philosopher is to bring…[our opinions]…into 
equilibrium. Our common task is to find out what equilibria there are that can 
withstand examination, but it remains for each of us to come to rest at one or 
another of them…455 
 
It seems that Lewis just cannot fathom what philosophy could be were it not a matter 
of bringing beliefs into some kind of unity/equilibrium, though he allows which 
equilibrium to be a matter of taste. It is, in my view, this limited view of what 
different philosophical alternatives might be that is a factor in limiting the appeal of 
his unity-oriented justification of his theory of modality. 
 
5.5 Assessment  
 
In Chapter 4 I outlined Lewis’s attempt to justify his analysis of modality. In the 
current chapter I presented what I take to be Lewis’s general justification of his 
whole theory of modality. The justification appears to be that because Lewis’s theory 
reduces modality, and reductive theories best satisfy our theoretical goals, we have a 
reason to think it is true. I say ‘appears to be’ because despite placing such a great 
justificatory burden on it, Lewis says very little in detail about it. An influential 
strategy of philosophising is introduced, but without sufficient detail to determine 
whether it is successful, or to guide those who want to implement the strategy. 
 
I argued that not only is more detail required, but that there are several problems 
with the justification and its assumptions. These problems at least make it 
questionable whether his justification meets the justification condition, according to 
which a justification for a theory must provide a reason to think it true (see §1.2). 
The three problems I found for his justification are: (a) that it presupposed our 
beliefs are such that they can coherently be brought together in a single theory. But 
this requires unities of belief that we do not have good reason to think exist, and for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
455 Ibid., x. 
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which have some reasons to think do not exist. (b) The second problem was that 
Lewis’s justification requires that we can compare our beliefs to various 
systematisations of them, and compare systematisations to each other to determine a 
ranking of theories according to principled determination of costs and benefits. 
However our beliefs are not readily comparable to theories in the way Lewis 
requires. Nor can theories be ranked in the desired way, because no guidance is 
given on how the different costs and benefits can be traded-off with each other. 
Finally, (c) the third problem was that the justification for Lewis’s view of what is a 
cost and what a benefit is very thin. So we are left without reason to accept a 
justification of his theory on the lines he provides. Even if we could make the 
relevant comparisons, and declare his theory the best because it is the most unified 
and conservative theory there is, we would have no reason to take his winning to be 
a reason to believe it.  
 
These problems cast doubt on Lewis’s conception of philosophy as the 
systematisation of our beliefs. Lewis wants systematising to achieve two seemingly 
irreconcilable goals: to yield a simple theory of the world which saves a great many 
of our beliefs, and to use that theory to give an account of the content of our, in this 
case, modal beliefs. Perhaps a single theory cannot achieve both of these goals at 
once. 
 
A final point: we have seen in this chapter that Lewis places the burden of 
justification of his theory on the putative fact that it reduces modal notions taken to 
be primitive. However in Chapter 3 I argued that there is reason to think that his 
theory is not in fact reductive. If this is correct, then Lewis has problems whether his 
justification is itself problematic or not. If it is problematic and doesn’t justify then 
we have little reason to believe his theory of modality. If isn’t itself problematic, 
then Lewis is faced with the problem that there are independent grounds to think that 
it doesn’t apply to his theory, because his theory doesn’t in fact reduce modality. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion   
 
In this final chapter I draw several conclusions from the case study which suggest 
several problems for Modal Reductionism. I first summarise the results of the case 
study (§6.0), then suggest how the results may be generalised to other similar 
theories of modality (§6.1). Finally, I suggest an approach to theorising about 
modality which seems not to be vulnerable to the problems found with Lewis’s 
theory and those similar to it (§6.2). 
 
6.0 Results of the case study 
 
Wilfrid Sellars wrote that  
 
[d]ifferences with a philosopher of Lewis’s stature…almost inevitably concern 
the basic premises and presuppositions of his argument, rather than its 
systematic elaboration.456 
 
Sellars was speaking of the other Lewis – Clarence Irving – but what he says also 
holds of ours. I have addressed, in the previous chapters what I take to be some of 
‘the basic premises and presuppositions’ of Lewis’s theory of modality, specifically, 
its ontology, analysis and justification. I found there to be four main problems with 
his theory, which I now briefly summarise in order of chapter, and connect to the 
minimal conditions laid out in §1.2.457 
 
Chapter 3: Ontology. I argued that because Lewis identifies possibilities with 
worlds, his ontology must postulate an abundance of worlds, enough worlds in fact 
to validate his analysis of modality as quantification over them. However, any way 
he tries to formulate a principle of plenitude to say there is an abundance of worlds, 
was found to require irreducible modal notions. So the first conclusion is that 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 Sellars 1948, 287-88. 
457 I use lower case Roman numerals to number the conclusions, which I will refer back to in the following 
section. In these conclusions I refer to the minimal conditions I used to test reductive theories of modality, as laid 
out in §1.2. 
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(i) Lewis’s theory requires irreducible modal notions, and so appears not to 
meet the reduction condition. 
 
Lewis’s favoured way to articulate the abundance of worlds flows from his 
combinatorial conception of possibility. However, this view is committed to 
substantial and controversial claims about what is and is not possible. In particular, it 
agrees with the Humean denial of the existence of necessary connections. As a 
consequence of this, the second conclusion follows, which is that  
 
(ii) Lewis’s theory is revisionary with respect to a significant class of our 
modal beliefs, so does badly with respect to the material adequacy condition.  
 
Chapter 4: Analysis. I examined whether Lewis’s conceptual analysis of modality is 
correct. A good argument to think it is correct would consist solely of conceptual a 
priori truths, linking either side of the analysis. Lewis proposed several such 
arguments which I analysed and found wanting. I further suggested that because (a) 
quantification over worlds appears not to suffice for understanding modal claims, 
and (b) that the two sides of his analysis appear to differ in their ontological 
commitments, we can conclude that  
 
(iii) Lewis’s theory does not appear to faithfully capture the content of our 
modal beliefs, and so does badly with respect to the conceptual adequacy 
condition.  
 
Chapter 5: Justification. I examined Lewis’s global justification for his theory of 
modality. His justification is that his theory systematises our modal discourse better 
than any other theory, where the key test of systematising a discourse is decreasing 
the number of primitive types of concept we require for expressing it. I argued that 
there are several problems with his justification, including that not enough is said to 
see how it works and so not enough is said to constitute a good reason to think 
Lewis’s theory is true. Most importantly, no account is given for why merely 
decreasing the number of its primitives makes a theory more likely true. I thereby 
conclude that 
 
187	  
(iv) The justification for Lewis’s theory of modality appears not to provide a 
good reason to think it is true, and so it does badly with respect to the 
justification condition. 
 
6.1 Generalisations and their limitations 
 
I 
 
Given the results of the test case outlined above, Lewis’s theory appears to fare 
badly with respect to the minimal conditions. I haven’t shown those conditions to be 
reliable, so Lewis’s failure to do well with respect to them doesn’t guarantee that his 
theory suffers serious problems and is thereby an unpromising candidate reductive 
theory of modality. What can be said is that if doing badly with respect to the 
conditions is indicative of serious problems, then Lewis’s theory is problematic. 
 
Suppose it is agreed that the case study indicates the existence of serious problems 
for Lewis’s theory of modality. What is the meaning of the results of the test case for 
Modal Reductionism? To answer this question we must go back to the original 
motivation for using Lewis’s theory as a test case for Modal Reductionism (see 
§1.1). It was selected as such because it (a) is very influential, (b) is widely regarded 
as the best modal reductionist theory, and (c) is representative of an important class 
of reductive quantificationist theories, which are the standard way of implementing 
Modal Reductionism. As I now suggest, each of these reasons provide the basis for 
generalisations from the conclusions of the test case. 
 
II 
 
(1) The first reason Lewis’s theory of modality was selected as a test case for Modal 
Reductionism was due to the influence it commands. Though few people believe in 
Lewis’s theory, its broadest influence appears to lie in shaping our conception of 
how such a reductive theory is to be motivated and justified. This influence touches 
not only reductive theories of modality, but much other theorising in metaphysics.  
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Lewis himself justifies his theory of modality largely in terms of the contribution it 
makes to a more general project of systematising all our beliefs into a single unified 
framework. Reducing modal primitives by analysing them in terms of quantification 
over worlds is thought to be the royal road to a general systematisation of our 
beliefs. The evaluative assumption in this justification – that proliferation of 
primitives is the great sin of theorising – has been widely accepted, as has his 
methodological holism and its theoretically driven cost-benefit framework of 
justifying philosophical theories. 
 
Sider’s recent book is a good example of the application of Lewis’s approach to 
wide-ranging metaphysical issues, including modality.458 Just as Lewis posits his 
worlds, so Sider posits structure; and just as Lewis justifies his posits by the work 
they do in unifying his theory which he shows through their analytic applications, so 
too Sider takes structure to best unify theory which he shows through its analytic 
applications. He writes  
 
Posits are most justified when they’re unifying…The posit of structure will be 
justified if its alleged “applications”…are in the end unified by nothing beyond 
a bare assertion that a single notion of structure plays the needed role in each 
case.459 
 
And, he affirms more generally the Lewisian justification of theories:  
 
Good theories must be as simple as possible, and part of simplicity is having a 
minimal ideology…The demand for minimal ideology recalls a familiar trade-
off between ontology and ideology.460 
 
Though Sider differs with Lewis about which concepts to take as primitive, he 
adopts Lewis’s theory driven justification of philosophical theories in terms of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458 Sider 2011 
459 Ibid., 10. 
460 Ibid., 14. 
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best trade-off of ontology and ideology; both agree that “ideology matters” in this 
justification.461 
 
Conclusion (iv) of the case study appears generalisable to any approach that shares 
Lewis’s justification of philosophical theories. First, any justification which, like 
Lewis’s, see philosophy’s role as building a single systematic theory of our beliefs 
has the problem of resolving what appear to be fundamental inconsistencies in our 
beliefs – the myth of the three unities – without distorting or radically revising them. 
Second, detailed guidance is required to determine how trade-offs – primarily of 
ontology and ideology – are to be assessed. This means detailed rules, because of the 
lack of agreement on how trade-offs are to be correctly made. These rules must 
encompass how we can measure and compare theories costs and benefits – and so 
how its primitives and ontology can be measured in the first place – in an effective 
way. Third, a justification for the given weighting of costs and benefits must be 
given. Specifically, they must ultimately be tied to truth. Lewis takes excess 
primitives to be costly because they make a theory less unified, and so less true. But 
it is often the case that the demand for a reductive and unified theory is not itself 
justified. Any theory justified in terms of its capacity to reduce primitive ideology, 
must take a view as to why such reductions make a theory more likely true.  
 
Theories influenced by Lewis’s tend to unreflectively work within this 
methodological framework, without providing it with foundations. If the demands 
above were met, this form of justification might be workable. As it is, the conclusion 
(iv) can be generalised to apply to any theory, including any reductive theories of 
modality, which make use of Lewis’s style of justification. If Lewis’s justification 
didn’t provide a good reason to think his theory is true, then we should expect 
similar justifications to suffer similar problems.462  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
461 Ibid., vii. See ibid., x, where Sider notes his debts to Lewis. Though Sider shares his general justificatory 
framework with Lewis, he has a different account of why ideology matters, because he takes ideological 
primitives to stand for structures, and Lewis does not. The problem of ideology is reducible, for Sider, to the 
problem of ontology, while for Lewis it is not. 
462 For further discussion see Oliver 1996. 
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III 
 
(2) The second reason Lewis’s theory was selected as a test case for Modal 
Reductionism was that it is commonly regarded as the best candidate reductionist 
theory of modality available. This is taken to be due, in part, to the strengths of 
Lewis’s theory, and also in part due to the limited availability of plausible alternative 
reductive theories. Some think that Lewis’s is the only genuinely reductive theory on 
the market. Sider, for instance, writes that 
 
Lewis’s analysis of modality is compelling and comprehensive…Hard as they 
are to accept, only Lewisian possible worlds allow a non-circular analysis of 
possibility and necessity; that is their great advantage…463 
 
If you take Lewis’s theory to be the only plausible candidate reductive theories of 
modality, then the connection between the results of the test case and Modal 
Reductionism couldn’t be clearer. The results suggest that Lewis’s theory is 
unpromising, and if it is the only plausible modal reductionist theory then Modal 
Reductionism is itself unpromising. If, however there are other plausible candidates, 
which I believe to be the correct view, then this conclusion cannot be drawn. How 
dim the outlook is for Modal Reductionism will then depend on the quality of the 
rivals to Lewis’s theory and their similarity to it. The more other plausible reductive 
theories of high quality you take there to be, and the less similar they are to Lewis’s 
theory – and so less sensitive to the kind of problems his has – then the less serious 
will problems for Lewis’s theory be to your verdicts on the prospects for Modal 
Reductionism.  
 
Relatedly, a further reason for those who take Lewis’s theory to be the best candidate 
reductive theory to be less than optimistic about Modal Reductionism, is that 
Lewis’s theory shares a common structure with a number of other reductionist 
theories of modality, and there is some reason to suggest that it is in virtue of this 
structure that Lewis’s theory suffers the problems it does. If this is so, then this may 
give us reason to treat other similar theories of modality with caution. I expand on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
463 Sider 2003, 193, my italics. 
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this point below, and generalise from the results of the test case to other theories of 
modality. 
 
IV  
 
(3) The third reason I selected Lewis’s theory as a test case for Modal Reductionism 
is because I take it to be representative of reductive quantificationist theories of 
modality. Reductive quantificationist theories such as Lewis’s share a structure, and 
it is in virtue of sharing this structure that Lewis’s theory can represent aspects of 
these other theories (see §1.1). I now say a little more about what I mean by 
Reductive Quantificationism and then suggest that conclusions (i), (ii) and (iii) can 
be generalised to certain theories which are structurally similar to Lewis’s. I also 
clarify exactly how far such generalisations go, by attending to which specific 
elements of the structure of Lewis’s theory allow for which specific generalisations 
to which specific theories of modality. By suggesting that theories similar to Lewis’s 
suffer some of the same problems as his, a cumulative case against Modal 
Reductionism is built. 
 
Lewis postulates the existence of worlds, and reductively analyses modality as 
quantification over them. His theory of modality has the following structure: 
 
 (a) a range of entities are postulated,464  
(b) modal notions are to be reductively treated in terms of quantification over 
these entities.   
 
The class of reductive quantificationist theories can be understood as those theories 
which share this structure.465 It is important to highlight the structure of these 
theories because I suggest that the central problems with Lewis’s theory of modality 
are not due to his non-standard ontology of concrete worlds, but are due to structural 
features of his theory and so potentially applicable to other similar theories. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 These entities needn’t be complete or fully determinate possibilities, and so needn’t be possible worlds which 
I take to be complete (see fn. 19 above). Below I deal with standard theories which take possibilities to be 
possible worlds and leave aside views according to which possibilities may be incomplete. 
465 It is important to emphasise that I include in this class those theories which aspire to reduce modality; 
whether any of them succeed is open to question, a question this thesis has, I hope, contributed towards 
answering. 
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Reductive quantificationist theories agree to the following schematic 
quantificationist analysis of modality: possibly p iff for some possible world w, at w, 
p; necessarily p iff for every possible world w, at w, p.466 They differ principally over 
what kinds of objects possible worlds are identified as, and how precisely modality 
is to be reductively analysed in terms of them. We can divide them into four broad 
types, according to what kinds of entities they take possible worlds to be: 
Concretism, Representationism, Abstractionism and Combinatorialism.467 I now 
briefly outline these theories, before discussing how conclusions (i)-(iii) of the case 
study can be generalised.  
 
First, Concretism. Lewis’s theory of modality is perhaps the only concretist theory 
available, and we are by now familiar with it. Suffice it to say that concretists treat 
possible worlds as maximal concrete objects of some kind, and modality as 
quantification over them. 
 
Second, Representationism. Representationists take possible worlds to be complete 
representations of some kind. A representation is a content, and contents are often 
thought to be abstract objects, which is perhaps one reason why Representationism 
and Abstractionism are often assimilated. But contents are not necessarily abstract, 
and Representationism is not essentially tied to a view of contents as abstract. 
Representations may turn out to be reducible to concrete objects without harm to the 
doctrine.468 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 For simplicity, I focus here and below on de dicto modality. 
467 It may well be that Lewis’s theory and his ersatz rivals should be seen as variations on a single theory, and so 
as closer to each other than even Lewis thought. See Lewis 1986, viii. Also Dunaway 2013, 153.  
468 The traditional ontological categories with which representations are identified are propositions or sentence 
types. This gives rise to two views about possible worlds, both of which treat possible worlds as set-theoretic 
constructions. Robert Adams takes the first view, and treats possible worlds as maximal consistent sets of 
propositions, where a set S of propositions is maximal iff for any p, S decides where p or ¬p. He aims to “reduce 
talk about possible worlds to talk about sets of propositions” (Adams 1974, 225; for a similar view see 
Williamson 2002, 238). Adams accepts that modal discourse is to be analysed in terms of quantification over 
possible worlds; his identification of possible worlds as sets of propositions is a metaphysical view of what the 
objects quantified over really are. On his view, to say ‘p is possible’ is roughly to say that there is a maximal 
consistent set of propositions which includes p; to say ‘p is necessary’ is roughly to say that every maximal 
consistent set of propositions includes p. In this way, modal talk is treated as talk about sets of propositions. 
Lewis’s ‘linguistic ersatzist’ – whose ideas, according to Lewis, have connections to “Jeffrey, Carnap, Skyrms, 
and (at one point) Quine” (Lewis 1986, 141-42) – takes the second view and treats possible worlds as maximal 
consistent sets of sentences. The linguistic ersatzist aims to reduce talk about possible worlds to talk about sets of 
sentences. Identifying possible worlds with sets of sentences allows the linguistic ersatzist to treat modal claims 
as quantifications over possible worlds, but without introducing commitment to new or controversial entities 
(ibid., 143). On this view, to say ‘p is possible’ is roughly to say there is a maximal consistent set of sentences 
which include a sentence s (or some set of sentences A) which (together) express that p; to say ‘p is necessary’ is 
roughly to say every maximal consistent set of sentences includes a sentence s (or some set of sentences A) 
which (together) express that p. So modal talk is treated as talk about sets of sentences. It turns out that both of 
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The third kind of reductive quantificationist theory is Abstractionism. Abstractionists 
say possible worlds are complete abstract objects. So some but not all abstractionists 
are representationists. Kripke is the most prominent non-representationist 
abstractionist. He writes:  
 
‘Possible worlds’ are total ‘ways the world might have been’, or states or 
histories of the entire world.469 
 
And discussing his famous dice-model of possible worlds, he writes, distinguishing 
his view from the concretists and representationists that  
 
when we talk in school of thirty-six possibilities, in no way do we need to posit 
that there are some thirty-five other entities, existent in some never-never land, 
corresponding to the physical object before me. Nor need we ask whether these 
phantom entities are composed of (phantom) ‘counterparts’ of the actual 
individual dice, or are somehow composed of the same individual dice 
themselves but in ‘another dimension’. The thirty-six possibilities, the one that 
is actual included, are (abstract) states of the dice, not complex physical 
entities.470 
 
What ‘ways the world might have been’ or ‘abstract states’ of things are, is harder to 
pin down in Kripke’s work, but one common non-representationist line of thinking 
treats them as complete properties of the world.471  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the above representationist theories are generally thought to fail as reductive theories of modality. This is 
primarily due to the difficulty of simultaneously ensuring (a) that every ordinary modal claim can be accounted 
for, and (b) defining ‘consistency’ non-modally. The more complete the theory is, the harder it becomes to define 
‘consistency’ without bringing in modal notions. Having said that, the apparent failure of these theories doesn’t 
mean that a reductive representationist theory is impossible. 
469 Kripke 1980, 18. 
470 Ibid. 
471 But his work has inspired others – notably Plantinga and Stalnaker – who aim to clearer about what these 
abstract states are. They select properties to be the traditional ontological category which these states are. 
Specifically, properties of the world. It is noteworthy that abstractionists have not been successful in reducing 
modality. Both Plantinga and Stalnaker, the main exponents of Abstractionism, define abstract states in modal 
terms. Plantinga holds that a possible world is a possible state of affairs. He explains how this is so as follows: 
one state of affairs S includes another S’ iff it is not possible for S to obtain and S’ not to obtain. A state of affairs 
S is maximal iff for every state of affairs S’, S includes S’ or S precludes S’. A possible world is defined as a 
maximal possible state of affairs (Plantinga 1978, 44-45). For Stalnaker, a possible world is a compete way the 
world might be, which Stalnaker takes to be a property, and properties he takes to be “understood in terms of 
what it would be for them to be exemplified” (Stalnaker 2012, 8-11). But while these theories haven’t succeeded 
in reducing modality, nothing appears to rule out the possibility of an abstractionist theory which does. 
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The fourth kind of reductive quantificationist theory is Combinatorialism. 
Combinatorialists treat possible worlds as complete combinations of simple objects 
according to combinatorial principles. Modal discourse, on this view, is to be 
analysed as quantification over combinations of these entities, where no modal 
notions are allowed to come into specifying either the simple objects or the 
combinatorial principles. A combinatorialist theory must answer two questions: (a) 
what are the simple objects which together constitute possibilities? And (b) what is 
the combinatorial principle that binds them? Different versions of Combinatorialism 
may be identified by different answers to these questions. The simple objects may, 
for instance, be conceived of as concrete objects – e.g., occupied space-time points – 
or simple representations472 – e.g., atomic sentences or propositions – or simple 
abstract objects473 – e.g., unstructured or atomic properties. These examples illustrate 
that combinatorialism may intersect with any of the above three theories about what 
the stuff of possibility is.474 
 
V  
 
The first conclusion about Lewis’s theory – (i) – states that it requires modal notions 
in order to express the plenitude of concrete worlds, and so fails the reduction 
condition. This point may be generalised to all four of the reductive quantificationist 
theories. 
 
A theory of modality which treats possibilities as entities and modal notions as 
quantifiers over them, should postulate enough of these entities to account for every 
possibility. This postulation is needed in order to provide a reason to believe that the 
theory can do the job it is designed for. Such a principle must say not merely that 
every entity which the theory identifies possibilities with exists, but that every such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472 A representationist Combinatorialism can be found in Quine (1968). For Quine, possible worlds (or, as he 
puts it, possible world states) are combinations of real numbers that represent fundamental physical reality, 
which is taken, provisionally, to be matter occupying points in space-time. 
473 An abstractionist Combinatorialism can be found in Max Cresswell’s theory (1979, esp. 135-56), according to 
which possible worlds are combinations of “basic particular situations” which are to be thought of rather like the 
atomic facts of the logical atomists in that a basic particular situation is something which may or may not be 
present without affecting any other basic particular situation. 
474Armstrong perhaps straddles the concretist and abstractionist camps, holding that “The simple individuals, 
properties, and relations may be combined in all ways to yield possible [simple] atomic states of affairs, provided 
only that the form of atomic facts is respected” (1986, 579). Compare to Skyrms 1981. 
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entity which could exist does exist. However, it is hard to see how any such theory 
can provide a principle of plenitude which doesn’t bring in modal notions. 
 
I argued at length that Lewis’s concretism must ultimately resort to hidden modality 
in its principle of plenitude. Representationists and abstractionists don’t seem able to 
do any better. For instance, a linguistic ersatzist must find a way to say that for any 
possibility, there is a possible world which includes it. This means, for any way the 
world could be, there is a consistent set of sentences which represents it. But given 
the notion of consistency is irreducibly modal, this approach will not work. An 
abstractionist might have a principle of plenitude which states that any way the 
world could be A, there is a maximal state of affairs or property B which includes it. 
But this seems to mean that it is not possible for B to obtain and A to not obtain, 
which of course brings in modality again. 
 
Combinatorial theories appear to fare better. Once the simple objects and principle/s 
of combination are given, a general view about the range of possible worlds 
emerges. In order for a combinatorial theory to state the abundance of possible 
worlds, there must exist sufficient simple objects whose combinations constitute 
them. And herein lies the problem. Combinatorialism, it is hoped, can be used to 
state that every possible world exists, without using modal notions. But how is it to 
state that every possible simple object – of the relevant kinds which build possible 
worlds – exists, without using modal notions? Without an account of the abundance 
of simple objects which constitute possible worlds, we won’t have explained the 
abundance of the possible worlds. To illustrate this, consider the situation in which 
there exists a possible world w constituted in part by a possible object o. If our 
theory fails to first postulate o, then it cannot postulate w, and so it will fail to 
postulate every possible world. In general, because on this view, possible worlds are 
constituted by combinations of possible objects, the failure to postulate every 
possible object will ensure the failure to postulate every possible world. How then 
can we ensure that a combinatorial theory postulates every possible object? 
Possibilities, on this approach, are composite objects, and it is this compositeness 
which combinatorialism exploits to both define possibilities and specify their range. 
Simple objects, however, are by nature non-composite, and so we cannot appeal to a 
further combinatorial principle to explain their abundant existence (and in any case, 
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such appeals must end somewhere). But it seems that the only other way to go is to 
use modal notions to say that every possible object exists – and this, of course, 
undermines the whole point of Combinatorialism as a way to implement Reductive 
Quantificationism.  
 
It appears then that we can trace the source of conclusion (i) to a structural problem 
that Lewis shares with other reductive quantificationist theories. They all need to 
say, in general terms, which possible worlds exist, but they cannot use the modal 
notions that saying so appears to require. It seems that once a theory defines 
modality in terms of the existence of a range of objects, saying that an abundance of 
those objects exists must bring in modal notions. This feature of such theories 
appears to undermine their claim to be reductive. This generalisation doesn’t apply 
to all modal reductionist theories, because not all of them share the structure of 
reductive quantificationism that seems to permit it. There are reductive theories of 
modality which do not define modality in terms of a range of objects, and so these 
theories do not have to postulate a plenitude of possible worlds, and so do not suffer 
from problems associated with doing so in a reductive framework (see §6.2 for a 
brief discussion). 
 
VI 
 
I now suggest that conclusion (ii) generalises to Combinatorialism of any form. The 
second conclusion stated that Lewis’s theory does poorly on the criteria of material 
adequacy. Combinatorialism yields a Humean picture of what is possible, in that it 
denies the existence of necessary connections between distinct objects. According to 
combinatorialism, every modal fact emerges from non-modal principles applying to 
non-modal simple objects. So there are no brute non-combinatorial modal facts 
written into the combinatorialist framework (for instance, in the specification of the 
principle or the simple objects). Given the objects are simple and without parts, 
nothing ‘inner’ to the objects prevent any object co-existing with any other; given 
the combinatorial principle is non-modal, there is no ‘outer’ modal force preventing 
or compelling the combination of simple objects, such as metaphysical laws or 
relations. Given there are no other brute modal facts, nothing prevents any object 
existing (or not existing) with any other. Indeed, the whole point of the 
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combinatorialist appeal to simple objects is that because of their simplicity they 
cannot conflict with or require one another. Out of this, a logical picture of modality 
emerges, according to which the only combinations which are strictly prohibited are 
logically impossible, and the only combinations which are necessary are logically 
necessary. 
 
There are two problems with this Humean picture. First, it is arguable that an 
account of what possibilities are should be neutral with respect to substantial 
questions of what is and is not possible. Combinatorialism is not neutral, and brings 
with it substantial and controversial views about what is and is not possible. The 
related second problem is that by making these Humean commitments to what is and 
isn’t possible, reductive combinatorial theories appear to be materially inadequate. 
For (a) a range of ordinary modal beliefs are undermined, because there is an over-
generation of possibilities with respect to them. We ordinarily take there to be at 
least some necessities other than logical necessities; the ‘broadly logical’ or 
‘metaphysical necessities’. Yet for any such putative necessity, there is a weaker 
logical possibility in which it fails to hold. The Humean view cannot account for our 
beliefs in such modal claims, and must deny them. (b) The theory forces 
commitment to a range of modal beliefs about which we are as yet undecided, some 
of which are philosophically controversial. Take for instance the possibility of 
nothing. I take there to be no consensus about this possibility, yet the 
combinatorialist must deny it. Lewis and Armstrong are the two most prominent 
combinatorialists, and both agree on this question. About this Lewis writes (without 
labelling his own theory ‘combinatorialist’): 
 
I find it pleasing that another view, the one I like second best after my own, 
also seems to make it come out necessary that there is something rather than 
nothing. This is the ‘combinatorial’ view: in place of other worlds, we have 
constructions in which the elements of this world – elementary particulars and 
universals, perhaps – are put together in different combinations…But as D. M. 
Armstrong has noted in discussion, there is no way to combine elements and 
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make nothing at all. So there is no combinatorial possibility that there might be 
nothing.475 
 
The combinatorialist understands possible worlds to be combinations of simple 
objects and every possibility to belong to some possible world. So wherever there is 
a possibility, there is a something, and no something can be identical to the 
possibility of nothing. Thus combinatorialism seems to takes the possibility of 
nothing to be contradictory, and so logically impossible. This means no 
combinatorialist can adequately account for the possibility of nothing, and so must 
deny it. Yet we may feel that a theory of possibility ought to be neutral on such 
meaty philosophical doctrines.476 It seems to make little difference if we take the 
simple objects possible worlds are built from to be abstract objects or representations 
– to the extent to which such views could be coherent and reductive, the same 
Humean conception of possibility would appear to result, and the same kind of 
problems for material adequacy would follow. 
 
VII 
 
I now suggest that conclusion (iii) may generalise to any quantificationist theory of 
modality, including reductive quantificationist theories.477 The third conclusion was 
that Lewis’s theory does not faithfully capture the conceptual content of modal 
discourse. We would do well not attributing this to idiosyncratic features of Lewis’s 
model of modal reality, such as the concreteness of his worlds, but rather find fault 
with his theory’s structure, in particular its quantificationist core. The reason for this 
is twofold.  
 
(1) We appear not to understand modality via quantification over possible worlds. 
Treating our understanding of modality as quantification over possible worlds both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
475 Lewis 1986, 74 fn. 53. 
476 It is interesting in this respect that that the combinatorialist does appear to require, seemingly contrary to its 
motivation, some brute necessities. It is as if the theory displaces the necessity in necessary connections between 
things, to the necessity of certain things which form the explanatory framework of modality, such as, e.g., worlds 
or propositions. 
477 In virtue of applying generally to quantificationist theories, the following generalisation thereby applies to 
reductive quantificationist theories. The generalisation does not apply to non-quantificationist reductive theories 
of modality. 
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attributes to us understanding of claims we intuitively do not understand and appears 
to fail to attribute to us understanding of claims we intuitively do understand. This is 
most clearly seen through problems of embedding modal propositions in various 
contexts. Take for instance, the explanatory context of the ‘Euthyphronic Dilemma’ 
– ‘is p necessary because it is true in every possible world, or is it true in every 
possible world because it is necessary?’ This question is trivialised by Lewis’s 
theory and any other quantificationist theory. Consider, for example, the theory that 
possible worlds are consistent sets of propositions. The dilemma is then equivalent 
to: ‘is p true at every consistent set of propositions because it is true at every 
consistent set of propositions, or is p true at every consistent set of propositions 
because it is true at every consistent set of propositions?’ By trivialising such 
obviously sensible questions, Quantificationism displays its inability to makes sense 
of our modal thoughts, and this suggests that our understanding of modal notions is 
independent of our understanding of quantification over possible worlds. This casts 
doubt on the idea that understanding a modal claim just is understanding an 
associated quantificational claim. 
 
Another example which illustrates this problem is Kripke’s Humphrey Objection. It 
is, in my view, the point of the Humphrey Objection to bring out the fact that 
Lewis’s analysis gets wrong our understanding of expectations, hopes, concerns etc., 
about that which might or must be. I believe the point can be extended to any 
quantificationist theory – such theories appear to fail to make sense of such 
propositional attitudes which take modal propositions as objects. Take for instance 
the possibility that the earth warms and the seas rise. We care about whether this 
might happen, but if our understanding of the possibility, as per the quantificationist, 
runs via the proposition asserting the existence of a possible world at which the earth 
warms and the seas rise, it seems our worry concerns the existence of that possible 
world. Perhaps, rationally, we should worry about the existence that possible world. 
But given that we don’t worry about the existence of that possible world, we can use 
this fact as evidence for the view that our understanding of modality does not go via 
our understanding of the possible world analysis. 
 
Not only do our modal intuitions fail to validate the quantificationist view of our 
understanding of modality, but the quantificationist view fails to make sense of our 
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practices. For if such a theory cannot, for instance, make sense of why someone 
might be worried about the possibility of the earth warming and seas rising, it seems 
unable to help in rationalising actions that are based upon it. According to 
quantificationist theories, the worry is to be understood as the worry that there is a 
possible world in which the earth in fact warms and the seas in fact rise. But this 
view fails to make sense of why we have the worry we do. Why would the existence 
of a possible world – a combination of simple objects, a representation, an abstract 
state of the world or a concrete world – at which the sea rises give me a reason to 
worry that the actual seas could rise? If there is no plausible account of this, then it 
seems there is little hope in rationalising actions based on the worry  
 
Connectedly, (2) the quantificationist requires that our modal discourse is 
ontologically committed to a range of possibilities, but we don’t take ourselves to be 
saying anything that is so committed. We ordinarily do not take ourselves to be 
quantifying over possibilities when we say that something is possibly so. But if a 
discourse is uncommitting it is not quantificational. Of course it may be that we are 
wrong about what we say, and that what we really say is not what we think we say. 
But before we are committed to a particular theory of modality, the evidence from 
what we take ourselves to say is to be taken seriously, and counts against a theory 
which denies it. If a theory is to deny it then it bears the cost that a range of our 
beliefs about what we believe and what we mean are wrong. Given the revision such 
a theory must make to our beliefs about what we say, it is questionable that such a 
theory is merely giving a conceptual analysis of what is said. It may well be that 
models can be provided for modal discourse which allow modal claims to be 
‘translated’ in quantificationist terms. But the reason the conceptual adequacy 
condition was introduced reflected the idea that we want more from a conceptual 
analysis of modality than a model – we want an analysis of what it is we say and 
think modally. As such, our intuitions about what we mean seem to be massively 
important evidence for or against a conceptual analysis and cannot easily, if at all, be 
brushed aside. Indeed it is hard to think of how else we can decide what it is that we 
mean than by consulting our intuitions.  
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VIII 
 
In summary of the main points above, I suggested three routes to make trouble for 
Modal Reductionism on the basis of the test case. The first was based on the 
influence Lewis’s theory wields, the second based on its high regard, and the third 
based on its structural similarity to other theories.  
 
 I suggested conclusion-specific generalisations from Lewis’s theory to specific 
other theories. Conclusion (i) is, I argued, generalisable to other reductive 
quantificationist theories of modality, conclusion (ii) to other combinatorial theories 
of modality, conclusion (iii) to other quantificationist theories of modality, and 
conclusion (iv) to theories which are justified in terms of reducing primitive 
ideology in the manner of Lewis. 
 
Together, the conclusions suggest a tentative cumulative case building against 
reductive quantificationist theories of modality. Given that Reductive 
Quantificationism is an important way to implement Modal Reductionism, these 
results appear to show there are problems for Modal Reductionism. However, given 
that there are reductive theories which escape the reach of my generalisations, more 
research needs to be done to strengthen this conclusion. 
 
6.2 Modal Primitivism 
 
I 
 
I have made the case for the view that Lewis’s reductive theory of modality has 
several problems which appear to generalise to a range of similar theories. This 
provides some reason to be sceptical of the reductive approach to modality. I want to 
stress however, before outlining what I take to be the more promising approach of 
Modal Primitivism, that there are reductive theories of modality that my critique of 
Lewis’s theory and those similar to it hasn’t touched, and they remain serious 
candidate theories. 
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The two central views reduce modality to either knowledge or meaning, and so treat 
modality as a notion belonging to epistemology or semantics. The first doctrine arose 
in the rationalist tradition – in the form: modality is apriority – and was the pre-
Kripkean orthodoxy. The second doctrine arose in the empiricist tradition – in the 
form: modality is analyticity – and was influential particularly in the first half of the 
last century. Both doctrines currently have prominent supporters. Hossack, for 
instance, supports the first view and treats necessity as apriority. He supports the 
analysis of modality in terms of the conditional and negation: a proposition is 
necessary if a contradiction would be true were it false. He then analyses the 
conditional in terms of a priori inferriblity: a true conditional is one whose 
consequent is inferrible a priori from the antecedent and ‘relevant conditions’, where 
these are understood in terms of “relative closeness of propositions to actuality”.478 
Alan Sidelle is a supporter of the second view. He divides the content of modal 
claims into non-modal synthetic truths and trivial analytic truths, and takes the 
source of necessity to be located in the analytic truths, which he treats as true in 
virtue of linguistic conventions. So for Sidelle “all necessity is grounded in our 
conventions”.479  
 
It is because these reductions don’t see modality as an ontological notion that they 
don’t appear to be vulnerable to the problems that affect Lewis’s and similar 
theories. Given that modality is not defined in terms of objects, no criticism along 
the lines of ‘modality is required to postulate enough objects’ applies. For the same 
reason, the criticism along the lines of ‘modal notions are not ontologically 
committing, whereas the quantifier is ontologically committing’ doesn’t apply to 
them. Nor does the criticism along the lines of ‘the reduction is justified in terms of 
an exchange of entities for ideology,’ for there are no new entities postulated, and so 
such justification is inapplicable to such theories. Neither theory seems immediately 
vulnerable to the objections laid out this thesis, and both are worthy of serious 
attention. Having said that, I believe that the results of this thesis also motivate 
taking non-reductive theories of modality more seriously. As Modal Primitivism is 
the only serious alternative to Modal Reductionism, it is to this approach I now turn.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478 Hossack, forthcoming. 
479 Sidelle 1989, xi. 
203	  
II  
 
Modal Primitivism is often not taken seriously. This attitude is best exemplified by 
Lewis’s view that treating modality as primitive is “not an alternative theory at all, 
but an abstinence from theorising”.480 This view is, I believe, incorrect; it 
presupposes that the only possible analysis of a notion is a reductive analysis, and I 
see no reason to believe that. Modal Primitivism is the view that, contra Modal 
Reductionism, modal notions should be recognised as irreducible. 
 
One reason given not to be a modal primitivist is based on the Lewisian views that 
modal primitives should be avoided at all costs – even at the cost of introducing 
entities no one (yet) believes in – and that a theory of modality is always better 
without them. But if the problems with these views outlined in Chapter 5 are correct, 
then a major obstacle to taking Modal Primitivism seriously is removed, and it 
emerges as a viable approach to modality.481 A second reason given not to be a 
modal primitivist is the thought that a reductive alternative is, or will, be available. If 
the problems with Modal Reductionism developed in this thesis are correct, then all 
the more should we take Modal Primitivism – the only real alternative to Modal 
Reductionism – seriously. 
 
There are a number of different versions of Modal Primitivism, and some of them 
appear to escape some problems which dog Lewis’s and similar theories. To see this, 
I distinguish between two very general forms of Modal Primitivism: Metaphysical 
Primitivism and Semantic Primitivism. Metaphysical Primitivism is the view that 
irreducible modal notions are required to explain the source of modal truth, while 
Semantic Primitivism is the view that irreducible modal notions are required to make 
sense of the meaning of our modal claims.482 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
480 Lewis 1973, 85. 
481 It is worth noting that Modal Primitivism isn’t tied to a particular conception of what justifies it. A modal 
primitivist may, for instance, adopt the same cost-benefit view of justifying theories as Lewis, but believe that 
taking modality as primitive is the most effective way of keeping down the total number of types of primitive 
notions our theory of the world requires. 
482 Metaphysical and Semantic Primitivisms are not mutually exclusive. Nothing prevents a modal primitivist 
theory giving a unified account of the source and meaning of modality, just as Lewis himself tried to do. There is 
however no reason for a modal primitivist to think that a single theory will answer both questions at once. On 
this see Menzel 1990, 384-85. 
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III 
 
I argued in the previous section that one of the problems that dogged Lewis’s and 
similar theories is that they must ultimately make appeal to irreducible modal 
notions in giving an account of the range of possible worlds. One of the virtues of 
Metaphysical Primitivism is that it embraces the use of irreducible modality in the 
characterisation of logical space. This means that Metaphysical Primitivism is 
liberated from two orthodox reductionist views. The first is that modal truth is 
ultimately explained in terms of non-modal entities. Metaphysical Primitivism 
makes room for a range of other plausible candidate answers. For instance, the view 
that there are some brute irreducibly modal facts. On this view, modal truths are not 
explained in terms of irreducibly modal objects, but in terms of irreducibly modal 
facts. Another answer that Metaphysical Primitivism makes room for is the view that 
modal truth is explained in terms of irreducibly modal objects.483 I take Hale’s 
theory of the source of modality to be a form of Metaphysical Primitivism. He takes 
the source of modal truth to lie in the essence of things, and takes the notion of 
essence to be an irreducibly modal notion. 484 So on this view, this explanation of 
modal truth in terms of essence is not a reduction. One of the advantages of 
Metaphysical Primitivism as compared to Lewis’s reductive theory is that by 
appealing to facts or objects characterised in essentially modal terms, modal truth 
appears to be explicable in terms of what actually exists, and so is compatible with 
the view that the actual world and the objects therein are everything that exists. 
Lewis’s Modal Realism, by contrast, denies that the actual world is all there is. We 
might think of this commitment to other worlds as the natural outcome of both 
denying the ontological richness of the actual world (which may include objects or 
facts defined in irreducibly modal terms) whilst wanting to honour the facts of 
modality. 
 
The second orthodox reductionist view Metaphysical Primitivism appears to liberate 
us from is that the entities in terms of which modality is defined are fully 
determinate possible worlds. The orthodox view is that incomplete possibilities are 
to be understood only in terms of fully determinate possibilities which are identified 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
483 For a discussion of some recent proposals along these lines see Vetter 2011. 
484 Hale 2013, 63 fn.1. 
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with an object which possesses a clear criterion of identity, such as a fusion or set, 
which can be specified without modal notions. By making appeal to irreducible 
modal notions legitimate, the metaphysical primitivist makes room for thinking of 
possibilities as incomplete and not essentially tied to entities which are fully 
determinate. So, for instance, we may think of possibilities as ways things could be, 
without thinking of those ways as answering every question as to how the rest of the 
world might be. 
 
Turning now to Semantic Primitivism, one of the problems that dogged Lewis’s 
theory was its difficulty making sense of our modal thoughts in anything like the 
way in which we make sense of them. In short, its interpretation of modality is 
alienating: we don’t think we say what it says we say. I am not of course suggesting 
that we are able to say precisely what our modal claims are about; if we could, we 
would have no need to theorise. Rather (a) we have intuitions about what our modal 
thoughts are not about, such as that they clearly seem not to be about worlds and 
entities therein,485 and (b) our explanations of our modal thoughts typically involve 
other modal thoughts. For instance, we might explain the necessity of a proposition 
p in terms of the counterfactual: p would remain true whatever else were the case. I 
take an advantage of Semantic Primitivism to be that it allows for the development 
of accounts of the content of our modal thought or discourse in the very modal terms 
which we ordinarily think or express them. That is, in terms which respect rather 
than alienate us from the modal thoughts we aim to give an account of. It can do so 
because it provides us unashamed access to the modal vocabulary and modal 
distinctions in terms of which we ordinarily think and express our thoughts. Further, 
Modal Primitivism provides for the move from possible worlds to incomplete 
possibilities at the semantic level as well as at the metaphysical level. And indeed, 
incomplete possibilities seem much closer to what our ordinary modal thought is 
about than possible worlds. It seems then that Modal Primitivism provides a 
promising approach to accounting for the place of modality in our thoughts, such 
that we can recognise those thoughts as our own. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
485 This Moorean view need not imply that we have a complete reflective understanding of the contents of our 
thoughts. We may, for instance, be able to determine when a report of what we say or think goes wrong, even if 
we cannot say precisely what its content is.    
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As I noted at the beginning of this thesis, Ramsey said that 
 
Philosophy must be of some use and we must take it seriously; it must clear 
our thoughts and so our actions….486 
 
Our thoughts may be cleared by being cleared away or they may be cleared by it 
being made clear what our thoughts are. I have investigated Lewis’s theory in which 
I hope to have highlighted the productive tension between these two ways of clearing 
our thoughts. There are significant dangers in clearing away our thoughts, and 
‘improving’ them, and so ‘improving’ our actions too. ‘Improvement’ tends to have 
its own metric and its own logic, and without serious reflection on its purpose and 
ethics, we run the risk of ‘improving’ our philosophy and our actions, but losing a 
grip on the content of our thoughts, and so of ourselves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
486 Ramsey 1990, 1. 
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